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Abstract 
This work is about the mental representations that underlie memory for the complex 
compositions of people, places, things, and events that comprise everyday mnemonic 
experience, the mechanisms that bind, encode, and reconstruct these representations, and the 
mathematical frameworks that describe these mechanisms.  It approaches this topic with a 
combination of computation modeling, human neuropsychological empirical research, and 
scholarly theory building.  The critical components are 1) a model and discussion of memory 
consolidation, 2) reconstructive memory experiments, both in patients with damage to the 
hippocampus and in college-aged participants, 3) a pair of computational models of relational 
memory binding, encoding, and reconstruction. These experiments all touch on a larger debate 
about memory representations that dates back at least to Bartlett (1932), and touches on 
questions such as: “What different types of memories are there?” “Are these memories more 
akin to reconstructions or recordings?” “How does time and experience change these 
representations” and “What are the mechanisms and brain structures responsible for encoding, 
updating, and reconstructing these representations?”   
Part 1: Memory Consolidation 
The first critical component gives an overview of memory consolidation research and 
argues that the literature has two divergent definitions for memory consolidation: a narrow 
definition focused solely on how memories are protected from amnestic insult, and a broader 
definition that considers all kinds of representational change over time as examples of memory 
consolidation.  Two consolidation models, one aimed at each of these definitions are presented.  
The first model explains the narrow definition of memory consolidation for memories of any 
type (episodic, semantic, procedural etc.) and of any scale (molecular, synaptic, or systems-
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level) by demonstrating that in any system that has 1) multiple loci for storing information, and 
2) mechanisms that transfer or copy information between these loci, information will tend to 
move from local to global representations.  This means that any amnestic disruption, whether it 
attacks molecular pathways (e.g., neurotransmitters, protein synthesis), individual neurons or 
synapses, entire brain structures, or even networks of structures, will become less effective with 
time as the information it seeks to disrupt becomes more globally represented.  Since the notion 
of multiple interacting memory systems in the brain is well established, and the model can be 
tuned with very minimal parameters to fit any arbitrary retrograde amnesia gradient there is no 
need to explain memory consolidation-as-protection-from-disruption with reference to any 
specific brain process, as it is an obligatory result of simply possessing a brain with multiple, 
interacting components.  The second, broader, consolidation definition however, requires a 
broader explanation that varies depending upon the type of memory representation in 
question.  The second model presents an example of memory change over time based on 
previous explorations of memory consolidation and interference in the hippocampus and 
necortex (McCloskey & Cohen 1989, McClelland, McNaughton & O’Reilly 1995, Ans et al. 2002).  
Unlike some of these previous works, it concludes that because the neocortical system is only 
learning the statistical structure of its inputs, hippocampal interleaved learning can only prevent 
interference in the neocortex to the degree that it creates artificial structure via temporal 
ordering and repetitive exposure.  In a modeling context, it is of course always possible to tune 
the degree of ordering and repetition to match the observed result, but this does not seem very 
informative as to the real mechanism involved.  The hippocampus cannot know what the 
neocortex “ought” to remember a priori, before the neocortex attempts to recall the salient 
fact.  Thus the chapter concludes that the hippocampal memory mechanism must be more 
elegant than a simple copy-theory that exposes the neocortex to repeated instances of previous 
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experience, because such a system would still require a homunculus that decides precisely how 
often previous experiences should be repeated.  
Part 2: Reconstruction Experiments 
The second critical component is comprised of two empirical, cognitive psychology 
studies of hippocampal relational memory binding using novel reconstruction paradigms.  
Memory for complex, compositions of items and relations is most often measured using 
manipulated images or configurations of items (e.g., Ryan et al. 2000, Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen 
2006).  This allows the item information to remain constant, while the specific composition of 
items is manipulated.  Participants typically demonstrate memory in such experiments by 
detecting manipulations.  Yet while these experiments are effective at detecting disruptions to 
relational representations, they do not communicate what the change to the underlying 
representation is that causes it to diverge from the originally studied configuration.  To allow 
participants to report what their mental representation looks like requires a reconstructive 
memory paradigm (c.f. Bartlett 1932), the results of which are often difficult to quantify.  The 
second component presents two studies that attempt to find a middle ground between open-
ended reconstruction and controlled quantifiability in hopes of developing richer relational 
memory datasets.  The first of these experiments involved a simple spatial reconstruction 
paradigm.  Patients with hippocampal damage at the University of Iowa or age and education 
matched controls studied an array of 2-5 everyday objects placed at random locations on a 
1x1m table and then tried to reposition the objects in their studied locations after a brief (4s) 
eyes-closed delay.  Previous experiments measured performance in this task exclusively with an 
item misplacement measure (how many cm away from their studied locations items were 
placed at reconstruction c.f. Smith & Milner 1981), however we found that swapping the 
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locations of pairs of items was far more indicative of hippocampal damage, with patients making 
numerous errors of this type while controls made only a single such error in the entire course of 
testing.  Patients made swaps error even on two object arrays, and the prevalence of swapping 
could not be explained simply by poor performance on other metrics, though it contributed 
heavily to poor performance on all of the other metrics we examined.  These findings suggested 
that the primary deficit in patients with hippocampal damage in a spatial reconstruction task 
was an inability to correctly bind individual item identities to their relative locations, and not a 
more general failure of spatial or declarative memory.  The fact that these deficits are 
observable even at short lags traditionally associated with working memory and even with item 
sets as small as two additionally argues that hippocampal damage is not simply a disruption of 
transfer from working to long term memory.  Finally, while the rate of swapping increased as 
the number of items increased, it did not increase faster than the number of pairwise relations 
present in the stimuli, suggesting that this error is directly tied to the relations between 
elements.   
The second experiment of the second component was designed to more thoroughly 
explore these swap errors.  Building on the first spatial reconstruction experiment, this second 
experiment required college-aged participants to reconstruct a short movie composed of a set 
of six face-background pairings, placing each face and background in their studied location, and 
in the correct temporal sequence.  Unlike the previous experiment where participants could 
position objects at any location within a 1m square, thereby producing different kinds of spatial 
errors, this “event reconstruction” paradigm had a finite and clearly delineated number of slots 
for each element to be bound to, allowing only for swap errors, and making possible robust 
similarity analysis to determine how many adjustments to the participants’ reconstructed 
configuration would be required to convert the reconstruction to the originally studied 
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configuration. In examining participants reconstruction accuracy (that is, how many elements of 
their reconstructed configuration were correctly bound), our central finding was that 
performance was tightly linked to relational complexity (i.e., bindings between sets with large 
numbers of elements were more difficult than those between sets with small numbers of 
elements), and arbitrariness (i.e., patterns of binding that were consistent across trials produced 
better performance than inconsistent patterns), and that both of these effects were closely 
related to the degree to which participants’ performance could be predicted from their prior 
patterns of reconstructions (i.e., reconstruction “semantics”).   However, once these two factors 
were controlled for we did not find a strong effect of the type of binding (e.g., spatial-spatial, v. 
item-item).  Additionally, using similarity analysis we were able to demonstrate that while 
participants’ reconstructions were dramatically better than random performance, they were 
only slightly more similar to the studied configuration than they were to reconstructions created 
before the participant saw the studied configuration.  We were additionally able to demonstrate 
that the general “semantic” tendencies of the participant enabled them to encode 
approximately 12 bindings more than would be expected by chance, while the “episodic” 
information encoded on each trial amounted to approximately 3 additional bindings.  We also 
demonstrated that this additional information was not simply present in the accuracy of the 
initial configuration but that the “errors” participants made were non-random, and contained 
informational structure similar to that of the original studied configuration. This study 
highlighted the dynamic and synergistic way in which new and previously learned information 
interact to provide a useful set of constraints capable of (re)creating a complex configuration of 
items, locations, and times, and reaffirmed the importance of examining not just how memory 
drives correct performance, but also how memory contributes to non-random errors.  
Part 3: Computational Models of Hippocampal Function 
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The first of two computational models presented is the Memory and Reasoning (M&R) 
computational model produced in collaboration with investigators at Sandia National 
Laboratories.  This system was meant to simulate the processing of visual sensory streams and 
the hippocampus.  It was composed of two cortical components, both of which were composed 
of hierarchically arranged adaptive resonance theory (ART) networks that used an unsupervised 
learning algorithm to capture the statistical structure of complex visual inputs.  One of these 
components acted on high-resolution pictures of faces (meant to be analogous to objects in the 
fovea), while the other acted on low-resolution pictures of scenes (meant to be analogous to the 
lower resolution visual surround).  Given a face-scene pairing, the first component simulated the 
processing of the ventral stream, parsing the complex images into simple visual features, then 
higher-order structural features, and finally into objects corresponding to the individual faces.  
The second component simulated the processing of the dorsal visual stream, parsing its inputs 
into spatial features (e.g., “objects of any kind on the left”).  Both of these streams were 
equipped with “recall” capabilities, if a single unit corresponding to a particular input or input 
category was activated, the recurrent connections within the ART network that represented that 
category would produce the “prototypical” input that would elicit the activation of that 
category.  This input would in turn activate ART networks lower down in the hierarchy in the 
same fashion until the network would print out at the sensory camera (its “mind’s eye”) a visual 
configuration that corresponded to the originally activated component’s input category.  In this 
way the system could be a “pictures in/pictures out” searchable database for visual images.  
Augmenting this function was the hippocampal component that bound together information 
from both the “dorsal” and “ventral” components.  It did this by passing the high-level activation 
of both components into a high-dimensional space (meant to simulate the dentate gyrus) to 
obtain a unique “pattern separated” key corresponding to the particular input conjunction.  It 
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then washed this key through a heavily locally recurrent component (meant to simulate CA3) to 
fill in any gaps, and then mapped this output back to the two cortical components via a third 
hippocampal component (meant to simulate CA1). In this way faces could be “shown” to the 
model to elicit the “scene” they were studied with and vice versa, allowing the model to 
complete source memory style tasks.  By tuning the time at which CA1 performed its 
reactivation of the cortical components it was also possible to recover additional face-scene 
pairings that were studied in close together in time to the original cue, and even entire 
sequences of studied face-scene pairings.  This model was therefore able to recreate much of 
the performance, and even subjective experience, of relational memory tasks, but it lacked 
much of the flexibility of relational memory.  It could not create face-face bindings, or perform 
transitive inference, or create novel bindings.  In essence, the hippocampal component was 
performing the same type of category learning as the two cortical components, but it was 
learning highly specific, cross-domain categories.   
The limits of the M&R model motivated the final model of the document the relational 
memory binding, encoding, and reactivation (RMBER) model.  Produced in collaboration with 
the FRAMES team of the IARPA ICArUS project, this model was meant to perform flexible 
relational binding of complex compositions of stimuli.  Structurally, it closely resembled the 
M&R model, with a cortical-inspired input/output region (the entorhinal cortex, EC layers 2 and 
5 respectively), a dentate gyrus (DG) with a large number of units relative to its inputs, a highly 
recurrent CA3 region, and a CA1 region that performed mappings between CA3 and the EC.  
However, unlike the previous model the RMBER model used Mihalas-Niebur spiking neurons 
(Mihalas & Niebur 2009), to model the actual oscillatory dynamics of neurons.  These neurons 
used spike-timing dependent plasticity that tuned the strength of neural connections but also 
the degree to which neurons were coupled with inhibitory interneurons.  In this way, input 
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could modulate both the rate that a unit fires, and the delay at which it fires in response to the 
input.  In addition, all units in the model were subject to an extrinsically generated theta 
rhythm, and a locally generated gamma rhythm.  This allowed the model to do more than simply 
generate conjunctions corresponding to previous inputs. First, the model treats dynamics of the 
entire entorhinal cortex as a superposition of the activity of the entorhinal cortical units.  It 
maps these dynamics into the high dimensional space of the dentate gyrus where complex 
dynamics of the entorhinal cortex are decomposed across a large number of cells, resulting in 
dentate cells which respond only to particular sub-frequencies of the entorhinal dynamics, and 
only when presented at certain phase delays (relative to the beginning of a theta or gamma 
cycle).  These dentate dynamics are collapsed back into the CA3 region, that by summing across 
large numbers of dentate cells’ activity and by reconstructing their signals within its highly-
recurrent local network, recreates the superposition of single unit dynamics present in the EC2.  
These dynamics are mapped back to EC5 via CA1.  Processing within each sub-region requires 
one gamma cycle ensuring that the output from CA1 arrives back at EC5 at the beginning of the 
next theta cycle, thus providing the hippocampal network’s predicted dynamics for the next 
theta cycle.  This process shares much in common with the discrete Fourier transform, 
decomposing a complex signal into its phase and frequency subcomponents, discarding the 
higher order frequencies and recomposing the original dynamics from a compressed code 
relying upon the stored coefficients.  However, while the hippocampal model initially fills in gaps 
in the signal with Gaussian random noise, it learns to fill in gaps with previously observed phase 
and frequency sub-components.  Since these sub-components are derived from the observed 
activity in the EC they reflect real relationships present in the activity of EC neurons.  Since the 
model stores both phase and frequency of previous dynamics, it creates a truly compositional, 
concatenative code that reproduces the appropriate level of activity at the appropriate EC units 
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in the same order as previously observed.   Thus, unlike the rigid configural categories of the 
previous M&R model, the RMBER model can flexibly add and remove sub-components from the 
entorhinal dynamics while maintaining the correct relative order of activations.  We show that 
the model is capable of learning simple rules, and complex patterns of geometric relations such 
as path integration.  We generate a “virtual rat” and have it run in a virtual circular enclosure 
according to a random path, and then allow the hippocampal model to reconstruct this path 
from a partial cue.  We also demonstrate that the model develops many of the same cell types 
observed in single-cell recording studies (e.g., “place” and “time” cells).  This model provides a 
novel way of understanding the hippocampus’s relational binding function by relating its 
intrinsic dynamics to the discrete Fourier transform.   
Together, these papers outline the need for a specialized memory system devoted to 
binding compositions of independent elements, experimental evidence for the existence of such 
a system, and computational mechanisms by which such a system might act.   
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Abstract 
 
We present two models of memory consolidation.  The first explains why memories become 
more resistant to disruption over time: memory involves multiple, dynamic, interacting 
processors.  New information is initially represented in those processors best able to capture it, 
but learning and offline processing cause representations to become more distributed and 
global over time. Since amnestic disruptions target only a specific sub-set of these systems, and 
cannot “follow” the information as representations move from local-to-global, their 
effectiveness will decrease with time.  This simple “diffusion” model of consolidation can explain 
any retrograde amnesia gradient or consolidation time-course at any level of analysis (i.e., 
synaptic, systems-level).   
 
However, specific memory systems’ mechanisms produce changes other than durability.  We 
present a second consolidation model focused on a pair of complementary systems, the 
neocortex and the hippocampus (c.f.McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995).  We tested this 
model with different input corpora and training regimes.  We found that while the neocortical 
perceptron-based model was capable of learning associative rules and arbitrary pairings, its 
performance on arbitrary pairings was entirely due to the artificial, repetitive, rule-based 
structure introduced by the interleaved learning paradigm.  Further, performance on arbitrary 
pairings was far worse, required far more training, and was extremely vulnerable to 
interference.  We conclude that this is due to the nature of the neocortical models learning 
algorithm, it is well suited toward discovering the statistical structure of its inputs, but arbitrary 
pairings have no such structure to discover unless it is artificially imposed via interleaved 
learning. 
 
Introduction 
 
Memory consolidation has two competing definitions.  The first is over a century old: “a time 
and experience dependent process by which newly-acquired memories become stabilized so 
that they are relatively immune from disruption by behavioral interference and by amnestic 
agents such as lesions or drugs (c.f. Muller & Pilzecker, 1900; McGaugh, 1966; Lechner et al., 
1999; Nadel, Samsonovich, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000).”  The second is more recent: “Memory 
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consolidation is any change in a memory representation that takes place between encoding and 
recall,” (Squire, Cohen, & Nadel, 1984; Winocur, Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010; McKenzie & 
Eichenbaum, 2012).  There has been debate over which of these is the best framework for study 
(Nadel, Winocur, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2007), yet these definitions are entirely orthogonal, refer 
to different data sets, and make non-comparable predictions.   
 
The former definition is a description of a phenomenon: over time, memories become resistant 
to amnestic insult.  It describes the temporal gradient in retrograde amnesia, but does not 
explain it.  As an explanation, it would beg the question: “why do memories become more 
durable?” “There’s a process which makes them more durable.”  The second definition however 
is an explanation: 1) there are different types of memory 2) over time, memories change type, 
3) each amnestic intervention only disrupts one type of memory, thus 4) over time amnestic 
interventions become less effective.  This explanation concerns itself with transforms between 
different types of memory representation; “durability” is a side effect of those transformations. 
 
There are many numerous current research threads on memory consolidation. Plasticity studies 
have elucidated the mechanics of memory consolidation at the synapse (Shimizu, Tang, 
Rampon, & Tsien, 2000; Bramham & Messaoudi, 2005; Izquierdo et al., 2006). Reconsolidation 
(Misanin, Miller, & Lewis, 1968; Nader, Schafe, & Le Doux, 2000; Suzuki et al., 2004) experiments 
demonstrate that the process of memory consolidation is not a simple, unidirectional, process 
of solidification.  Studies of consolidation during sleep have drawn attention to the effect of 
offline reactivation and rehearsal (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Stickgold, 1998; Buzsáki, 1998; 
Paller & Voss, 2004; Walker & Stickgold, 2004). Animal studies demonstrated that mental 
representations could affect the time-course of consolidation (Tse et al., 2007). But it is often 
unclear whether these different approaches attempt to better describe memory solidification or 
to provide an explanation for different types of memory transformation.   
 
This work presents two models of memory consolidation.  The first captures the “memory 
solidification” data and argues that memory solidification is a necessary consequence of 
changing mental representations-even if those representations are not converted to a more 
durable format.  The second model highlights a particular kind of transformative consolidation: 
the shift from sensorial episodic representations containing information about the specific 
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bindings of objects, places, and sequences, to context-independent semantic representations 
(Nadel et al., 2000).  We explain this shift via a model adapted from the complementary learning 
systems framework (McClelland et al., 1995; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003), that demonstrates a 
trade-off between representing complex, arbitrary relational information, and rule-like semantic 
relations.  Based on this result we argue that the shift from episodic to semantic memory is due 
to episodic and semantic memories being different kinds of information represented in different 
brain systems, and that semantic memories take more time to construct not due to 
“consolidation” per se, but simply because semantic memories require multiple examples.  
 
Retrograde amnesia gradients-a consequence of multiple memory systems. 
The first definition of consolidation: “a time and experience dependent process by which newly-
acquired memories become stabilized so that they are relatively immune from disruption by 
behavioral interference and by amnestic agents such as lesions or drugs,” invokes a quantitative 
framework for doing memory research.  In fact, it prescribes a specific experimental technique:  
1) An experimental subject will learn some corpus of information either via training or 
incidentally.  2) At some subsequent time, the experimental subject receives an amnestic insult 
either via intervention or accident.  3) The learned corpus of information is tested.  4) A 
comparison sample is gathered from non-amnesic subjects and 5) the information retained by 
the amnesic subjects is plotted relative to the information of comparisons undergoing normal 
forgetting.  The independent variable is the nature of the amnestic intervention, and the 
dependent variable is the time it takes for the two curves to meet. A prototypical plot of this 
relationship (Squire, 1992; Squire & Alvarez, 1995; McClellan et al., 1995) is below: 
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Figure 1.1
 
 
The shape of these curves was described more than a century ago.  The control’s memory curve 
is characterized by Jost’s law of forgetting (Jost, 1897): the absolute amount remembered 
decreases with time, and also, that the rate of decrease decreases.  The amnesic curve is 
characterized by Ribot’s law of retrograde amnesia (Ribot, 1881), which stipulates that in 
retrograde amnesia recent memories are preferentially degraded; memories become more 
stable over time.  Mathematically, this function is also in the exponential family, and resembles 
the inverse Gaussian distribution which has a positive first derivative, causing it to initially slopes 
up from zero, but has a negative second derivative, which causes it to eventually saturate at 
some non-zero asymptote and decay back toward zero.    
 
There have been more than a century of consolidation experiments within this paradigm, and 
the take-home finding has been that there is no single time-course of consolidation.  Rather, the 
time course can be affected by species, amenstic treatment, memory corpus, modulatory 
compounds, and the level of analysis-synaptic vs. systems level (for review c.f., McGaugh, 2000) 
  
Thus memory consolidation is not only “a time and experience dependent process,” it seems to 
involve many processes and have many dependencies.  Muller & Pilzecker’s original hypothesis 
that the time course of consolidation was a knowable constant has not been borne out. It is 
possible to say that consolidation takes two hours, but only if we additionally stipulate that this 
is true only for the finger opposition-sequence learning task disrupted by an interference 
 6 
training sequence, and only in humans, and only if the humans do not nap between the two 
training sequences (Korman et al., 2007).  Time is an important prerequisite for memory 
durability, the brain is a physical system that cannot instantly change, but time is hardly the only 
or primary factor.  
 
In addition to the absence of a constant time course, there is little evidence for a simple 
“disruptable/non-disruptable” distinction.  A one-trial avoidance memory in chicks was resistant 
to a low dose of flurothyl after a few minutes, but not resistant to a high dose even after hours 
(Cherkin, 1969).   There simply seems to be no simple relationship between the variables of 
“time” and “durability.” 
 
Yet, memories do become resistant to amnestic interventions over time, and this phenomenon 
requires an explanation.  Thus we turn to the latter definition: memory change.  Since at least 
Hebb (1949), there has been broad acceptance of multiple types of memory, implemented by 
different brain processes, with some mechanisms for transforming memories of one type into 
another.  In the next section we argue that such a framework predicts a time dependant 
memory solidification process. 
 
Multiple stores confer durability. 
 
Suppose we take the minimal case: two memory systems.  This could be a working memory/long 
term memory distinction, a reverberating circuit/long term potentiation distinction, or a 
hippocampus/neocortex distinction; the details of the memory system are unimportant—it 
could even be a pair of buckets storing water—all that is required is two stores and a means of 
transferring information between them (Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2 
 
 
 
 
 Feedback & decay 
Transfer & 
interaction 
Inputs System 1 
 
(disruptable) 
System 2 
 
(non-
disruptable) 
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A multi-system memory: Information is initially input to the first system.  Over time, information is exchanged between the systems 
via reciprocal connections which mediate information transfer and interaction.  Each system may also have some internal feedback 
processing or decay via forgetting.  Each of these flows may be governed by a complex function, but from the point of view of a 
retrograde amnesia experiment, it is usually sufficient to consider each as a single parameter corresponding to the first derivative of 
information with respect to time.  
 
When information is introduced to the first store, it slowly begins to transfer to the second 
store.  This does not require that information be “copied” or “duplicated,” though that could be 
the case, it is sufficient for the information to flow until it reaches an equilibrium state.  In the 
context of memory, this flow could be the transfer from working to long-term memory, or, just 
as easily, the transfer of information from a neural spike train to NMDA receptors. 
 
An amnestic intervention is simply removing all of the information from the first store, either by 
“draining” the information already there (via interference or a transient memory disruption 
which produces only retrograde amnesia), or by destroying the store entirely (which will 
produce anterograde amnesia in addition to retrograde since that store is no longer able to hold 
information at all).  This amnestic treatment only preserves the information that has already 
been transferred to the second store.   
 
Such a treatment inevitably produces temporally graded retrograde amnesia.  Longer wait time 
will produce smaller losses up to the point where the system reaches an equilibrium state, after 
which any intervention will produce the smallest possible disruption given the systems’ 
dynamics.  Critically, the information has not become more durable because the second store’s 
representations are more intrinsically durable; both stores are identical in this respect.  Instead 
the information has become more durable because it is more distributed, and thus is partially 
immune to the localized amnestic disruption of the first store.   Just as a drop of ink becomes 
increasingly hard to remove from a glass of water over time, information becomes increasingly 
hard to remove from the brain as it is processed by more memory systems.   
 
This model is perfectly capable of accommodating different consolidation time courses.  Instead 
of assuming that the two stores are identical and that at equilibrium each contains precisely half 
of the initial information, we need only tune the relative leakiness of the components.  If the 
second system leaks more slowly than the first, then, in the limit, disruption of the first system 
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would produce no loss of memory whatsoever and we might say that this information has been 
“fully consolidated” into the second memory store (Figure 1.3).  If the first system leaks more 
slowly, then we would expect that amnestic interventions ought to disrupt memory whatever 
the wait time.  Thus some portions of memory are always dependent upon certain components 
(assuming our measures are sufficiently sensitive to detect precisely how much memory is 
disrupted).  Indeed, some theories such as multiple trace theory (Nadel et al., 2000) make just 
such a prediction, in this case, that the hippocampus is always required for episodic memories, 
and as evidence points to a body of studies that found flat retrograde amnesia gradients for 
episodic memories (Moscovitch et al., 2005).  But if we allow each of our memory components 
to vary in how quickly they integrate information (in other words, vary their leakiness), they can 
produce any pattern of consolidation.   
 
Figure 1.3 
 
Multisystem consolidation: Memory moves from the disruptable store to the non-disruptable store over time.  The sum of the two 
components corresponds to intact performance and the non-disruptable alone to amnestic performance.  
 
Further, while two components are sufficient to predict any consolidation time course (with one 
parameter to fit the dynamics of the disrupted memory store, and one to fit the non-disrupted 
store), the brain certainly contains more than two components, memory is distributed across 
dozens or hundreds of anatomical divisions, thousands of biochemical pathways, and billions or 
trillions of synapses-each with different dynamics.  However, any amnestic intervention disrupts 
only a sub-set of these components, and performance is always measured in only two 
categories.  Thus the experimental method itself it will necessarily divide memory into 
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“disrupted” and “spared,” and the consolidation time-course will always be best approximated 
with a two-box model.  
 
Because the particulars systems disrupted by the intervention are unknown, consolidation will 
have complex dynamics, individuals will vary, previously consolidated information will affect 
consolidation’s time course, and information that was independent of a particular sub-system 
may become dependent upon it again, meaning that the vulnerability of a particular type of 
memory to a particular amnestic disruption varies with time and treatment-as observed in the 
reconsolidation literature.  Yet if we had never observed time dependant memory consolidation 
or a retrograde amnesia gradient we could have predicted all of the results simply from the 
existence of multiple memory systems.  We could even have predicted the variability of 
consolidation’s time course from the observation that different memory systems have different 
properties.  In principle we could predict any arbitrary consolidation time course with simple 
calculus if we knew all of the trillions of parameters involved (or indeed, the two parameters 
corresponding to the disrupted and undisrupted stores), though this prediction would have 
questionable practical value.   “Consolidation” is an epiphenomenon produced by disrupting the 
normal flow of information through multiple memory systems.  
 
However, this model tells us nothing about the actual properties of the memory systems in 
question because it treats memory as a unitary construct which can be “preserved” or 
“disrupted.”  It explains why memory becomes resistant to disruption by pointing out that 
memory is dynamic while disruptions are static.  Yet this motivates a far more interesting 
question: “What are the dynamics of memory?” This is the heart of the second definition of 
memory consolidation: “any change in memory between encoding and recall,” it requires 
research on the different mechanisms of memory systems, regardless of any change in 
“disruptability.”1  “Disruption” is such a grand abstraction it can be answered for all memory 
                                                        
1 There is a philosophical debate to be had about whether the term “consolidation” 
is valuable in a framework of memory change.  Although he surely did not intend it, 
Eric Kandel concluded his keynote address at the 2010 Society for Neuroscience 
with a succinct eliminativist message:  “memory takes time.”   He did not say 
“consolidation takes time” or even “memory consolidates,” because he did not need 
to.  If one understands the biological and information processing that forms and 
changes memory, there is no additional “consolidation process” left to study.  
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systems in the same way, but there is no universal answer to the memory change question; it is 
different for each memory system.  In the next section we present a discuss a particular example 
of memory change, the tradeoff between hippocampal and neocortical memory, and present a 
model similar to that of the complementary learning systems framework, (McClelland et al., 
1995; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) that helps explain the representational change between these 
two structures.  
 
Multiple episodes, pattern separation, or arbitrary relations? 
 
The hippocampus and neocortex are complementary memory systems (McClelland et al., 1995), 
that each provide the other with increased functionality.  There is relatively broad agreement on 
the generalities on the role of the neocortical system: it acts as a powerful associative memory 
(Hebb 1949; Rosenblatt, 1961 ; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976; McLelland, & Rumelhart 1986), 
building a web of semantic knowledge based on examples using some sort of multivariate 
statistical algorithm related to Hebbian learning.  There is less consensus on the role of the 
hippocampal component.  Some research traditions stress its role in boosting memory strength, 
providing additional details, performance accuracy, and memory items (Stark & Squire, 2003; 
Squire & Bayley, 2007), although this effect may be super-additive (Shimamura & Wickens, 
2009).  Other traditions stress the role of the hippocampus in pattern separation and 
completion, providing unique codes for individual inputs and filling in any gaps in those codes 
(Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).  Other work is concerned primarily with 
the content of the hippocampal representation and its involvment in spatial maps (O’Keefe & 
Dostrovsky, 1971; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Maguire, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 1999;  Byrne, Becker, & 
Burgess, 2007) or temporally coded episodes (Tulving, 1984; 
Endel Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998; Huxter, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 2003).  Finally, one tradition 
stresses the role of the hippocampus encoding arbitrary relations between items (Cohen, 1995; 
Eichenbaum, Dudchenko, Wood, Shapiro, & Tanila, 1999; Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 
2000; Konkel, Warren, Duff, Tranel, & Cohen, 2008; Komorowski, Manns, & Eichenbaum, 2009). 
 
These accounts each provide an important perspective on hippocampal function.  However, 
because the neocortical accounts agree so closely, there is an opportunity to test the various 
predictions.  Since each believes that the neocortex is the seat of semantic learning, and works 
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by via some sort of statistical learning algorithm (like that of a multi-layer perceptron trained 
with back-propagation), we can ask which type of information a neocortical model has the most 
difficulty learning.  Within the consolidation framework outlined above, we know what 
hippocampal representations will change into, and from that we can estimate what they 
originally resembled.  There is no doubt that the neocortex modeled as a multi-layer perceptron 
trained with back-propagation can learn any of the relations in question: it can approximate any 
input-output mapping arbitrarily closely (Hornik, 1991).  However, speed and efficacy matter: if 
our neocortical model can rapidly and without interference assimilate a particular class of 
information then a hippocampal representation of that information is unnecessary, the 
neocortex is well designed to capture it.  However, if the neocortex struggles with a particular 
type of information, then that information is a good candidate for an alternate representational 
format. 
 
This approach is similar to the one taken by McClellend et al. in Why are there complementary 
learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex (1995, c.f. Norman & O’Reilly 2003), which 
modeled a delayed non-match to sample task in primates (Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1985).  Their 
hippocampal model was able to precisely encode individual object-response mappings and 
replay these in an interleaved fashion to their neocortical model.  Interleaved learning of new 
and old patterns protected the neocortical model from catastrophic interference, in which new 
patterns overwrite old.  Because this account contains multiple interacting memory stores (i.e., 
the complementary learning systems), it produces the consolidation phenomenon--increased 
resilience to hippocampal damage over time.   Yet, because these two systems have different 
properties, it also produces a shift in representations from specific, pattern separated, instances 
of hippocampal representation to the more generalized neocortical perceptron-like 
representation. 
 
Tuning this model to address the research frameworks above requires three substantial 
changes.  First, most of the frameworks above make claims about declarative memory, and test 
memory with paired associate recall rather than match/non-match.  Thus we must test the 
model’s ability to map complex inputs to complex outputs.  Second, these frameworks make 
different claims about the informational structure of the inputs (e.g., inputs and outputs are 
organized like a spatial map).  Thus, we must create relationships between input-output 
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pairings, some of which emphasize the arbitrariness of the pairings, others of which emphasize 
spatial relations or rules.   
 
Finally, the training must be adjusted to reflect a critical difference between human human 
amnesics and hippocampally lesioned animals.  The primate lesion data modeled by McClelland 
et al., demonstrates that the primate’s training (memory for familiar objects) becomes 
hippocampal independent over time, but the human data upon which many of these research 
frameworks is based makes a slightly different claim: that older memories are less dependent on 
the hippocampus than more recent.   If memories become more durable over time, we might 
assume that older episodes would be less dependent on hippocampus.  However, older 
memories also must face longer periods of interference.   Since one of the chief claims of the 
CLS framework is that the hippocampus protects neocortical representations from interference 
via interleaved learning, it may be the case that we should predict higher levels of interference 
post lesion, which would predominately affect older memories.  This is counter to the human 
findings, and would provide evidence against the interleaved learning account of the 
hippocampus, thus we divide training inputs into three serially presented epochs (old, middle-
aged, and recent memories).  Additionally, within the primate data the hippocampal trace 
decays over roughly the same period as the neocortical trace increases.  This introduces another 
possible confound-if the hippocampal trace is required to provide an interleaved learning signal 
that reduces neocortical interference; we should expect to see interference return as the 
hippocampal trace decays.  As in the case of episodic memory, this may not result in an overall 
performance decrease, rather we should expect to see the impact preferentially fall on those 
patterns which have been lost in the hippocampal trace.  Thus our model also includes a 
hippocampal trace decay component to measure the impact of slowly losing inputs.  
 
Model Architecture and Training 
 
Architecture  
The model was a three-layer perceptron trained by back-propagation, there were eight input 
units, eight output units, and twenty hidden units. In addition there were four “noisy” inputs, 
assigned random states on each training trial. All weights were initially random.  It was coded in 
MATLAB (MATLAB Version 7.0, Simulink) 
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Training Design 
Training was accomplished by exposing the perceptron to an input-output pairing randomly 
drawn from the hippocampal trace and applying the back-propagation of error learning rule 
(Rosenblatt 1961).  We repeated this procedure for a number of iterations equal to the number 
of patterns currently present in the hippocampal trace.  After a full training cycle, the network 
was tested (without learning), on all of the to-be-learned input patterns, to see what proportion 
of them achieved a correct match.  Since output was real-valued rather than binary, we applied 
a threshold of 0.85 to the output for the purposes of counting matches. 
  
We used three training corpora.  In the first inputs and outputs were randomly paired integers 
(random pairings of all 256 unique binary codes of 8 bits).  In the second input corpus, these 
codes were ordered in a 16x16 spatial grid with each input mapped to the output above it and 
to the left (i.e., each input was connected to an output such that a path would be formed from 
that input to the upper-left corner of the grid).  In the third corpus, inputs and outputs were 
paired based on the “minimally interesting coding problem,” each binary input was paired to its 
equivalent Gray code output.  Thus, we tested arbitrary random pairings, spatially coded 
pairings, and a pairings encoding simple rule.   
 
Further, the training corpora were divided into three epochs: “old” memories, “middle aged” 
memories, and “recent” memories that were presented serially (i.e., instead of being trained on 
the entire set of possible patterns, the network was trained in three epochs, each of which was 
randomly assigned 1/3 of the 256 total input-output pairings).  The “middle” epoch was 
introduced after one third of the training cycles had elapsed, and the “recent” after two thirds 
of the training cycle.  When a new epoch of input-output pairings was added, they became part 
of the same general training set from which the perceptron drew its input-output pairings.  
Thus, new, middle, and old patterns would be interleaved in training.   
 
Additionally, we allowed the hippocampal trace to decay by removing input-output pair 
examples from the training pool.  This was accomplished by applying a simple exponential decay 
function to the input corpus in which 0.01% of input patterns were lost after each training step.  
This “leak” was applied to each epoch separately.  
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Finally, we implemented interleaved learning by allowing recurrent connections from the 
neocortex to the hippocampus.  The neocortex reintroduced some number of successfully 
learned output patterns (those which passed the “correct” threshold during testing as described 
above) into input training cycles.  This makes the network somewhat similar to an Elman 
network (Jordan, 1986; Elman, 1990), though without the explicit learning of inputs as outputs.  
It does however, allow previously learned information to be interleaved with and interfere with 
new learning.  
 
Testing Design 
 
Experiment 1 
We tested three identical versions of the model, one on each of the three different input 
corpora (arbitrary, spatial, and rule).   In each instance, the hippocampal model was the same, it 
provided leaky traces of three “episodes” of the inputs (old, middle, and recent).  In this 
manipulation, we did not allow the neocortical system to train itself on previously assimilated 
patterns.   
 
Experiment 2 
This was identical to experiment 1, except that now the neocortical system was allowed to 
introduce any successfully learned input-output pairing into the training corpus.  Note that this 
means that the model went through additional training since there were a greater total number 
of patterns available (hippocampal trace + neocortical trace).  Any patterns that were disrupted 
by interference were removed from the training corpus until they were re-learned.   
 
Experiment 3 
For the arbitrary pairings alone, we explored increasing the strength of neocortical feedback and 
decreasing the rate of hippocampal decay.  Our goal was to “rescue” the retrograde amnesia 
finding by tuning these two parameters until old pairs would be best retained, middle pairs 
would be intermediate, and new pairs would be most disrupted by hippocampal lesion.  We 
used the same mechanism as in experiment 2; however we introduced multiple copies of each 
neocortically-learned pattern into the training corpus, thus allowing previously learned pairs to 
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have a greater influence on model training (note that this once again results in a greater total 
amount of training due to the additional presentations of learned pairs).   
 
Results 
Experiment 1: Learning without neocortical feedback 
In experiment 1 (Figure 1.4), at the end of the training, the neocortical model learned 
approximately 220 pairings from the rule based input corpus, 140 pairings from the spatial input 
corpus, and 28 pairings from the arbitrary corpus.  For both the rule-based and spatial corpora, 
all three epochs (old, mid, and new) improved performance across the entire experiment, 
peaking in highest number of pairs learned at the end of training.  For arbitrary pairings 
however, while the total number of patterns known generally increased throughout the training, 
each new epoch almost completely interfered with prior learning.  At its peak, immediately 
before the introduction of the “mid” epoch, the “old” epoch had learned 20 patterns.  This 
replicates the catastrophic interference finding (McCloskey & Cohen 1989, McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly 1995). 
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Figure 1.4 
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Experiment 2: Does neocortical feedback driven interleaved learning protect from catastrophic 
interference? 
When neocortical learned patterns were returned to the training corpora, both of the 
structured data sets were more quickly learned, and to a higher total number of patterns.  
However neocortical feedback-driven interleaved learning did not substantially increase learning 
for arbitrary pairings (figure 1.5).  However, interleaved learning did change the pattern of 
learning for arbitrary pairings.  Upon introduction of the second epoch of patterns, the first 
epoch experienced interference, but not catastrophically so, and the old epoch remained the 
best learned during learning of the middle epoch.  However, introduction of the new epoch 
once again caused considerable interference.  This pattern of learning suggests that it may be 
possible to preserve the retrograde amnesia gradient by tuning the amount of hippocampal 
decay and neocortical feedback in a manner consistent with the model presented in the first 
section.   
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Figure 1.5 
 
 
Experiment 3: Can neocortical feedback ever rescue arbitrary pairings? 
 
With increased neocortical feedback and decreased hippocampal decay (figure 1.6) the 
neocortex successfully learns the arbitrary pairings without catastrophic interference and with a 
temporal gradient for the three epochs (i.e., old > mid > new).  This replicates the experimental 
consolidation data from human patients (Squire, Slater, & Chance, 1975, Squire, Cohen, & Nadel 
1984), and the interleaved learning finding (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly 1995, French 
1999).  However, it does not dramatically improve the amount of arbitrary pairings learned over 
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even the model without interleaved learning, despite decreases in the rate of hippocampal 
decay.   
   
Figure 1.6 
 
 
Discussion 
In the first part of this document we argued that the phenomenon of memory consolidation, 
that memories become less disruptable over time, is best understood as a consequence of 
multiple, dynamic, interacting memory stores.  As memory becomes more distributed, it must 
necessarily be more resistant to local amnestic disruptions. In the second part we examined one 
of many consolidation processes, the shift from individual memory examples to more semantic 
representations, using a modeling approach.  This modeling approach highlighted properties of 
neocortical perceptron-style representations that provide some insight into what a 
complementary hippocampal representation ought to capture, and provides a more general to 
models of human memory.  Further, these two models of memory consolidation are not in 
conflict, in fact, principles from the former model greatly informed the latter and assisted in 
tuning the parameters of the hippocampal and neocortical model to most accurately reflect the 
retrograde amnesia data.   
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In our model of the consolidation process, we explored how input-output pairings with different 
levels of shared informational structure might affect rates of consolidation from hippocampus to 
neocortex (c.f. Tse et al 2007).  Additionally we explored how different tunings of hippocampal 
decay and neocortical feedback interact with these differences in information structure to 
produce different levels of preservation for memories of different ages. 
 
In all conditions, even when there was no interleaved learning, the neocortical perceptron 
rapidly and easily learned both the simple rule-structured inputs, and the more complex, multi-
dimensional spatially structured inputs.  Yet in all conditions, even those with extremely strong 
interleaved learning, the neocortical perceptron struggled to learn arbitrary, random pairings, 
capturing fewer before hippocampal decay removed them from the training corpus, and 
experiencing greater levels of interference.    
 
Why is the neocortex so poor at learning arbitrary pairings? 
 
The neocortical perceptron works by approximating a function that maps the inputs to the 
outputs.  For a structured relationship, such as a simple rule or a spatial manifold, this is a single 
function mapping all possible inputs to all possible outputs, and thus each example provides 
useful data for fitting all other examples.  It is especially striking that in both simple rule and 
spatial conditions, due to the considerable intercorrelations between the pairings, model 
performance improved even on pairings that had not yet been presented.  The model was not 
prescient; it was simply that each pair served as a sufficiently good example of the as yet 
unobserved pairs to drive performance.  
 
For arbitrary pairings, however, each input-output mapping is a unique transform, and no 
pairing assists in fitting any other.   The neocortical perceptron is certainly capable of fitting 
these pairings, but the function describing the mapping requires a huge number of parameters.  
Approximating it requires considerable bootstrapping-repetition of previous examples in an 
interleaved fashion.  This bootstrapping induces a consistent, repetitive structure, and thus the 
neocortical perceptron is able to capture the information present in “random” pairings, albeit at 
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a much lower level than in the rule-based pairings, reaching criteria on only about a third of the 
total patterns.   
 
The irony is that before any learning took place the neocortical perceptron was an excellent 
model of the actual function that generated the random pairings.  Given a random binary digit 
as an input, the randomly wired perceptron produced a random paired associate.  Through 
training the network was slowly converted from a pseudorandom number generator (i.e., an 
accurate model of the process that created the arbitrary pairs), to a list of the particular input-
output pairings originally generated (i.e., an extremely poor random number generator).  This is 
a simple case of over fitting; the neocortical perceptron has simply drawn a line through each 
studied point.  This trading off of generalizability for specificity is an example of the 
bias/variance dilemma (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992).   
 
This reluctance to learn random pairings is a feature, not a bug.  The neocortical perceptron is 
using a gradient-descent algorithm to build a model of the statistical structure of its input-
output pairings (visualize an “error” landscape with peaks and valleys, and a ball rolling down to 
find the lowest “error” point). Reducing the error for a one observation also reduces the error 
for the other observations to the extent that these observations are correlated.  But for arbitrary 
pairings data, a good fit of previously observed pairings is no more likely to be a good fit of 
future pairings than a poor fit of previously observed pairings.   
 
Why is there so much more interference for arbitrary pairings? 
 
In the rule based and spatial conditions, new patterns do not cause interference, quite the 
opposite; they improve the fits of all three sets by providing additional inter-correlated 
information.  However, in the arbitrary pairings condition each new corpus disrupted much of 
the prior learning.  These disruptions can be ameliorated with the introduction of stronger 
neocortical training, but this change does not actually reduce interference, it simply ensures 
that the new patterns are more greatly interfered with than the old (a process sometimes called 
runaway reinforcement c.f. Meeter, 2003).  This tradeoff is described in the literature as the 
“stability-plasticity dilemma” (Abraham & Robins, 2005; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1988; 
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Grossberg, 1980).  Architectures can be tuned to be more sensitive to new data or old or any 
particular mixture thereof, but it can’t be tuned to be both stable and plastic.  
 
The only way to actually increase neocortical learning of arbitrary pairs is to increase the 
amount of hippocampal training available to the neocortex by decreasing the rate that pairings 
are removed from the hippocampal store (as in experiment 4), and to slow this rate as new 
pairings are added to allow the interleaved learning algorithm to complete reduce the 
comparatively greater interference between the multiple sets of pairings.  The most effective 
tuning is to never remove pairings from the hippocampal store (as in McClelland, McNaughton, 
& O’Reilly 1995).  This is essentially combining all of the input data into a single corpus, and re-
commencing a complete search of the error space after each new example to find the global 
minima.  This way no information can be lost. 
 
This may seem implausible, since it predicts that all experiences are permanently stored in the 
hippocampus, and that after each new experience the entire neocortex (or at least the portion 
of it in which arbitrary associations are coded) is completely rewired to reflect the combination 
of new and old experience (additionally it suggests a strong need to understand what 
constitutes an “experience”).  Yet, with our current limited knowledge of brain function perhaps 
this indeed what happens.  In addition, some prior studies suggest that this computational 
problem can be considerably ameliorated by simply increasing the model’s tolerance (French 
1999), effectively smoothing out the error surface and allowing the model to return near 
matches.  In this scheme the neocortex provides completely redundant representations of the 
hippocampal trace for arbitrary pairings, but it continues to be valuable for learning structured 
information, and can provide some temporally graded arbitrary pairings in the event of a 
hippocampal lesion.  There are some theories of hippocampus-neocortex consolidation that 
make essentially this claim (Rosenbaum, Winocur, & Moscovitch 2001).   
 
Why does the neocortex learn the arbitrary pairings that it does? 
 
The neocortical perceptron is better at capturing pairings that share common structure, appear 
early in training or immediately accompanying new training epochs, and are frequently repeated 
(either via neocortical feedback or hippocampal training).  These are not different properties.  
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“Firstness”, “oldness”, “repetition,” etc. are all consistent structural properties of the pairings 
presented to the neocortical perceptron, and it learns those consistencies.  In the case of 
arbitrary pairings, there is no structure intrinsic to the pairings that the model can leverage, but 
the model can learn the structure imposed by the experimenter’s training algorithm.  There 
have been many improvements to training algorithms developed since the original catastrophic 
interference finding (McCloskey & Cohen 1989) to leverage just such structure to minimize 
interference between data sets (Elman, 1990, Ans et al., 2002, Musca, Rousset, & Ans, 2009).  
These advances are valuable, and it is almost certain that some similar algorithms are at work in 
managing the interactions between hippocampal and neocortical data. 
 
How does this speak to research traditions on hippocampal function? 
 
This paper argues that the neocortex is capable of learning structure, but incapable of learning 
unstructured, random, or arbitrary associations except when such associations have some 
external structure imposed upon them.  This suggests a role for the hippocampus: it captures 
unstructured, random, or arbitrary associations, and imposes some form of structured playback 
upon them.  The neocortex can capture this structured playback using precisely the same 
mechanisms it uses to capture structured associations present in perception.  Since everyday 
experience contains so many examples of unstructured, coincidental, or conjunctive data, it is 
no surprise that the loss of the hippocampus creates such a profound amnesia for new 
declarative memory.  This reaffirms the ability of the hippocampus to provide a time-limited 
boost to neocortical function (Squire, Cohen, & Nadel 1984, Alvarez & Squire 1994), and 
suggests that theories of hippocampal function ought to explain the nature of hippocampally-
imposed structure.   
 
And this is precisely what these traditions do! One tradition suggest that the hippocampus is 
critical for learning stimuli that unfold in space (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971, O’Keefe & Nadel 
1978,) and time (Tulving 2002), and that the structure it imposes upon associations between 
items is like the dimensional structure of space and time.  A second tradition stresses the 
importance of the hippocampus for learning unique conjunctions of features (Norman & O’Reilly 
2003), and that it imposes structure via control over the resolution of the representation 
(Aimone, Deng, & Gage 2011), coding precise, pattern-separated examples and filling in missing 
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information via pattern completion.  A third tradition suggests that the hippocampus is critical 
for capturing arbitrary relations regardless of their resolution, or content (Eichenbaum, 2000), 
and that it imposes only the structure present in the bindings of those relations themselves.   
 
The modeling results presented here challenge these research traditions to produce theories 
that carefully unpack how arbitrary associations are converted into structured.  For example, a 
naïve spatial theory that claims the hippocampus is necessary for all forms of spatial 
representation is almost certainly wrong; the spatial path that we encoded in our spatial 
associations was perfectly learnable by our neocortical model.  Indeed, any dataset that 
contains internally correlated associations, such that each example improves predictive 
performance for as-yet-unseen examples, does not require any additional structure to be 
learned.   A more nuanced spatial theory, however, that argues that arbitrary, unstructured 
information (e.g., the order in which a set of landmarks was visited), is mapped onto a spatial 
representation (e.g., a 2D map), and thus can be learned by a neocortical system, is plausible.  
This theory may be empirically wrong, a map may not in fact be the structure taught to the 
neocortex, but at least it does not claim that the hippocampus works by imposing a spatial 
structure on spatially structured data.  Such structured data could also be learned without a 
hippocampus. 
  
Whatever algorithm the hippocampus uses to convert unstructured information to structure, it 
produces powerful and flexible recall.  A hippocampal memory of a past event can answer who, 
what, when, where, how, and why-despite the fact that none of these questions were present at 
encoding.  This is an interesting future direction for hippocampal research: how does the 
hippocampus convert unstructured information to structured at recall?  What kind of 
representation can capture the arbitrary, incidental nature of out experiences, and yet store 
them in such a way that they can be easily accessed and flexibly applied in new situations?  
What, after all, is the similarity between events that lack shared structure, and how does the 
hippocampus bring them into alignment during recall?   
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Abstract 
 
Hippocampal damage causes profound yet circumscribed memory impairment across diverse 
stimulus types and testing formats. Here, within a single test format involving a single class of 
stimuli, we identified different performance errors to better characterize the specifics of the 
underlying deficit. The task involved study and reconstruction of object arrays across brief 
retention intervals. The most striking feature of patients’ with hippocampal damage 
performance was that they tended to reverse the relative positions of item pairs within arrays of 
any size, effectively “swapping” pairs of objects. These “swap errors” were the primary error 
type in amnesia, almost never occurred in healthy comparison participants, and actually 
contributed to poor performance on more traditional metrics (such as distance between studied 
and reconstructed location). Patients made swap errors even in trials involving only a single pair 
of objects.  The selectivity and severity of this particular deficit creates serious challenges for 
theories of memory and hippocampus 
 
Introduction 
The precise role of the hippocampus in memory is a topic of much investigation. Observations of 
patients with amnesia following hippocampal damage reveal a complicated pattern of impaired 
and spared memory functions. The deficits include profound and pervasive impairment in 
learning and remembering new facts and events, preventing patients, for example, from normal 
learning of new routes, places, or people, and from keeping track of appointments or events of 
daily life. Yet other aspects of memory such as skill learning remain fully intact. Taken together 
with converging evidence using other neuroscience methods, the functional dissociations 
resulting from hippocampal damage illuminate the scope and limits of hippocampal involvement 
in memory (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Schacter and Tulving, 1994; 
McClelland, McNaughton, and O’Reilly, 1995; Aggleton and Brown, 1999; Nadel, 
Samsonovitch,Ryan, and Moscovitch, 2000; Eichenbaum, and Cohen, 2001; Eichenbaum, 
Yonelinas, and Ranganath, 2007). 
 
Some research has focused on the role of the hippocampus in processing spatial information 
and maintaining a dynamic, flexible “mental map” of space; highlighting deficits in numerous 
spatial tasks after hippocampal damage, along with evidence of place-sensitive cells in the 
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hippocampus, and correlations between hippocampal volume and spatial ability (O’Keefe, and 
Nadel, 1978; Hayes, Ryan, Schnyer, and Nadel, 2004; Ryan, Lin, Ketcham, and Nadel 2010). 
Another line of research points to the role of the hippocampus in managing declarative memory 
load—finding deficits following hippocampal damage when capacity limits are reached or when 
delays become sufficiently long (Stark and Squire 2003; Squire, Stark, and Clark 2004; Gold, 
Smith, Bayley, Shrager, Brewer, Stark, Hopkins, and Squire, 2006). Other research findings 
emphasize the nature of the representations generated by the hippocampus (Cohen and 
Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010). For example, one extensive body of work reports impairment 
following hippocampal damage for relational memory, showing deficits in representing the 
relationships among disparate elements of scenes or events (Eichenbaum and Cohen 2001) or in 
representing cross-modal bindings (Marr, 1971; Damasio, 1989; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; 
Aggleton and Brown, 1999). Such deficits are manifested for all manner of accidental or 
arbitrary relations (Konkel, Warren, Duff, Tranel, and Cohen, 2008; Konkel and Cohen 2009), 
regardless of the timescale over which the relational information must be maintained (Hannula, 
Tranel, and Cohen, 2006; Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, and Cohen 2006; Warren, Duff, Jensen, Tranel, 
and Cohen 2012).  
 
Across all of these different lines of research, hippocampal damage is seen to produce memory 
impairment – and hence hippocampus is clearly engaged – in many different categories of 
stimuli and test formats. This highlights the broad scope and pervasiveness of hippocampal 
function in memory, but also makes identifying the critical factors(s) that tie these findings 
together challenging. What is the fundamental nature of the deficit, and hence the role of the 
hippocampus in memory? 
 
Even within a single stimulus domain and test format, memory impairment following 
hippocampal damage can be difficult to interpret unambiguously. Deficits in learning to navigate 
among multiple locations in large spatial environments could be attributed to spatial, 
load/capacity, relational, or other demands. In the current experiment, we employed a simple 
memory test complemented by a set of performance analyses rich enough to identify various 
categories of errors arising from the different predicted deficits, permitting a more direct 
evaluation of various predictions within a single experimental paradigm. 
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Our goal was to determine whether hippocampal damage causes errors even in short-delay 
spatial reconstruction, and whether specific types of errors occur disproportionately, in a 
fashion that would be helpful in assessing the role of hippocampus in various types or aspects of 
memory.  
 
Materials and Methods  
Participants 
Behavioral data were collected from three individuals with amnesia subsequent to hippocampal 
damage and from four comparison participants with no known neurological impairments.    Each 
comparison participant was matched to an amnesic participant in age (within 2 years), 
educational attainment (within 1 year), sex, and handedness.  Table 1 summarizes each amnesic 
patient's etiology along with demographic, neuropsychlogical, and hippocampal volumetric 
measures where available. 
 Amnesic etiology and neuroanatomy 
All amnesic participants suffered acute episodes in adulthood that rendered them 
memory impaired, and previous reports have established that each amnesic participant has 
substantial damage to the hippocampus bilaterally.  Patient 2363 became amnesic after cardiac 
arrest and an accompanying anoxic episode that resulted in selective regional atrophy without 
lesion.  The bilateral volume of his hippocampus has been measured and quantified, and found 
to be significantly less than normal for his age and sex based on a regression model fit to 
hippocampal volumes of healthy comparison participants (Allen et al., 2006), with a Studentized 
residual value of -2.64.  2636's cerebral gray matter has been characterized as less than 
normative (Allen et al., 2006) with a Studentized residual value of -2.47, which was driven in 
large part by a normatively small amount of parietal gray matter (Studentized residual value of -
2.78).  Gray matter volume in the frontal and temporal lobes was less than normative but 
unremarkable.  Patient 1846 became amnesic after a combined, hour-long episode of status 
epilepticus and anoxia that resulted in selective regional atrophy without lesion.  Her 
hippocampus is atrophied bilaterally, with the atrophy being greater on the left (Warren et al., 
2012).  Her bilateral hippocampal volume has also been measured and quantified, and found to 
be significantly less than normal, with a Studentized residual value of -4.23 (Allen et al., 2006).  
Outside of the MTL, 1846's brain has been described as normal except for "some evidence of 
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cortical thinning in the paracentral lobule and precuneus" (Warren et al., 2012) that may be 
related to her anoxic etiology.  Otherwise her brain volume (gray and white matter, both total 
and per-lobe) has been characterized as normative (Allen et al, 2006).  Patient 2308 became 
amnesic after an episode of herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE) that damaged significant portions 
of his left and right temporal lobes.  Specifically, 2308 has bilateral damage to the medial 
temporal lobe (including the amygdalae and the anterior hippocampi in their entirety) and 
medial temporal poles along with unilateral damage to left ventral and lateral temporal lobe 
extending to the left temporal pole (Cavaco et al., 2012).  The hippocampal lesions in 2308 are 
so extensive that it is not possible to measure meaningfully the remaining tissue and make a 
quantitative comparison to normative data.  Beyond the temporal lobes, 2308 has left-
lateralized damage to the insular cortex, basal forebrain, and the posterior portion of 
orbitofrontal cortex, and right-lateralized damage to the insular cortex. 
Amnesic neuropsychology 
Neuropsychological examination confirmed severe declarative memory impairment in 
each amnesic participant, with performance on the Wechsler Memory Scale - Third edition 
(WMS-III, Wechsler, 1997a) at least 25 points lower than their performance on the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale - Third edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997b), and the average delay score 
on the WMS-III more than two standard deviations below the population mean. Memory 
impairments were selective, in that, for example, none of the amnesic participants showed any 
systematic impairment on a battery of neuropsychological tests of executive function, including 
trail making, Wisconsin card-sorting, controlled oral word associations, and the tower of London  
(Konkel, et al., 2008). 
 
Experimental Paradigm 
We used a spatial reconstruction task (Huttenlocher and Presson 1979; Smith and Milner, 1981; 
Jeneson, Mauldin, and Squire 2010).  During each trial the participant studied an object array 
(containing between 2 and 5 objects), arranged on a 100cm-by-100cm white tabletop, and then 
had to reconstruct the spatial layout of the objects after a brief eyes-closed delay. During the 
“study” portion of the trial, the participant picked up each object with his or her dominant hand, 
named it, and immediately placed it back in the same location. When the participant had 
finished, he or she covered his or her eyes for approximately 4 s while the location of the objects 
was recorded in a digital photograph and the objects were cleared from the table. After the 4 s 
 38 
“blind” period, the participant attempted to place the objects back into the original 
configuration (reconstruction). The final location of the objects was then recorded in a second 
digital photograph, and the next trial began after a short break. Some trials involved familiar, 
nameable objects (e.g., a pen, a button, a toy car, etc.) and others involved novel objects carved 
out of white foam blocks into various complex shapes and covered in patterns of simple lines 
and other shapes (“Greebles” c.f. James, Shima, Tarr, and Gauthier, 2005). All of the materials 
composing the novel shapes were of the same composition and color for each stimulus, such 
that stimuli could not be distinguished based on simple features. Blocks involving novel objects 
were interleaved with familiar-object blocks, with an equal number of each block type in each 
experimental session. During the study portion of each trial, participants picked up each object 
(as for the trials involving familiar objects), but counted integers aloud instead of providing 
names, given the obvious difficulties that would be associated with attempting to name these 
novel objects. 
 
Another condition was also included that varied from the main paradigm in the instructions 
given to the participants. In this condition, participants were instructed to create the initial 
configuration of the objects (whether novel or familiar) on each trial themselves, rather than 
studying locations selected by the experimenter (i.e., objects were self-placed rather than 
experimenter-placed). This condition was administered in blocks randomly interposed with the 
main experimental blocks described here. Data from this condition are not reported here 
because amnesic participants self-positioned objects in grossly different patterns than did 
comparison participants, thus confounding comparisons of subsequent relational memory 
performance. 
 
The digital photographs taken after the study and reconstruction portions of each trial were 
analyzed offline using MATLAB software (MATLAB version 7.9  Natick, Massachusetts: The 
MathWorks Inc., 2009). The edges of the table were identified via a semi-automated algorithm 
and were used to warp the coordinate space of the table into a common, Cartesian coordinate 
system via linear deformation. There was no more than 1cm of displacement in the position of 
the table edges for the reconstruction image relative to the study image for any trial, indicating 
that table and camera movements did not contribute significantly to measures of reconstruction 
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errors. The location of the center of each object was marked prior to deformation and object 
coordinates in the common reference frame were used for analysis. 
Memory Measures 
This task permitted multiple error types, and assessed reconstruction performance using five 
metrics (Fig. 1) capable of capturing this error heterogeneity.  Because this task involved spatial 
reconstruction performance could be evaluated with respect to spatial theories.  Because the 
task involved variable set sizes, including as few as two objects, performance could be evaluated 
for the effects of memory load.  Finally, our use of unique error analyses permitted a rich 
evaluation of performance with respect to the different types of representation required. 
 
Different object-configuration schemes are sensitive to different types of reconstruction errors.  
Spatial reconstruction experiments have historically used the item misplacement measure, 
which is simply the distance (in cm) between each item’s studied location and the location 
where each item was placed during reconstruction (Huttenlocher and Presson, 1979, Smith and 
Milner, 1981, Jenesen, Mauldin, and Squire 2010).  Although it is a simple, intuitively appealing 
analytic approach, it assumes that the underlying representation is of each item’s location in a 
grid-like Cartesian coordinate system.  While some theories of hippocampal spatial processing 
might endorse such a map-like representational scheme, it is not clear that all do (e.g., some 
spatial theories might argue that the representation is more like a path than a map).  Moreover, 
such an item-based approach does not take into account the possibility that performance might 
be driven by memory representations of the configuration of the objects or the relations among 
the objects. Accordingly, we also measured spatial reconstruction using edge resizing and edge 
deflection metrics, which measure reconstructed changes in the length and direction (in cm and 
radians respectively) of vectors between each pair of items. These metrics assume that each 
items’ location in the underlying representation serves as a landmark for each other item’s 
location, with polar coordinate-like vectors between them.  Moreover, we also measured 
memory for the overall arrangement of items with a rearrangement metric.  This metric 
assumes that the underlying representation has no fine-grained representation of distance or 
angle, but rather reduces the configuration of studied items to simple shape via perceptual 
closure and measures the frequency of categorical changes in shape (e.g., a square changing to 
a rhombus, or a line changing its direction).  This array of measures applied to amnesic 
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performance allowed us to better characterize the hippocampal contribution to spatial 
representation. 
 
One other new metric assessed is swaps, which is the rate at which any pair of objects “swap” 
places between study and reconstruction (i.e., when the correct locations were filled but with 
mis-assignment of particular objects to particular locations).  This metric was applied for each 
possible pair of objects in a given reconstruction of 2-5 objects. Because the number of possible 
pairwise swaps increases combinatorially while set size increases linearly, our metric here was 
swaps-per-pairwise-relation, thereby avoiding confounding the increase in relational complexity 
with the increase in the number of items. We measured such swaps by counting the frequency 
that the vector connecting each pair of objects reversed direction (i.e., the sign of the vector’s x 
and y components changed simultaneously between study and reconstruction). This metric 
assumes an underlying representation that involves binding each trial’s set of object-identities 
onto each trial’s set of locations.  The experimenters’ assignment of particular objects to 
particular locations was random. Thus, successful performance required memory for arbitrary 
relations, and the incidence of swaps in patients with hippocampal damage could be used to 
assess the role of hippocampus in relational memory. 
 
 
Patient to Comparison ratios 
Patient to comparison ratios were simply calculated as patient performance over healthy 
comparison performance on each metric.  Standard error bars were obtained via propagation of 
uncertainty: 
 
For  
 
 
 
 
Where  corresponds to patient performance,  corresponds to healthy comparison 
performance, and  and  are independent and uncorrelated. 
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Random performance 
Random performance was calculated by assuming a pair of objects was placed at two random 
locations (indexed by random, unique pairs of x,y coordinates drawn from our 100x100 spatial 
grid) during the study phase, and that these two objects were placed at two random locations 
during the test phase.  The mean of the resulting misplacement, edge resizing, edge deflection, 
rearrangment, and swaps were calculated by applying our measures above.  For any pair of 
objects placed at random, mean item misplacement ought to be 52 cm, mean edge resizing 28 
cm, mean edge deflection π/2 radians, and the expected probability for rearrangements and 
swaps 50% and 25% respectively.   
 
Note that this definition of random performance does not take into account biases present in 
our experimenter or participants.  For instance, during the study phase no object was positioned 
less than 10cm from the outer edge of the table, meaning that the utilized area of the table was 
closer  to 90x90.  However, since making use of this information would imply some level of 
memory on the part of our participants, we chose to use the less constrained definition of 
randomness above. 
 
Results 
What kinds of errors do amnesic participants make? 
We first consider reconstruction performance for displays that contained familiar, everyday 
objects (Fig. 2.1).   
Memory load 
Relative to healthy comparison participants, at all set sizes, and on all metrics, amnesic 
participants were impaired in reconstructing object configurations after an approximately 4s 
delay.  ANOVAs with factors Group (amnesic/comparison) and Set Size (2, 3, 4, and 5) were 
conducted on each measure. While every measure yielded a main effect of group (all p< 0.01, 
see below), only rearrangements yielded a main effect of set size (F(3,6)=4.11  p<0.01).  Thus, 
after accounting for relational complexity, we found no additional effect of memory load on 
patient performance on any measure except rearrangements.  
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Figure 2.1 
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Spatial Measures 
We report mean performance on the item misplacement metric, collapsed across the number of 
objects that were studied (2, 3, 4, and 5), as well as the mean performance for each object set 
size (Fig. 2.1a). A mixed 2-by-4 ANOVA with factors of group and set size with yielded a main 
effect of Group (F(1,6)=137.74, p<0.0001), indicating reliably poorer placement among amnesics 
for all set sizes. The visual trend for more misplacement with increasing set sizes did not reach 
significance (F(3,6)=1.47, p>0.22), nor was there an interaction between the two factors 
(F(3,6)=0.47, p>0.69).   On the edge resizing (Fig. 2.1b) and edge deflection (Fig. 2.1c) metrics 
that assess the reconstruction of the magnitude and direction of vectors between object pairs, 
we found similar effects.  For edge resizing, a mixed 2-by-4 ANOVA with group and set size 
showed a significant main effect of group (F(1,6)=48.45, p<0.0001) but there was no significant 
effect of set size (F(3,6)=1.49, p>0.21), nor was there an interaction between the two factors 
(F(3,6)=2.05, p>0.10). Likewise for edge deflection, there was a significant main effect of group 
(F(1,6)=36.66, p<0.0001), a nonsignificant main effect of set size (F(3,6)=1.64, p>0.17), and 
nonsignificant interaction (F(3,6)=1.3, p>0.27).   On the rearrangements metric (Fig. 2.1d), 
measuring performance at reconstructing an undistorted overall shape , showed a significant 
main effect of group (F(1,6)=22.53, p<0.0001), a significant main effect of set size (F(3,6)=4.11, 
p<0.01), and a significant interaction between the two factors (F(3,6)=3.43, p<0.02). Thus, 
amnesics were impaired overall, while both amnesics and comparisons made more 
rearrangement errors as set size increased, with this trend being disproportionately greater for 
amnesics.  
 
These findings replicate previous reports of worse performance for amnesics versus comparison 
participants using item misplacement measures of reconstruction (Smith and Milner, 1981, 
Jeneson, Mauldin, and Squire, 2010). In addition, they demonstrate that amnesic participants 
are also impaired relative to comparisons at reconstructing the positions of objects relative to 
each other and are also less likely than comparisons to reconstruct an accurate version of the 
general shape they observed during the study phase.   
 
Relational Measure 
Errors made in reconstructing the relative positions of objects, resulting in objects “swapping” 
positions, are summarized (Fig. 2.1e). The swaps measure showed a significant main effect of 
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group (F(1,6)=29.78, p<0.0001), but no significant main effect of set size (F(3,6)=0.96, p>0.4) and 
no significant interaction between the two factors (F(3,6)=1.01, p>0.3).   Thus patients were no 
less likely to swap a pair of items that appeared alone (set size 2) than they were to swap any 
pair of items that appeared in set sizes of three, four, or five.  This finding shows that 
hippocampal amnesics are also more likely than comparisons to fail at binding item identities to 
locations.  
 
Do any metrics show disproportionate impairment?  
All five measures were highly inter-correlated, with R2 between 0.95 and 0.69 (all P<0.02).  This 
was expected since some reconstruction errors might lead to high values on more than one 
metric (e.g., a swapped item will also be misplaced relative to its original location). To identify if 
any of these error types disproportionately impaired to overall performance we examined the 
relative proportion of reconstruction errors committed by amnesic versus comparison 
participants.  Relative to the other metrics, amnesics produced a strikingly disproportionate rate 
of errors for the swap metric (Fig. 2.2). For the other four metrics, amnesics performed between 
two and four times worse than comparisons.  However, on the swap metric, amnesics were 
more than 40 times worse than comparisons. Amnesics made a swap error on 17% of pairwise 
relations (31 swaps in 182 pairs) whereas comparisons made the error on only 0.4% (1 swap in 
242 pairs) of pairwise relations. There was only a single swap error made by any of the 
comparisons in any of the familiar-object conditions. By comparison, all three amnesic 
participants made numerous swap errors in the familiar object condition, with patient 2363 
making an average of 0.17 swap errors per relation (10 swaps in 60 pairs), patient 1846 making 
0.14 (11 swaps in 80 pairs), and patient 2308 making 0.25 (10 swaps in 40 pairs).  For trials in 
which amnesic participants committed swap errors, 66% involved one swap error, 24% involved 
two errors, 5% involved three errors, and 5% involved four errors. Thus, more than one swap 
error in a single trial was a frequent occurrence for amnesics (34%), while never occurring in the 
performance of any of the comparison participants (0%). Additionally, when adjusted for 
number of relations amnesic participants made swap errors at an approximately equal rate for 
all set sizes while comparisons made the error only once and only in a 5-item set. Swap errors 
were thus an essentially unique identifier of amnesic participants. 
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Figure 2.2 
 
 
Are swap errors the primary deficit in amnesia? 
Given the strikingly disproportionate prevalence of swap errors relative to the other error types, 
we next asked whether swap errors constitute the primary deficit in amnesia. In other words, 
what is the causal relation between swap errors and errors on the other metrics? 
 
One possible explanation for the high incidence of swaps errors made by amnesic participants is 
simply that they made large misplacement errors. That is, what appeared to be swap errors 
actually could have resulted from misplacement errors wherein item locations were 
reconstructed so inaccurately that items were actually placed in another object’s studied 
location. Thus, we examined how likely it would be for items to swap given the study-time 
distance between pairs of items, and the magnitude of patients’ misplacement errors.  We 
tested this with a Monte Carlo simulation that utilized the item misplacement values and the 
study-time inter-item distances collected from patients in our observed data. The simulation 
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randomly drew a pair of misplacements and an inter-item distance each iteration, controlling for 
set size. This had the effect of creating a new set of data in which pairs of objects moved 
randomly according to the distribution of the actual misplacement data. Each run of the 
simulation produced a number of data points equal to those observed in the real experiment, 
and we calculated the mean number of swaps present in the simulated data over 1,000 runs. For 
each run of the simulation, we performed a 1-way ANOVA on the observed versus the simulated 
data, and here report the mean incidence of swaps, and mean p values produced by this 
simulation (Fig. 2.3). The Monte Carlo simulation showed that based on item misplacements 
alone, patients should have made only 0.045 (SD = 0.015) swaps per pairwise relation, far less 
than the 0.17 swaps per relation actually observed. This meant that on average, the Monte-
Carlo simulation produced approximately 8 (SD = 2.73) swaps, while the empirical data 
contained 31. This difference was significant: Given the observed level of misplacement error, 
the mean probability of observing the number of swaps in the actual data due to item 
misplacement alone was 0.007. Therefore, overall poor spatial positioning of items individually 
was not the cause of the high level of swap errors actually observed (i.e., general item 
misplacement was not primary to swap error).  
Figure 2.3 
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Do swap errors contribute to amnesics’ poor performance on item misplacement? 
We next tested the opposite direction of causality (i.e., determining whether the high incidence 
of swap errors might be contributing to the overall poor spatial positioning performance of 
amnesic participants). We recalculated item misplacement after removing the error values 
introduced by swaps (i.e., calculating item misplacement only for un-swapped items). If swap 
errors were primary to item-placement errors, we would expect a significant reduction in simple 
spatial errors after removing the effects of swaps. This was confirmed (Fig. 2.4).  Although 
amnesic participants still performed worse than comparisons after removal of item 
misplacement due to swaps (main effect of group, F(1,3)=5.15, p<0.03), removing swaps led to a 
significant reduction in item misplacement (one way ANOVA with swaps-present vs. swaps-
removed, F(1,3)=31.49, p<0.0001). This suggests that the amnesic participants’ deficits on the 
standard item-misplacement measure can be at least partially attributed to their poor 
performance on the swap metric.  We also used an “unswapping” algorithm (see Appendix A) to 
determine whether poor misplacement performance led to swaps, the results of which 
converge with the above analysis showing that improvements in item misplacement are not 
simply due to discarding poor trials.   
Figure 2.4
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Do patients simply perform randomly? 
It is illustrative to compare participants’ performance across the measures to an objective 
benchmark: random performance.  Supposing neither patients nor comparisons were allowed to 
see the study phase, but were still able to place objects in random positions.  Their performance 
could only be randomly related to the experimenter-positioned objects (based on the premise 
that both the experimenter and participants are equally likely to place any object at any 
coordinate on a 100x100 cm grid, see Methods).   
 
On all measures except swaps, both patients and comparisons perform far above chance across 
all set sizes (the 95% confidence interval does not include chance), demonstrating that, in an 
information processing sense, they possessed some useful information about the original 
configuration.  Yet on swaps, comparisons’ performance for familiar objects was nearly perfect: 
the 95% confidence interval included 0%.  For amnesics, swap performance was nearly at 
chance: the 95% confidence interval included 25%.   This quantitative difference cannot be 
much larger.  For reconstructing the object-identity-to-vertex-position bindings, comparisons 
behaved as if they had nearly perfect information, while patients behaved as if they had nearly 
no information about such bindings.  
 
Do novel-object displays have a disproportionate impact on patients?  
The same reconstruction was also performed using a set of 14 novel objects, composed of white 
foam blocks carved into various complex shapes and covered in patterns of simple lines and 
other shapes (James, Shima, Tarr, Gauthier 2005).  
 
We performed the same series of analyses (i.e., misplacement, edge resizing, edge deflection, 
rearrangements, and swaps) of reconstruction performance for arrays composed of novel 
objects (Fig.2.5), as well as an ANOVA for each measure with a factor of item type (familiar v. 
novel). Here we describe the main findings averaged across all set sizes to facilitate comparisons 
with the effects identified using familiar objects. 
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Figure 2.5 
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Performance was significantly worse for novel objects relative to familiar objects for three of the 
five metrics, as indicated by significant main effects of the object-type factor (for the item-
misplacement, edge-deflection, and rearrangement metrics, (F(1,6)=7.48, 6.6, and 4.932, 
respectively, p’s < 0.01, 0.02, and 0.04), although not for the edge-resizing (F(1,6)=0.3, p=0.60) 
and swap (F(1,6)=3.25, p=0.72) metrics). As was the case for familiar objects, for novel objects 
amnesic participants showed worse performance than comparison participants for all five 
metrics, as indicated by significant main effects of group (for the item-misplacement, edge-
resizing, edge-deflection, rearrangement, and swap metrics, (F(1,6)=220.2, 136.7, 129.9, 60.3, 
and 84.2, respectively, all p’s < 0.001). However, there was no evidence that novel objects 
impaired performance to a greater extent in amnesic than in comparison participants for any of 
the metrics; the interactions of object-type by group were all nonsignificant (p’s between 0.15 
and 0.65).   
 
As for familiar objects, a striking characteristic of amnesic participants' performance with novel 
objects was the highly disproportionate incidence of swap errors compared to all other error 
types. Relative to comparisons, amnesic participants’ performance was 2.2 times worse for item 
misplacement, 1.7 times worse for edge resizing, 2.3 times worse for edge deflection, and 1.75 
times worse for rearrangement, but 7.3 times worse for swaps. Amnesics made a swap error on 
21.4% of the opportunities they had to do so (39 swaps in 182 pairs), whereas comparisons 
made the error on only 3% of their opportunities (7 swaps in 249 pairs).All three amnesic 
participants made numerous swap errors, with patient 2363 making an average of 0.18 swap 
errors per pairwise relation (11 swaps in 60 pairs), patient 1846 making 0.28 (22 swaps in 80 
pairs), and patient 2308 making 0.15 (6 swaps in 40 pairs). For trials on which any swap error 
occurred, amnesics frequently made multiple swaps: 54% involved one swap error, but 19% 
involved two errors, 11% involved three errors, 5% involved four errors, and 11% involved five 
errors. By contrast, multiple swaps were much less frequent in comparison participants: 85% 
involved only one swap error and the other 15% involved only two. As was the case for familiar 
objects, amnesics made swap errors for all set sizes whereas comparisons made these errors 
only for 4- and 5-item sets. 
In addition, since comparison participants were no longer at “ceiling” on the swap metric, we 
once again examined patient to comparison relative performance across the five metrics (Fig. 
2.6).  Once again, the swap measure showed the most disproportionate deficit, with patients 
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performing 7.2 times worse than comparisons, with relative performance on the other four 
measures between 1.7 and 2.3.   
Figure 2.6 
 
Finally, Monte Carlo simulations showed the same direction of causality for the various error 
types for novel objects as was observed with familiar objects. The prevalence of swap errors was 
significantly higher than would have been expected by chance if they were due entirely to pure 
item-misplacement error (Mean Simulated Swaps per relation=0.05, mean p< 0.01). 
Furthermore, removal of all item-misplacement error due to swap error led to a significant 
reduction in item-misplacement error for both groups (F(1,6)=216.31, P<0.001), and a 
disproportionately greater reduction in error for amnesics. Thus, for novel objects as for familiar 
ones, swap errors cause an over-estimate of the memory deficits suggested by item-
misplacement errors. 
 
Discussion 
Individuals with hippocampal amnesia displayed impaired performance in reconstruction of 
spatial locations of small arrays of objects over a short delay interval. Impairments were present 
both in the standard measure in such paradigms, involving the degree of item misplacements 
(mean distance between objects’ position at study versus reconstructed position as placed by 
the participant at test), and for all other metrics we used to examine aspects of the memory 
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representations needed to support reconstruction of object locations. Strikingly, the observed 
deficit was markedly disproportionate for errors involving object-for-object swapping, which 
evaluated object-identity-to-relative-location bindings. For arrays of familiar objects, amnesic 
participants committed swap errors at a rate more than 40 times that of comparison 
participants, who almost never committed this kind of error; making swaps nearly a unique 
identifier of amnesia in our sample. 
 
The high incidence of swap errors in amnesia was shown via simulation analysis not to arise 
from larger-than-normal item misplacement. Instead, the causal relationship between these 
error types was in the other direction. Findings showed that removal of swap errors from the 
analysis led to a significant reduction in the estimates of item misplacement error, suggesting 
that a significant proportion of the overall poor performance resulted from the inability to track 
object-identity-to-relative-location bindings. Notably, the prevalence of swap errors in the 
performance of participants with hippocampal amnesia was seen for two independent stimulus 
categories (familiar objects and novel objects), and held across all set sizes.  
 
One possible explanation of the pattern of performance across the various metrics is that both 
patients and comparisons were able to represent the object arrays as simple “shapes” formed 
by perceptual closure (with each object corresponding to a vertex of the shape c.f., Uttal, and 
Chiong 2004), and/or as a motoric sequence indexing each location within the array (as in the 
Corsi block tapping task, which is partially spared in patients with hippocampal damage c.f. Corsi 
1972, Kessels et al. 2000). However, whatever spared representation underlies patient 
performance; it seems to lack the cross-domain binding information about which items occupy 
which spatial indices.  Thus, comparison participants were highly successful both at 
reconstructing the array outline and at placing each object at the specific vertex position at 
which it was studied, as demonstrated by their relatively successful reconstruction performance 
measured using all metrics. Amnesic participants were somewhat less successful at 
reconstructing the geometry of object arrays (as indicated by their deficits in our first four edge 
metrics), but showed strikingly disproportionate impairment in representing the arbitrary 
object-to-vertex mappings required to replace the correct objects in their specific vertex 
positions, instead swapping object-to-vertex relations.  These swap errors were nearly 
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diagnostic of hippocampal amnesia; in our sample if a swap error was observed on a familiar 
object trial, it was 97% likely that a patient was positioning the objects.   
 
This is best illustrated by one especially striking feature of patient performance: the presence of 
swap errors by patients on two-object trials.  Even in our task’s simplest condition, with only 
single binding between a single pair of familiar objects, requiring maintenance for a few 
seconds, patients still reversed the positions of the two objects approximately once every five 
opportunities—a rate of swapping similar to that which would be produced without any 
knowledge of the proper arrangement of objects.  Intuitively, and as observed in the 
performance of healthy comparisons, errors of this kind should be vanishingly rare in 
neurologically intact participants.  
 
The deficits observed here were for brief retention intervals and short lags traditionally 
associated with working memory. This is consistent with other findings of relational memory 
deficits in amnesia at short retention intervals (Ryan and Cohen, 2004, Hannula, Tranel, and 
Cohen, 2006, Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, and Cohen, 2007).  and also with recent evidence that the 
human hippocampus is essential for the expression of memory even with no interposed study-
test delay (e.g., when memory is used online to guide exploration behavior, as in Voss et al., 
20011a, Voss, et al., 20011b, or to assemble and maintain complex representation as in Warren 
et al., 2012). It also converges with fMRI findings of hippocampal activation for relational 
memory over the same very short timescale (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, and D’Esposito, 2000, 
Piekema et al., 2006, Hannula and Ranganath, 2009) as well as with imaging data implicating the 
hippocampus more generally on the short-term/working memory timescale (Ranganath and 
D’Esposito, 2001, Stern, Sherman, Kirchoff, and Hasselmo, 2001, Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 
2005).  
 
One of our goals in using a simple but open-ended test complemented by a suite of 
performance metrics was to test different theoretical accounts of hippocampal deficits.   Our 
analysis provides the strongest support for theories that emphasize arbitrary relational bindings 
as the primary hippocampal representation (indexed by our swaps metric).  Because removal of 
swap errors did not entirely ameliorate patients’ reconstruction deficits, our analysis also 
provides partial support for theories that emphasize geometric, spatial, hippocampal 
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representations (at least where these spatial representations correspond to simple Cartesian 
coordinate maps, the vectors and landmarks of a polar coordinate representation, or unitized, 
shapes formed by perceptual/motor processes), as indexed by our misplacement, edge resizing, 
edge deflection, and rearrangement metrics.  However, we were able to explain the 
preponderance of these spatial deficits as the secondary consequences of swap errors.  While 
the remaining deficit does partly support spatial theories of hippocampal function, it may also 
be a consequence of our pair-wise swap measure which counts only two dimensional rotations 
of inter-item vectors in a continuous, Cartesian space.  Swap measures that take into account 
multi-item swaps (e.g., rotation of trios of objects), categorical swaps (e.g., swapping the left 
and right halves of a figure), or non-spatial swaps (e.g., perseveration of a previously 
reconstructed shape) could perhaps account for some additional portion of the deficit and are 
an intriguing avenue of future study.  Finally, we found little evidence that hippocampal amnesia 
was best explained by a deficit in transferring information from a limited capacity working-
memory system to long-term memory (indeed patients made swap errors over short delays 
even in the two object condition, and the error rate did not increase for larger set sizes after 
accounting for the increase in relational complexity).  We would explain findings that amnesics 
make disproportionally greater misplacement errors on arrays with large numbers of items 
(Jeneson, Mauldin, and Squire, 2010) as a natural consequence of linear growth in item counts 
producing combinatorially more opportunities to commit swap errors.  
 
However, our goal was not to adjudicate competing theories, but to identify the primary 
memory deficit resulting from hippocampal damage.  Since the experiment examines only 
spatial reconstruction, it is impossible to infer if swap errors are a consequence of a deficit 
specific to item-identity-to-location bindings (c.f., Lee et al. 2005, Hartley et al. 2006), or if they 
arise from a deficit in a more domain-general binding system.  Our findings are compatible with 
any theory that proposes that the hippocampal is critical to performance that relies upon 
flexible, reconfigurable bindings that index locations, and that it is the disruption of such 
bindings that causes generally poor spatial performance.  Our assertion that these findings more 
strongly support a representation scheme based upon arbitrary relational binding than a 
scheme that emphasizes spatial relations arises  from the fact that spatial representations often 
carry connotations of geometric properties such as coordinates, distances, angles, and shapes 
which, according to the measures reported here, were less disrupted by hippocampal than item-
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identity-to-location-bindings.  Four of the metrics (edge resizing, edge deflection, 
rearrangement, and swaps) are spatial relational measures, but only the relations supporting 
performance on the swap metric are disproportionately impaired by hippocampal damage.  The 
spatial reconstruction paradigm we used provides rich behavioral records, and avoids many 
confounds between relational and item memory (e.g., test format, test difficulty, retention 
interval, etc.).  We showed that while the hippocampus is certainly involved in spatial 
representations of all types, there is one kind of representation (which binds item identities to 
their relative locations) for which an intact hippocampus is the difference between chance level 
performance and perfect performance. Furthermore, this binding deficit is primary to more 
traditionally measured spatial reconstruction impairments.  The precision of our result supports 
a similarly precise theoretical account that emphasizes that general memory impairments result 
from specific binding deficits. Rather than simply highlighting tasks which are impaired by 
hippocampal damage, theoretical accounts should be able to explain why a measure uniquely 
sensitive to binding errors (e.g., our swap metric) is most indicative of hippocampal impairment, 
and why representations of arbitrarily assigned, reconfigurable, item-identity-to-relative-
location-bindings so critically depend on hippocampal function.   
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Abstract 
Binding together complex configurations of stimulus relations supports all kinds of mental 
construction, including remembering, imagining, reasoning, and prediction (Hassabis & Maguire, 
2009a).  However, the diverse properties of the stimuli used in studies of mental 
(re)construction often produces asymmetries in difficulty across stimulus categories, for 
example, pitting memory for small numbers of spatial locations against memory for large 
numbers of objects that occupy those locations (Kumaran & Maguire, 2005; Ryan, Lin, Ketcham, 
& Nadel, 2010).   This mismatch in memory requirements is a confound for memory theories 
suggesting that increased hippocampal involvement in domain-specific relations may be due to 
the increased relational binding demands of more complex or arbitrary tasks, rather than 
domain-specific hippocampal processing preferences.  In this paper we present the Event 
Reconstruction Technique (ERT), a method for comparing arbitrary relational binding of stimuli 
across domains and complexity levels.  Among healthy college-aged participants, we found 1) 
that behavioral performance was best predicted by the complexity of the binding at hand; 2) 
once this variation was accounted there was no significant effect of domain (spatial or temporal) 
on performance.  When different types of choice complexity were constrained by non-arbitrary 
rules participants were able to leverage these rules to dramatically increase their performance 
above chance.  Finally, participants made errors that revealed a hierarchically organized 
memory for the stimuli.  For example if participants switched the locations of pair of scenes, 
they would often “import” faces which were paired with those scenes during study to their new, 
incorrectly reconstructed location.  
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Introduction 
“Going to the feelies this evening Henry? Enquired the Assistant Predestinator.  “I hear the new 
one at the Alhambra is first-rate.  There’s a love scene on a bearskin rug; they say it’s marvelous.  
Every hair of the bear reproduced.  The most amazing tactile effects.” 
-Brave New World (3.42), Aldous Huxley 
 
Our everyday experience of episodic remembering is a rich reconstructive process that brings 
together past visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory experiences to produce vivid 
internal scenes not unlike those of Huxley’s “feelies.”  For particularly detailed or salient 
memories, this reconstruction can feel almost as if we had returned to the moment, via “mental 
time travel” (Tulving, 2002).  This mental construction system has recently garnered increased 
research interest to help understand how perceptual, memory, and cognitive systems interact 
to produce rich, internal, representations (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis 
& Maguire, 2009) 
 
However, this involvement of multiple brain and memory systems makes mental reconstruction 
particularly difficult to study.  Reconstruction requires configuring many different dimensions of 
information (items, space, time), which may come from different sensory modalities.  This 
process is dynamic and interactive (Voss, Gonsalves, Federmeier, Tranel, & Cohen, 2011),with 
constant updates and edits to the reconstruction.  Of particular difficultly, is finding a measure 
that can compare the accuracy of a mental reconstruction to the original event (Koriat, 
Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000), since the reconstruction often involves qualitatively different kinds 
of information it is unclear how to compare performance, especially if some domains are more 
complex than others.   
 
For example, in Watson et al. (2013), patients with hippocampal damage were far more likely to 
commit “high level” reconstruction errors (e.g., switching the relative positions of object pairs), 
than “low level” errors (e.g., shifting an object relative to its studied position) as compared to 
control participants.  However, because this spatial reconstruction was analogue, it is difficult to 
compare the relative difficulty of these different aspects of the task.  It is clear that neither 
patients nor controls had a representation fine-grained enough to replace each item at the exact 
1cm by 1cm point where it was originally studied, but it is unclear at what level participants 
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were “chunking” space.  Without knowing how many elements were in play, it’s impossible to 
tell how complex (that is, how alternative configurations it is possible to construct) the bindings 
required to reconstruct the configuration were.  Since the task requires choosing the correct 
reconstruction from a vast family of well-formed but incorrect alternatives, higher levels of 
complexity are simply more difficult, and thus require more reconstructive memory. 
 
In addition, even when the level of complexity is controlled for, different aspects of a task may 
vary in how arbitrarily the different components of the stimulus are related, that is, given partial 
information about the stimulus to what degree could one predict the missing information of the 
stimulus.  For example, Konkel et al., (2008), observed a decreasing gradient of hippocampal 
dependence for item, spatial, temporal, and re-pair conditions despite each of these conditions 
involving the same number of elements and relations at encoding time.  However, in the “item” 
condition, two familiar objects were paired with a novel object.  Correct rejection could be 
accomplished by noticing the novel object or by correctly recalling the “missing” familiar object 
via its relationship with one of two familiar objects.  Since memory constrains the different 
conditions in different ways, each will require a different amount of reconstruction, and thus 
require different contributions of hippocampal processing. 
 
However, many experiments assume the null hypothesis: that different levels of complexity and 
arbitrariness at reconstruction ought to result in the same level of reconstructive difficulty and 
hippocampal involvement.  A more constrained recognition memory study (Ryan et. al 2010), 
compared spatial, temporal, object, and semantic performance within a single common 
experimental framework.  Participants studied object arrays and later answered questions about 
the locations, order, and properties of items in the arrays.  However, while items were trial-
unique, the same four spatial locations, were used in each block, and there were six sequential 
arrays (six “moments”).  Thus, while each item uniquely indexed a particular location in space 
and moment in time, each location was mapped to six different objects, and each moment to 
four (Figure 3.1).  This confounds memory strength with complexity and arbitrariness.  Since 
there are six paired associates with the upper-left hand location, participants have a better 
chance of selecting an item that appeared in the upper-left than of picking an item that 
appeared in the first array (1/4 v. 1/6), even if they remember nothing about the arrays.  But for 
precisely the same reason, if participants have a poorer chance of identifying “the item that 
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appeared in the upper-left first” (drawing the correct item out of a set of six), than they do of 
identifying the “upper-left-most-item in the first array” (drawing the correct item out of a set of 
four).  It is difficult to say then, if a variation in performance or the involvement of different 
brain regions in such an experiment is due to an associative strength or interference. 
Figure 3.1: Mismatches in the complexity of item, spatial, and temporal information 
 
Different numbers of object, spatial, and temporal elements argue for different levels of performance, and differential 
involvement of different brain systems.  Without controlling for these differences in complexity, any observed differences might 
simply be due to predictably different baselines in different conditions (Adapted from Ryan et. al 2010). 
 
This article presents an original, interactive, reconstructive experiment that attempts to account 
for the richness of memory reconstructions, while at the same time controlling for different 
levels of associative strength and confusability to allow an apples-to-apples comparison of 
performance across different levels of multi-modal stimulus complexity.  Our goal was to 
determine which type(s) of information participants used to guide memory reconstruction, and 
how that information was organized.   
Participants viewed a series of short movie clips and reconstructed the relations between the 
people, places, locations, and time present therein.  By analyzing the number of free parameters 
(i.e., the number of ways it was possible to configure each set of relations), we were able to 
obtain expected performance due to chance in each category of relations, and by comparing 
these expected levels of performance to those actually produced by our participants we were 
thus able to determine what information participants were using to guide their reconstruction.  
By analyzing systematic patterns of errors, we are able to construct a set of dependencies that 
permitted us to determine which types of information were the primary organizers of 
reconstruction, and which types were subvenient classes.  
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Methods 
Participants 
Behavioral data were collected from 26 college aged participants (14 females and 12 males).  16 
of these participants were paid, while 10 received class credit.  One participant was excluded for 
failing to complete the experiment. 
 
Experimental paradigm 
Participants performed a complex reconstruction task (Figure 3.2).  During the “study” phase of 
the task participants viewed a brief (6s) movie clip consisting of a set of 6 still pictures, each 
involving a face superimposed on a scene.  There were six unique faces and three unique 
scenes.  Each face appeared at one of six possible “sockets” within a scene and each scene 
appeared at one of three possible “venues” on the screen.  While the faces could appear at any 
of the sockets at any time, the scenes appeared sequentially with the first one always appearing 
in the upper left hand venue, the second always in the middle venue, and the last always in the 
lower right hand venue.   During the “test” phase of the task participants reconstructed the 
configuration of stimuli they had originally seen by dragging each face and each scene to the 
remembered “sockets” and “venues” respectively.  Once all of the stimuli had been placed 
spatially, participants labeled each face with the time it appeared (1st, 2nd etc.).  Participants 
were not timed, and were free to re-order the faces, scenes, and times to their satisfaction 
before moving on to the next block.  There were a total of 50 study/test blocks, interleaved with 
pleasant images (pictures of kittens) as a brief break between blocks.  Before beginning 
participants were extensively briefed on the form and nature of the experiment, and given the 
opportunity to attempt two un-scored practice trials.  
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Figure 3.2: An example trial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A) An example study phase.  Each face-background pair 
appeared for 2s and was immediately followed by the 
next pair.  The same faces, backgrounds, and locations 
were used in all trials, only the configuration varied.   
The first two face-background pairs always appeared 
in the upper left quadrant of the screen, and always 
involved the same background.  The second appeared 
in the middle and the last in the lower right.  The 
locations and order of the faces within the 
backgrounds varied, as did the mapping of each 
background to the “venue” on the screen it appeared 
in.   
B) An example reconstruction.  Participants used the 
mouse to drag the faces and backgrounds to their 
original locations.  And then labeled them with the 
order in which they appeared.  The figure shows the 
initial configuration of faces and backgrounds 
presented to the participants, a partial reconstruction, 
and the completed reconstruction.  Note the error the 
participant made swapping the order and locations of 
the pair of faces in the second background.    
 67 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were divided into scenes and faces.  There were three unique scenes, and six unique 
faces which were reused in all 50 blocks of the experiment, differing only in their relational 
configuration.  The scenes (Brand X Photography) were visually complex, and included two 
outdoor and one indoor scene.  The faces included three male faces and three female faces all 
white and all in neutral or smiling expressions (Althoff & Cohen, 1999).    
 
There were three unique “venues” into which scene could be placed, which were occupied 
sequentially from upper left to lower right.  Any scene could appear in any venue on a given 
trial.  There were six unique sockets into which faces could be placed, each of these locations 
was associated with each of the scene locations meaning there were a total of 18 possible 
sockets into which faces could be placed.  However, faces were constrained to appear only once 
per socket, and only two locations would be occupied by faces per venue.   The face/scene 
distinction mirrored the socket/venue distinction: 6 small objects (faces) were placed in six small 
locations (venues), while three large objects (scenes) were placed in three large locations 
(venues). Participants were made aware of these constraints in their initial briefing.   
 
In total, this made for 24 unique stimulus components, 3 scenes, 3 venues, 6 faces, 6 unique 
face sockets, and 6 unique “time-slots” for faces.  The combinatorics of this set of objects allows 
for 3,110,400 (3!*6!*6!) possible unique study trials.  Each of these combinations of 
components involves a set of bindings between the different components, 3 scene-venue 
mappings, 6 scene-face mappings, 6 scene-socket mappings, 6 scene-time mappings, 6 venue -
face mappings, 6 venue -socket mappings, 6 venue –time mappings, 6 face-socket mappings, 6 
face-time mappings, and 6 socket -time mappings for a total of 57 unique relations present in 
each study and reconstruction trial. 
 
The set of study trials was generated by randomly assigning a complete set of relations (57 in 
total) to the 24 components in each of 50 blocks.  The set was checked to ensure there was no 
exactly repeated configuration.  This corpus was divided into four counter balanced versions and 
each participant viewed one of these.  Thus each participant viewed the same set of study trials, 
though not necessarily in the same order to avoid any incidental ordering effects.  
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Analysis 
Relational Performance via graph theoretic analysis 
A natural framework for analyzing these data is graph theory (for an introduction, c.f. Diestel, 
2010).  Each of the 24 unique items is mapped to a “node” in a graph, and each of the 57 unique 
relations is an “edge” connecting a pair of item nodes.  By constructing a graph composed of the 
configuration items and relations in the study phase, and comparing it to the graph constructed 
from the reconstruction configuration we can straightforwardly measure the relations that were 
reconstructed correctly and those that were misassigned (c.f. Figure 3.3).  This data can be 
analyzed to see if performance varies across different types of relations (e.g., are participants 
more successful at putting faces in the correct sockets or at putting backgrounds in the correct 
venues?) 
 
Additionally, this method helps disambiguate which portion of performance is due to memory 
for  particular configuraitons and performance which might be predicted based soley on the 
general rules that generate each configuraiton. That is to say, since all of the studied 
configurations were generated by a single psuedorandom algorithm, participants could achive 
above-zero reconstruction performance by simply following all of the rules of that algorithm 
even if they never saw the particular configuration they were meant to reconstruct!  Thus, the 
lower bound on performance (i.e. “chance level” performance), depends upon the participants’ 
model of the algorithm that generated the inputs (and upon random effects such as 
idiosynchratic strategies, fluctuations in attention etc.).  This is roughly equivalent to saying that 
the participants’ performance is a combination of “episodic” (i.e., information tied to a 
particular reconstruction), and “semantic” (i.e., information common to all reconstructions), 
components.  The elegant way to decompose the “episodic” and “semantic” components is to 
compute the degree of overlap between a studied-reconstruction pair, and then subtract from 
that the degree of overlap between that reconstruction and the reconstruction immediately 
prior.  Since the two reconstructions can only resemble each other due to information which is 
shared across trials, their overlap must correspond to the “semantic” component and any 
additional information provided by the study trial (i.e., the “episodic” component) is then 
equivalent to increase in similarity between studied and reconstructed configurations over the 
semantic component.   
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Figure 3.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An example of a study-reconstruction pair of graphs.  In this case, the reconstruction has an error, the Face-socket relations for 
Face 1 and 2 have been swapped.  
 
Using this framework we were able to examine participants performance by measuring how 
many relations are correctly reconstructed.  Additionally, we are able to compare different types 
of relations to see if some are better remembered than others. 
 
Domains, Complexity, Arbitrariness 
 
There are ten different types of relations reconstructed by participants (generated by the ten 
ways it is possible to bind together a pair of elements, e.g., a face and a socket).  We examined 
three critical comparisons: 
1. Object-Object relations v. Spatial-Spatial relations 
Face-background relations and socket-venue relations are matched in the degree of 
complexity (3 elements mapped to 6 elements), and arbitrariness (2-to-1 mappings), but 
differ in the domain they concern (faces and backgrounds are both “objects dropped 
into slots” while sockets and venues are both “slots that accept objects”).  Thus if 
performance differs it should be due to the underlying effect of the domain.   
2. Simple mappings v. complex mappings 
Study Phase 
Face 
1 
Socket 
1 
Socket 
2 
Face 
2 
Reconstruction Phase 
Face 
1 
Socket 
1 
Socket 
2 
Face 
2 
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The background-to-venue binding maps 3 elements to 3 elements, using a 1 to 1 and 
onto rule.  The face-to-time binding maps 6 elements to 6 elements, also using a 1 to 1 
and onto rule.  Thus differences in performance between these two bindings are likely 
due to differences in their complexity.  
3. Strongly rule-bound mappings v. arbitrary mappings. 
The most strongly constrained binding is venue-to-time which is completely 
deterministic.  We compared it to the equally complex, but less strongly constrained 
background-to-time binding (since backgrounds appear at arbitrary times). 
 
 
Structural measures via realignment 
Looking at reconstruction performance only in terms of “errors” is somewhat misleading.  When 
a participant binds an element incorrectly, they are guaranteed to make a second error since by 
assigning relations incorrectly excludes the nodes to which those relations were assigned from 
being bound correctly. Thus, no error can be made independently of any other error.  Worse 
still, some errors introduce unresolvable conflicts in subsequent reconstruction. For example, if 
the participant transposes a pair of background-venue relations (i.e., swapping the locations of a 
pair of scenes), it is impossible to correctly assign both face-background and face-venue 
bindings (since the scenes are in the wrong venues, the participant must choose to place the 
appropriate faces in the correct background or the correct venue, but cannot do both).  
To capture how well participants are able to preserve the general structure of relations in the 
presence of different error types we created a measure that can quantify the distance between 
study and test trials.  This measure is aimed at capturing quantitatively what is often obvious to 
memory researchers qualitatively-that a participant confused a pair of items or a block of trials-
but made an excellent reconstruction of the configuration given that initial mistake.   
This measure was constructed by describing each configuration with a sentence of 36 words, 
one for each of the elements that appeared at reconstruction time (i.e., 3 venues, 3 
backgrounds, 6 faces, 6 times, and 18 sockets).  The order of the symbols corresponded to the 
order in which they appeared reading from left to right placing venues before backgrounds, 
backgrounds before sockets, sockets before faces, and faces before times (i.e., the symbols were 
ordered according to a hierarchical, right-linear grammar).  For example, the sentences 
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describing the study and reconstruction (with the mismatched sub-strings underlined) trials 
depicted in Figure 3.2 are:  
 
Study 
 
V1, B1, S1, S2, S3, S4, F1, T1, S5, F2, T2, S6,  
V2, B2, S7, S8, F3, T3, S9, S10, S11, S12, F4, T4,  
V3, B3, S13, F5, T5, S14, S15, F6, T6, S16, S17, S18. 
 
Reconstruction 
 
V1, B1, S1, S2, S3, S4, F1, T1, S5, F2, T2, S6, 
V2, B2, S7, S8, F4, T4, S9, S10, S11, S12, F3, T3, 
V3, B3, S13, F5, T5, S14, S15, F6, T6, S16, S17, S18. 
 
The distance between sentences can be measured by calculating the number of operations 
required to convert one such sentence to another.  There are several possible operation 
measures (e.g., weighted Levenstein which measures substitutions, deletions, and insertions), 
however, since all of the symbols were present in the sentence, we defined operation cost in 
this case in terms of the number of rotations (i.e., moving all the symbols one step to the right 
or left) or reflections (reversing the order of the symbols) of the non-matching sub-region of the 
sentence pair.  To count the operations, the re-alignment algorithm identifies the mismatched 
region, and applies the rotation and reflection transforms to the string of mismatched elements.  
It then finds the transform that results in the greatest increase in match, and then recurs, 
focusing on the new, smaller error region. For example, the above study/reconstruction 
sentences are realigned via the following steps: 
 
Mismatched region 
F4, T4, F3, T3 
Rotation+1 
T3, F4, T4, F3 
Rotation +2 
F3, T3, F4, T4 
Target 
F3, T3, F4, T4 
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These two sequences are thus described as being 2 operations (2 rotations + 0 recursions), from 
each other.  In addition to the operations required to convert one sentence to the other, we can 
count the number of symbols which are simultaneously placed into the correct configuration.  If 
multiple elements “snap” into place simultaneously more often than might be expected due to 
chance, it suggests that these elements were bound together in an associated “chunk.”  Just as 
with cost, a difference in chunk size suggests different strategies for different conditions.  For 
details on the realignment algorithm and specifics on the structural similarity measures see 
Appendix B.  
More fundamentally, this approach can help to elucidate the representational format of 
reconstructive memory by telling us about the kind of information that participants store and 
how they organize it.   
For additional information about how metrics are calculated, see Appendix C.  We examine two 
measures produced by this algorithm: total cost (the mean of operations + recursions, for the 
example trial, the total cost would be 2), and chunk size (the mean of the size of the steps in the 
cost function, this is equivalent to the number of elements that snap into place simultaneously 
when the two sentences are realigned, suggesting that these elements were associated in a 
single chunk, for the example trial, the chunk size would be 4).  
 
This metric corresponds very closely to the qualitative descriptions of configurations and the 
modifications necessary to convert the reconstruction to the studied configuration.  We might 
describe the two configurations by saying that face 3 and face 4 had been swapped (in both 
space and time) by the participant, between study and reconstruction, and that to fix this 
mismatch we ought to swap them back.   
 
The “Semantic” and “Episodic” components 
In all of the above measures, there is no guarantee that participants’ performance, whether 
measured by accuracy or similarity, is due to exposure to the stimulus configuration presented 
at study time.  Even if participants did not observe the study trial, so long as they created some 
reconstruction, it would resemble the study trial at some chance level.  Some of this baseline 
performance is due to the constraints of the physical universe (e.g., each item may only occupy 
a single place and time, and no two items may occupy the same place and time), some of the 
baseline performance is due to constraints of the experimental apparatus (e.g., it was 
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impossible to place a background into a socket, only faces could be placed there), some of 
baseline is due to explicit experimental instructions (e.g., use each socket only once), and some 
is due to implicit instructions (e.g., place exactly two faces per background), and so on.  The 
experimenter cannot know exactly what mixture of these constraints a participant chooses to 
use.  Further, participants are free to use their own strategies and biases during reconstruction, 
including being willfully perverse and reconstructing configurations that systematically differ 
from the studied configuration. 
 
To disambiguate the degree to which participants relied upon information present in studied 
configurations (e.g., the bald man appeared in the upper left hand corner of the desert), from 
participants general reconstruction tendencies regardless of the particular studied configuration 
we performed a Monte-Carlo style control, using participants’ own performance as a model for 
their own general tendencies.   
 
We first considered how accurately or similarly a participant had reconstructed a studied 
configuration.  We then considered how accurately or similarly a participant had reconstructed 
their immediately prior reconstruction.  Since the each of the two reconstructions were 
constructed by the same participant, but did not share the information contained in the 
intervening study trial (i.e., a prior reconstruction could only contain information gleaned from 
the current study trial if the participants were precognitive), their performance can only 
correspond to whatever set of rules or strategies the participant chose to employ, and this 
performance corresponds to how well any of the participants reconstructions would serve as an 
example of the studied configuration-even if they had not yet seen the studied configuration.  
Any additional performance above this baseline measure could only result from information 
present in the studied configuration.  The logic of this comparison is very similar to that of word-
stem completion priming tasks that control for the chance a participant would produce the 
prime in response to the stem if they had not seen the prime (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970), 
with the additional benefit that each participant serves as their own control.  For an extensive 
discussion of why this approach is preferable to more traditional measures of chance, see 
Appendix B.   
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Because performance on reconstruction-reconstruction pairs corresponds to information 
present across trials, coded by general constraints, rules, strategies, or biases, we refer to this 
component of performance as the “semantic” component, taking this to mean “the portion of 
performance that could have been predicted without any knowledge of the particular studied 
configuration.”   The component of performance above this baseline that is present only within 
trials, and is tied to an individual studied configuration we refer to as the “episodic” component, 
taking this to mean “performance that could not have been predicted without information of 
the particular configuration being reconstructed.”  It is important to note that these terms, are 
not always used in precisely this way.   
 
Results  
 
How much did participants’ reconstructions depend upon episodic v. semantic information? 
Accuracy 
 
Participants’ mean reconstruction accuracy was 64.0% with a standard error of 1.6%.  Of this 
performance approximately 55.1% was due to semantic knowledge about the experiment (as 
measured by overlap between reconstructions), and 45.0% was due to information tied to the 
particular study-reconstruction episode (Figure 3.4).  This is equivalent to saying that of the 
original 64% of performance, knowledge of the general rules was sufficient to raise performance 
from 0 to 35.3% (s.e. 0.2%) , and information tied to a particular trial was sufficient to add an 
additional 28.6% (s.e., 1.5%) to bring the total to 64% (s.e. 1.6%). 
   Figure 3.4: Semantic and episodic accuracy 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the relative proportion of performance attributable to cross-trial “semantic” information, and within trial 
“episodic” information.   
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Critical comparisons of performance 
 
We made three critical comparisons between different types of bindings.  First we compared 
bindings within two different domains: items and space.  Item-item binding performance 
compared to location-location bindings (i.e., Were faces more strongly associated with 
backgrounds, regardless of location, or were sockets more strongly associated with venues, 
regardless of what item occupied them).   Second we compared a simple 3-to-3 mapping to a 
more complex 6-to-6 mapping.  Finally we compared a completely constrained deterministic 
binding to a more flexibly remappable binding of equal complexity (Figure 3.5).  For an overview 
of all ten possible pair-wise bindings, see Appendix D. 
 
Figure 3.5: Critical comparisons  
 
Figure 3.5 shows the episodic and semantic components of the three critical comparisons.   
 
In the three critical comparisons, there was no effect of domain (item v. location) after 
controlling for complexity and arbitrariness, but there was an effect of complexity and 
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arbitrariness, with more complex and more arbitrary patterns of bindings yielding lower 
performance.   
 
Additionally, a mixed ANOVA with factors of domain (item-item, item-space, item-time, space-
space, space-time), complexity (3 to 3, 3 to 6, and 6 to 6), arbitrariness (deterministic, flexible), 
and memory type (semantic, episodic), found significant effects of complexity (d.f., 1, F=20.17, 
P<0.0001), arbitrariness (d.f., 1, F=14.4, P<0.0002), and memory type (d.f. 1, F=12.37, P<0.0005), 
but no significant effect of domain (d.f., 4, F=0.44, P>0.783).   
 
Structural similarity 
Comparing structural similarity of configurations produced a slightly different story of the 
relative value of semantic and episodic information.  With no constraints (i.e., with a random 
string of symbols) it took an average of 63.8 steps (s.e., 0.3) to convert one string to another 
(i.e., any pair of configurations would be approximately 63.8 operations apart in the 
experiment’s “configuration space”).  However, it took only 14.1 steps (s.e., 0.2) to convert a 
reconstruction to the immediately preceding reconstruction, suggesting that the participants’ 
grasp of the semantic rules considerably constrained and improved their performance.  
However, realigning a reconstruction with the appropriate study trial was even better, taking 
only 12.2 steps (s.e., 0.6), providing a marginal improvement upon the semantic performance 
(Figure 3.6).  This relationship held for both the complexity of the operations required to 
translate one configuration to another (Random: mean = 51.8, s.e. = 0.3; Semantic: mean = 9.1, 
s.e. = 0.2; Episodic: mean = 7.8, s.e.= 0.4) and for the number of recursions required by the 
algorithm (Random: mean =  12.0, s.e. =  0.03; Semantic: mean = 5.0, s.e. = 0.06; Episodic: mean 
= 4.4, s.e. = 0.18), suggesting that  knowledge of the general semantics, and of specific 
information tied to a particular episode decreased both the breadth and depth of the search 
required to realign the two configurations.   
 
In addition, the mean number of elements that simultaneously “snapped” into place as a single 
chunk (ignoring those initially correctly ordered) varied across these three conditions.  For 
randomly arranged sentences, the average chunk size was 2.6 (s.e., 0.01), for semantically 
related reconstructions 3.6 (s.e., 0.03), and for episodically related study-reconstruction pairs, 
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3.0 (s.e., 0.06), suggesting that part of the increase in similarity over randomness was due to 
using larger “chunks.”  
Figure 3.6: Mean number of operations to restore studied target  
 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the mean number of operations required to convert a configuration to the studied target (represented by the 
point at the origin).  The green circle represents the number of steps from a randomly ordered sentence to the target, the blue 
circle the number of steps from a previous reconstruction to the target, and the red circle the number of steps from the 
participants’ current reconstruction to the target.  
 
Is structural similarity due to chunking? 
 
There two possibilities that might explain the pattern of similarity in Figure 6.  First, study-
reconstruction, or reconstruction-reconstruction pairs might simply have better initial 
performance: more items are correctly bound initially, but incorrectly bound items are bound 
randomly.  Second, the incorrectly positioned items share useful structural relationships, that is, 
they are associated in a chunk, but the chunk as a whole is bound incorrectly to the other items.  
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This latter possibility cannot be the case in the randomly bound case, since there are by 
definition, no meaningful structural relationships or associations between individual elements.   
 
Since each step in the realignment algorithm assumes that all of the incorrect items belong to 
the same chunk and attempts to find the transform that maximizes the number of correct 
bindings while preserving the structure of the chunk, we can evaluate these two hypotheses by 
examining how much similarity improves over the course of realignment for the “episodic” and 
“semantic” representations relative to randomly ordered elements (Figure 3.7).   
 
Figure 3.7: Similarity improves over the course of realignment 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the course of realignment for episodic, semantic, and random comparisons.  While much of the benefit of 
episodic and semantic representations over random comes from their lower initial number of incorrectly bound items, both 
slopes are also more curvilinear, suggesting that the incorrectly bound items within the episodic and semantic representations 
are realigned in larger “chunks” than the randomly ordered items.  
  
There is a large difference in the initial performance between the episodic and semantic 
realignments and the random comparison, the random comparison begins with a mean of 35.0 
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(s.e., 0.2) incorrectly bound items, compared to just 18.0 (s.e., 0.9) incorrectly bound items for 
the semantic (reconstruction-reconstruction) realignments, and only 15.8 (s.e., 1.2) for episodic 
(study-reconstruction) realignments.  
 
However, both episodic and semantic reconstructions had additional structure present in their 
incorrectly aligned elements.  The first “chunk” aligned by the algorithm for random data 
contained a mean of 3.7 elements (s.e., 0.01), while the first chunk realigned in the semantic 
condition contained 5.8 (s.e., 0.2) elements, and the episodic condition contained 5.0 (s.e., 0.3) 
elements.  However, this is not an apples-to-apples comparison, since the “first” chunk of the 
random data involved 35 elements of the 36 total elements, compared to just 18 for the 
semantic and 15.8 for the episodic conditions.  When the realignment algorithm acted on a 
random data chunk of size 18, it was only able to realign 2.8 (s.e., 0.1) items.  When it acted on a 
random chunk of size 16, it was only able to realign 2.7 elements (s.e. 0.1).  Thus, the chunks 
successfully realigned in the semantic and episodic conditions were nearly twice as large as 
those aligned at similar chunk sizes in randomly bound elements.   
 
To control for this, we measured the difference between both episodic and semantic 
reconstructions and random performance controlling for chunk size by finding a random chunk 
of the same size as the one present in the episodic and semantic reconstructions.  The mean 
number of bound elements per-reconstruction in excess of what would be predicted from 
realigning random data was 12.4 (s.e., 0.4) for semantic reconstructions, and 15.4 (s.e., 0.8), for 
episodic reconstructions.   
 
Discussion 
We used an event-reconstruction paradigm to analyze reconstructive memory for previously 
viewed events assessing both accuracy and general structural similarity.   In addition, we 
separated performance tied to the general cross-trial “semantics” from performance tied to a 
specific single-trial “episode,” and showed that these two components made roughly equivalent 
contributions to performance.  Using a set of critical comparisons we showed that participants’ 
reconstruction accuracy was strongly related to the level of complexity of the relations they 
reconstructed, and to the arbitrariness of the rules for binding, but we found little to 
differentiate performance on different stimulus categories.   
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This pattern of performance suggests that much of the data explained by theories of mental 
processing can be equally well explained with reference to intrinsic differences in the complexity 
of the data, without the need to propose any special mechanism.  Theories which emphasize the 
spatial or temporal nature of cognitive processing for example, cannot rest solely on differences 
in performance on spatial or temporal tasks, because spatial and temporal tasks must 
necessarily contain types of relational complexity (e.g., ordering, dimensionality, an ambiguous 
number of “locations”), absent in simpler item based tasks.   
 
At a structural level, both the episodic and semantic reconstructions performed dramatically 
better than randomly bound configurations, both in their initial accuracy, and in the structure 
contained in the initially incorrectly bound items.  These initially incorrectly bound items were 
shown to contain “chunks” of associated elements that could be simultaneously correctly bound 
with the same operation.  Semantic similarity between reconstructions accounted for a 
preponderance of this chunked information, providing slightly more than 12 additional bindings 
per trial, while the episodic component provided approximately three additional bindings per 
trial (similar to what has been observed in other working memory tasks c.f. Cowan 2001).  These 
findings suggest that traditional quantitative performance measures (such as “number of items 
correctly recalled”), tend to overestimate the degree to which memory performance is tied to 
particular episodes.  Our measure of memory accuracy estimated that approximately 45% of 
participants’ performance was explained by their episodic memory contribution, while the 
realignment measure suggested viewing the study trial only increased the number of known 
bindings by 25% and overall similarity between the reconstruction and the study trial by 14%.   
 
To help explain the seeming tension between the episodic component’s large contribution to 
accuracy and small contribution to similarity consider the following thought experiment: A 
participant is asked to guess a number between 1 and 5.  The experimenter, however, never 
chooses 4 or 5.  Once the participant learns this, their performance increases from 20% to 33%, 
this semantic property of the experiment is therefore, worth a 13% increase in their success 
rate.  However, on one trial, the participant learns that the experimenter has not selected the 
number 3.  On this trial, therefore, they can achieve 50% performance, a boost of 17%!  In one 
sense, they have half as much episodic information as semantic, on the other hand, because the 
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episodic information about a difference between this trial and prior trials, it is synergistic with 
the previously known semantic information provides a greater benefit than all of the semantic 
information put together.  Since episodic information is a marginal increase on semantic, any 
linear increase in episodic information will yield exponential gains in performance by leveraging 
the existing semantic information and further, the more semantic information, the greater the 
leverage.  
 
This phenomenon was born out anecdotally in participants’ post-experiment interviews.  Nearly 
all participants found the experiment extremely difficult, and estimated that they had done very 
poorly, yet performance was relatively high: 64% of the bindings in each reconstruction were 
correctly reconstructed. Participants accurately reported their difficulty in encoding the large 
amount of rapidly presented information, capturing only about 15 of the total 57 unique 
bindings present in episode, but by leveraging the rules and the small amount of episodic 
information they were able to encode they were able to achieve high performance. 
 
This dynamic interactivity of episodic and semantic knowledge is a constant feature of every day 
experience, and has strong basis in past literature.  In animal literature using radial arm mazes, 
rats must remember both which arms tend to be baited, and which arms were baited, but now 
have been consumed (Davis et al. 1986).  This distinction (often referred to as the difference 
between “reference” and “working” memory), maps very closely onto the distinction made here 
between “semantic” and “episodic.”  The rats “episodic” knowledge that a particular arm is no 
longer baited is far more valuable to performance than one would expect in the absence of the 
“semantic” knowledge of which of the arms tend to be baited.     
 
However, this is not to say that the interplay of episodic and semantic always redounds to our 
benefit.  In the famous DRM paradigm (Deese 1959, Roediger & McDermott 1995), participants 
see a list of words all of which are related to a single target word that is not presented (e.g., bed, 
snooze, awake, alarm, dreams, blanket, pillow. Unpresented target word: sleep), and often are 
more likely to produce the unpresented target word during tests of free recall than they are to 
produce any word actually on the list.  This recalled, yet unpresented, word is often taken as an 
example of a “false” memory, in which the general “semantic” information present across the 
list has repeatedly primed the missing word causing it to be recalled.  However, this entirely 
 82 
frames the memory question in terms of inhibiting the target word, and entirely neglects how 
valuable the target word is for generating the words that were studied.  Knowing the fact that 
everything on the list was sleep related helps generate a large number of sleep related words 
that might plausibly have been on the list at the minor cost of accidentally adding the target 
word to the list.  The participants’ “episodic” memory, the ability to recall presented words, 
depends not just on which individual words they saw, but upon the conceptual features that all 
of the words share.  It is impossible to know if a word like “bed” was generated because of some 
specific knowledge, or simply because it was related to sleep.   
 
These constant interactions between general knowledge and specific experience help to explain 
the richness of human memory, and how such memory can be applied to construct novel 
imaginings, plans, or scenarios.  Participants’ ability to create meaningful “chunks” of 
information, each of which itself contained meaningful internal structure dramatically improved 
their performance on the task, because even when they erred, there error was due to a 
misalignment of already meaningful units, and therefore the studied structure was preserved 
except for at the point of the swap.  Participants’ performance could be understood both in 
terms of its similarity to their target, and similarity to their prior performance.  Since prior 
performance closely matched the general statistical tendencies of the data being presented, 
whenever a participant’s knowledge of the particular target configuration failed, they could fall 
back on a pattern of behavior that general worked well, providing a robust level of performance 
even in the absence of information tied to a particular target.  An interesting future avenue of 
study is to delve into the rules that organize these chunks.  What are the criteria for binding 
together associates, and upon what brain systems and mechanisms does it depend? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83 
References 
Althoff, R. R., & Cohen, N. J. (1999). Eye-movement-based memory effect: a reprocessing effect 
in face perception. Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition, 
25(4), 997–1010. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10439505 
Burgess, N., Maguire, E. a, & O’Keefe, J. (2002). The human hippocampus and spatial and 
episodic memory. Neuron, 35(4), 625–41. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12194864 
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental 
storage capacity. The Behavioral and brain sciences, 24(1), 87–114; discussion 114–85. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11515286 
Davis,H., Tribuna,J., Pulsinelli,W., Volpe,B.; Reference and working memory of rats following 
hippocampal damage induced by transient forebrain ischemia, Physiology & Behavior, Volume 
37, Issue 3, 1986, Pages 387-392, ISSN 0031-9384, 10.1016/0031-9384(86)90195-2. 
 
Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate 
recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 17-22. 
Diestel, R. (2010). Graph Theory. Oberwolfach Reports (fourth., pp. 1–451). Springer. 
doi:10.4171/OWR/2010/11 
Dusek, J. a, & Eichenbaum, H. (1997). The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus 
relations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
94(13), 7109–14. Retrieved from 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=21293&tool=pmcentrez&ren
dertype=abstract 
Eichenbaum, H. (2000). A cortical-hippocampal system for declarative memory. Nature reviews. 
Neuroscience, 1(1), 41–50. doi:10.1038/35036213 
Eichenbaum, Howard, & Cohen, N. (2001). From conditioning to conscious recollection. 
 84 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. a. (2007). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 104(5), 1726–31. doi:10.1073/pnas.0610561104 
Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. a. (2009). The construction system of the brain. Philosophical 
transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 364(1521), 1263–
71. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0296 
Konkel, A., Warren, D. E., Duff, M. C., Tranel, D. N., & Cohen, N. J. (2008). Hippocampal amnesia 
impairs all manner of relational memory. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 2(October), 15. 
doi:10.3389/neuro.09.015.2008 
Koriat, A., Goldsmith, M., & Pansky, A. (2000). Toward a psychology of memory accuracy. Annual 
review of psychology, 481–537. Retrieved from 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.481 
Kumaran, D., & Maguire, E. a. (2005). The human hippocampus: cognitive maps or relational 
memory? The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 
25(31), 7254–9. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1103-05.2005 
Maguire, E. a, Burgess, N., & O’Keefe, J. (1999). Human spatial navigation: cognitive maps, 
sexual dimorphism, and neural substrates. Current opinion in neurobiology, 9(2), 171–7. 
Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10322179 
McKenzie, S., & Eichenbaum, H. (2012). New approach illuminates how memory systems switch. 
Trends in cognitive sciences, 16(2), 102–3. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.010 
Nadel, L., Samsonovich, a, Ryan, L., & Moscovitch, M. (2000). Multiple trace theory of human 
memory: computational, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological results. Hippocampus, 
10(4), 352–68. doi:10.1002/1098-1063(2000)10:4<352::AID-HIPO2>3.0.CO;2-D 
O’Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. (1978). The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Why People Get Lost. 
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Retrieved from 
 85 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/7347120/2010/00000001/00000001/art00
006 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not 
presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 21, 
803-814 
Rosenbaum, R. S., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2001). New views on old memories: re-
evaluating the role of the hippocampal complex. Behavioural brain research, 127(1-2), 
183–97. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11718891 
Ryan, L., Lin, C.-Y., Ketcham, K., & Nadel, L. (2010). The role of medial temporal lobe in retrieving 
spatial and nonspatial relations from episodic and semantic memory. Hippocampus, 20(1), 
11–8. doi:10.1002/hipo.20607 
Sutherland, R. J., Weisend, M. P., Mumby, D., Astur, R. S., Hanlon, F. M., Koerner, a, Thomas, M. 
J., et al. (2001). Retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage: recent vs. remote 
memories in two tasks. Hippocampus, 11(1), 27–42. doi:10.1002/1098-
1063(2001)11:1<27::AID-HIPO1017>3.0.CO;2-4 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual review of psychology, 53, 1–25. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114 
Tulving, E., & Markowitsch, H. (1998). Episodic and declarative memory: role of the 
hippocampus. Hippocampus, 204, 198–204. Retrieved from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1098-1063(1998)8:3%3C198::AID-
HIPO2%3E3.0.CO;2-G/abstract 
Voss, J. L., Gonsalves, B. D., Federmeier, K. D., Tranel, D., & Cohen, N. J. (2011). Hippocampal 
brain-network coordination during volitional exploratory behavior enhances learning. 
Nature neuroscience, 14(1), 115–20. doi:10.1038/nn.2693 
Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz L. (1970) Amnesic syndrome: Consolidation or 
retrieval?. Nature, 228, 628-630. 
 86 
Watson, P. D., Voss, J. L., Warren, D. E., Tranel, D. N., & Cohen, N. (in press). Hippocampal 
amnesia is dominated by relational errors.  Hippocampus  
Winocur, G., Moscovitch, M., & Bontempi, B. (2010). Memory formation and long-term 
retention in humans and animals: convergence towards a transformation account of 
hippocampal-neocortical interactions. Neuropsychologia, 48(8), 2339–56. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.04.016 
 
 
 
  
 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODELING ASPECTS OF HUMAN MEMORY FOR SCIENTIFIC STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors 
Michael Bernard, J. Dan Morrow, Shawn Taylor, Stephen Verzi, Craig Vineyard, Thomas Caudell, 
Neal Cohen, Howard Eichenbaum, Mark McDaniel, & Patrick Watson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This document was an interdisciplinary modeling effort involving collaborators at the University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sandia National Laboratories, Boston University, and the 
University of New Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
It was published as a technical research report by Sandia National Laboratories in 2009.  Sandia 
is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for 
the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under 
Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
 
 
 
 
  
 88 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive neuroscience research has found that the hippocampus plays a central role in forming 
and temporarily storing representations of personal experiences. These representations are 
later migrated to widespread areas of the cerebral cortex, which are then permanently stored. 
The focus of the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) work was to produce a 
computational model that: (1) represents the fundamental features of hippocampus-dependent 
relational processing and (2) tests this representation against human memory by comparing the 
performance of normal humans subjects and people lacking normal hippocampal function 
(amnesic subjects) with the performance of the full model and the model without a functional 
“hippocampus” on the same memory tasks. Success of the model was measured in terms of 
similar performance compared to that of humans with and without the contribution of 
hippocampal processing, as a function of experimental parameters and controls. The intent was 
to develop a falsifiable model (i.e., one where we can find and understand its limitations and 
characterize them properly), where the trend of results from human experimentation match the 
trends of simulation. A second focus, modeling aspects of human reasoning, was dropped after 
the first fiscal year due to cutbacks in the overall funding of this project. As such, this technical 
report will only discuss the modeling of declarative memory. 
1.1. Overview of the Problem and Idea 
Memory is usually thought of as a passive record of past events and acquired factual knowledge. 
But our adaptive application of memory is to make plans for our future actions. Therefore, our 
conscious lives are dominated by interactions between retrospective memory, the capacity for 
recollection of general knowledge and one’s personal history of previous actions and their 
outcomes, and prospective memory, our intentional application of knowledge, and history in 
directing ongoing decisions and behavior. This project is currently modeling of how the brain 
accomplishes retrospective recollection and memory. Our capacity for recollection is known to 
be supported by a system composed of several cortical association areas interacting with 
structures in the medial temporal lobe, and in particular, the hippocampus. There is a general 
consensus that the cortex is the repository of detailed representations of perceptions and 
thoughts and that the hippocampus supports the ability to bind together cortical 
representations and, when cued by part of a previous representation, to reactivate the full set 
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of cortical representations that compose a recollective, declarative (explicit) memory. 
To date, computational models have not neurocognitively represented episodic recollection 
memory within an embodied, simulation environment. This creates several limitations regarding 
the plausibility of current models. First, current approaches do not dynamically collect “what,” 
“where,” and “when” perceptual information to produce an episodic memory trace. Second, 
current approaches typically create a false distinction between semantic and event-based, 
episodic memory. While semantic memory has a different phenomenology than episodic 
memory, there is strong evidence they are part of the same system (McKoon et al., 1986). 
Research has found that the hippocampus plays a central role in forming and temporarily storing 
representations of personal experiences. These representations are later migrated to 
widespread areas of the cerebral cortex, which are then permanently stored. 
To address the need for more plausibility model Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has (1) 
produced a computational model that represents the fundamental features of hippocampus-
dependent relational processing and (2) tested this representation against human memory by 
comparing the performance of normal humans subjects and people lacking normal hippocampal 
function with the performance of the full model and the model without a functional 
“hippocampus” on the same memory tasks. Success of the model was measured in terms of 
similar performance compared to that of humans with and without the contribution of 
hippocampal processing, as a function of experimental parameters and controls. 
This effort is extending the current Sandia Cognitive Framework by incorporating a 
representation of memory processing, focusing on hippocampus and neocortical systems 
described in current complimentary learning systems theory (i.e., cortical-hippocampal theory 
of declarative memory, Eichenbaum, 2007). The model also specifies how hippocampal and 
cortical representations interact at multiple levels of abstraction to support the interleaving of 
new information within the cerebral cortex. For example, we integrated the perceptual features 
of relational memory processing into our computational model. This project produced two main 
products: (1) a neuro-cognitive computational architecture that represents episodic memory 
and (2) major review paper(s) submitted for publication. This work extended current 
computational models (for example, McClelland et al.; Psych Rev. 1995) wherein a pre-existing 
knowledge structure in cortical areas is challenged to incorporate new information within an 
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existing network. To accomplish this goal we collaborated with leading experts from academia. 
Specifically, the external research team consisted of: (1) Howard Eichenbaum, professor of 
psychology and neuroscience and Director of the Center for Memory and Brain at Boston 
University, (2) Neal Cohen, professor of psychology and neuroscience at the Beckman Institute 
of the University of Illinois, (3) Thomas Caudell, professor and Director of the Center for High 
Performance Computing at University of New Mexico, and (3) Mark McDaniel, professor of 
psychology at Washington University. 
2. THE DECLARATIVE MEMORY SYSTEM 
Like the Roman god Janus, memory looks both into the past and the future. Memory is usually 
thought of as a passive record of past events and acquired factual knowledge. But our adaptive 
application of memory is to make plans for our future actions. Therefore, our conscious lives are 
dominated by interactions between retrospective memory, the capacity for recollection of 
general knowledge and one’s personal history of previous actions and their outcomes, and 
prospective memory, our intentional application of knowledge and history in directing ongoing 
decisions and behavior. The discussion will begin by outlining the experimental evidence on the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms of recollection, and then consider retrospective memory from 
experimental studies in cognitive science. The paper will then outline a formal model and its 
implementation in software. 
2.1 What is recollection? 
We have all been in the situation where we meet someone who seems highly familiar but we 
cannot recall who they are or why we know them. Sometimes, we just give up and say, “Don’t I 
know you?” Alternatively, when a clue or sufficient mental searching helps us retrieve a wealth 
of information all at once, including the name, where we met before, and the circumstances of 
the meeting. Considerable current research on recollection has focused the distinction between 
a vivid recollection the lesser condition of a sense of familiarity with a particular person or 
object. Familiarity comes rapidly and reflects the strength match between a cue and a stored 
memory template. It is an isolated ability to identify a person or object as previously 
experienced. Recollection is typically slower and measured by the number of qualitative 
associations retrieved and the organization of the memory retrieved. Thus, recollections 
typically include not only the item sought in memory but also three other kinds of additional 
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information: 
(1) a spatial and temporal context of the experience in which the item was previously 
encountered 
(2)  a replay of the sequence of events that compose an entire episode with that item  
(3)  and remembering additional related experiences with the item.  
Furthermore, one brain area, the hippocampus, is critically involved in each of these aspects of 
recollection. Yonelinas et al. (2002) ROC analysis on recognition memory performance to show 
that mild hypoxia that causes damage largely confined to the hippocampus resulted in a severe 
deficit in recollection but normal familiarity. A similar pattern of deficient recollection and 
preserved familiarity was reported in a patient with relatively selective hippocampal atrophy 
related to meningitis (Aggleton et al., 2005). Further consideration of the three properties of 
introduced above provides insights into both the fundamental elements of recollection and the 
role of the hippocampus in memory processing (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. The hippocampal and parahippocampal regions within the brain 
 
Events are represented as items in the context in which they were experienced. A fundamental 
12 
 
Hippocampal  
Region 
 
Figure 1. The hippocampal and parahippocampal regions within the brain 
  
 
Events are represented as items in the context in which they were experienced. A 
fundamental feature of recollection is memory for the spatial, temporal, and associational 
context in which experiences occur. Functional imaging studies support the notion that 
the hippocampus is activated during the encoding or retrieval of associations among 
many elements of a memory, a characteristic of context-rich episodic memories (for 
review see Cohen et al., 1999; Eldridge et al., 2000; Maguire, 2001; Addis et al., 2004). 
For example, Henke et al., (1997) observed greater hippocampal activation when subjects 
associated a person with a house, as compared to making independent judgments about 
the person and house and others have found selective hippocampal activation during 
recollection of the context of learning in formal tests of memory (e.g. Davachi et al., 
2003; Ranganath et al., 2003). The coding of associations extends beyond item and 
context associations such that the hippocampus is also selectively activated during the 
encoding or retrieval of verbal (Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Giovanello et al., 2003a) and 
face-name associations (Small et al., 2001; Zeineh et al., 2003; Sperling et al., 2003). 
Correspondingly, recent neuropsychological studies have found that recognition of 
associations is impaired even when recognition for single items is spared in amnesic 
patients (Giovanello et al., 2003, Turriziani et al., 2004). These studies reported 
impairment in recognition memory for associations between words or between faces or 
face-occupations pairs, as compared to normal performance in recognition of single 
items. At the same time, other functional imaging studies and characterizations of 
amnesia have suggested that the hippocampus is sometimes involved in both associative 
and single item recognition, highlighting the need to clarify the nature of associative 
information that composes an “event” (Squire et al., 2004). Nevertheless, these findings 
are generally consistent with the notion that the hippocampus plays a distinct role in 
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feature of recollection is memory for the spatial, temporal, and associational context in which 
experiences occur. Functional imaging studies support the notion that the hippocampus is 
activated during the encoding or retrieval of associations among many elements of a memory, a 
characteristic of context-rich episodic memories (for review see Cohen et al., 1999; Eldridge et 
al., 2000; Maguire, 2001; Addis et al., 2004). For example, Henke et al., (1997) observed greater 
hippocampal activation when subjects associated a person with a house, as compared to making 
independent judgments about the person and house and others have found selective 
hippocampal activation during recollection of the context of learning in formal tests of memory 
(e.g. Davachi et al., 2003; Ranganath et al., 2003). The coding of associations extends beyond 
item and context associations such that the hippocampus is also selectively activated during the 
encoding or retrieval of verbal (Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Giovanello et al., 2003a) and face-
name associations (Small et al., 2001; Zeineh et al., 2003; Sperling et al., 2003). Correspondingly, 
recent neuropsychological studies have found that recognition of associations is impaired even 
when recognition for single items is spared in amnesic patients (Giovanello et al., 2003, 
Turriziani et al., 2004). These studies reported impairment in recognition memory for 
associations between words or between faces or face-occupations pairs, as compared to normal 
performance in recognition of single items. At the same time, other functional imaging studies 
and characterizations of amnesia have suggested that the hippocampus is sometimes involved 
in both associative and single item recognition, highlighting the need to clarify the nature of 
associative information that composes an “event” (Squire et al., 2004). Nevertheless, these 
findings are generally consistent with the notion that the hippocampus plays a distinct role in 
recollection associated with binding features of items and their context to represent salient 
events (Eichenbaum et al., 2007). 
Studies that employ animal models can provide compelling evidence on the effects of selective 
hippocampal damage. Several studies have shown that damage limited to the hippocampus 
results in deficits in forming a memory for the context or location where items were once 
experienced (reviewed in Mumby, 2001). In one recent study, rats were initially exposed to two 
objects in particular places in one of two environmental chambers (Mumby et al., 2002). In 
subsequent recognition testing, the place of the object or the context was changed. Normal rats 
increased their exploration of objects that were moved to new places or put in novel contexts. 
By contrast, rats with hippocampal damage failed to recognize objects when either the place or 
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context was changed (see also Eacott & Norman, 2004). 
Several investigators have argued that animals are indeed capable of remembering the temporal 
as well as spatial context in which they experienced specific stimuli (Clayton et al., 2003; Day et 
al., 2003). To further explore these aspects of episodic memory, Eichenbaum (a team member of 
this LDRD) developed a task that assesses memory for events from a series of events that each 
involve the combination of an odor (“what”), the place in which it was experienced (“where”), 
and the order in which the presentations occurred (“when”; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004). On 
each of a series of events, rats sampled an odor in a unique place along the periphery of a large 
open field. Then, memory for the when those events occurred was tested by presenting a choice 
between an arbitrarily selected pair of the odor cups in their original locations. Normal rats 
initially employed their memory of the places of presented cups and approached the location of 
the earlier experience. Then they confirmed the presence of the correct odor in that location. 
Animals with selective hippocampal damage fail on both aspects of this task even though their 
memory for independent features of location and odor items was intact. These findings indicate 
that the hippocampus is critical for effectively combining the “what”, “when”, and “where” 
qualities of each experience to compose the retrieved memory. 
Studies on the firing properties of single neurons in animals provide insights into the nature of 
neural population representations in the hippocampus. There is a large body of evidence that 
hippocampal neurons encode associations among stimuli, actions, and places that compose 
discrete events. Many studies have shown that hippocampal neurons encode an animal’s 
location within its environment, and some view this as the principle function of hippocampal 
populations (Muller et al., 1999; Best et al., 2001). However, many other studies have shown 
that hippocampal neurons also fire associated with the ongoing behavior and the context of 
events as well as the animal’s location (Eichenbaum et al., 1999). In the most direct examination 
of this issue, Wood et al (1999) directly compared spatial and non-spatial coding by hippocampal 
neurons by training animals to perform the same memory judgments at many locations in the 
environment. A large subset of hippocampal neurons fired only associated with a particular 
combination of the odor, the place where it was sampled, and the match-non-match status of 
the odor. In a similar study on the coding properties of hippocampal neurons in humans, 
Ekstrom et al. (2003) recorded in subjects as they played a taxi driver game, searching for 
passengers picked up and dropped off at various locations in a virtual reality town. They 
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observed that many of these cells fired selectively associated with specific combinations of a 
place and the view of a particular scene or a particular goal. These and other studies indicate 
that, in rats, monkey, and humans, a prevalent property of hippocampal firing patterns involves 
the representation of unique associations of stimuli, their significance, specific behaviors, and 
the places where these events occur (see Eichenbaum et al., 2004). 
Episodes are represented as sequences of events. We live our lives through personal experience, 
and our initial construction of reality within consciousness is a form of episodic buffer that 
contains a representation of the stream of events as they just occurred (Baddeley, 2000). In an 
early characterization of episodic recollection, Tulving (1983) distinguished episodic memory as 
organized in the temporal dimension, and contrasted this scheme with a conceptual 
organization of semantic memory. Tulving (1983) argued that the central organizing feature of 
episodic memory is that “one event precedes, co- occurs, or follows another.” This is 
reminiscent of Aristotle’s (350BC) characterization of vivid remembering: “Acts of recollection, 
as they occur in experience, are due to the fact that one thought has by nature another that 
succeeds it in regular order.” These characterizations emphasize the temporal organization of 
episodic memories. 
The order of events within human memory depends on hippocampal function. In a study using a 
design similar to that described above, Hopkins et al. (1995) found that patients with hypoxic 
brain injury involving in shrinkage of the hippocampus are impaired in memory for the order of a 
series of 6 words, pictures, or spatial locations. These patients were, however, also impaired in 
recognition of the items, undermining an unambiguous interpretation of a deficit in the order of 
the events independent of memory for the events. More recently, Spiers et al. (2001) reported a 
selective deficit in order memory independent of item memory in a patient with selective 
hippocampal damage due to perinatal transient anoxia (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). In this 
study the patient explored a virtual reality town in which he received objects from virtual 
characters. His recognition of the familiar objects was intact, but he was severely impaired in 
memory for the order in which he received objects, as well as for where he received them. Also, 
Downes et al. (2002) reported that patients with medial temporal lobe damage that included 
bilateral hippocampal damage were impaired in memory for the order of presentation of words 
for which recognition of the items was equivalent. Also, evidence from the deferred imitation 
task, where subjects are required to remember an action sequence, indicate a critical role for 
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the hippocampus (McDonough et al., 1995; Adlam et al., 2005). Thus, humans with hippocampal 
damage are impaired in memory for the order of events in unique episodes even in cases where 
recognition memory is intact. 
Studies on animals also show that the representation of memories by the hippocampus 
incorporates not only items that must be remembered, but also the events that precede and 
follow. For example, Honey et al. (1998) provided a simple demonstration of the importance of 
temporal order in hippocampal processing, reporting that hippocampal lesions disrupted 
animals’ normal orienting response when a pair of stimuli are presented in the opposite order of 
previous exposures. The specific role of the hippocampus in remembering the order of a series 
of events in unique experiences has been explored using a behavioral protocol that assesses 
memory for episodes composed of a unique sequence of olfactory stimuli (Fortin et al., 2002; 
see also Kesner et al., 2002). Memory for the sequential order of odor events was directly 
compared with recognition of the odors in the list independent of memory for their order. On 
each trial rats were presented with a series of five odors, selected randomly from a large pool of 
common household scents. Memory for each series was subsequently probed using a choice 
test where the animal was reinforced for selecting the earlier of two of the odors that had 
appeared in the series. In later sessions we also tested whether the rats could identify the odors 
in the list independent of their order, by was rewarding the selection of a novel odor against one 
that had appeared in the series. Normal rats performed both tasks well. Rats with hippocampal 
lesions could recognize items that had appeared in the series but were severely impaired in 
judging their sequential order. 
How do hippocampal neuronal populations represent the sequences of events that compose 
distinct episodes? A common observation across many different behavioral protocols is that 
different hippocampal neurons become activated during every event that composes each 
experience, including during simple behaviors such as foraging for food (e.g., Muller et al., 1987) 
as well as learning related behaviors directed at relevant stimuli that have to be remembered in 
studies that involve classical conditioning, discrimination learning, and non-matching or 
matching to sample tasks to tests and a variety of maze tasks (e.g. Hampson et al., 1993; for 
review, see Eichenbaum et al, 1999). In each of these paradigms, animals are repeatedly 
presented with specific stimuli and rewards, and execute appropriate cognitive judgments and 
conditioned behaviors. Corresponding to each of these regular events, many hippocampal cells 
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show time-locked activations associated with each sequential event. Also, as described above, 
many of these cells show striking specificities corresponding to particular combinations of 
stimuli, behaviors, and the spatial location of the event. Thus, hippocampal population activity 
can be characterized as a sequence of firings representing the step-by-step events in each 
behavioral episode. 
Furthermore, these sequential codings can be envisioned to represent the series of events and 
their places that compose a meaningful episode, and the information contained in these 
representations distinguishes related episodes that share common events and therefore could 
be confused. Recent studies on the spatial firing patterns of hippocampal neurons as animals 
traverse different routes that share overlapping locations provide compelling data consistent 
with this characterization. In one study, rats were trained on the classic spatial alternation task 
in a modified T-maze (Wood et al., 2000; see also Frank et al., 2000; Ferbinteanu and Shapiro 
(2003). Performance on this task requires that the animal distinguish left-turn and right-turn 
episodes that overlap for a common segment of the maze and requires the animal to remember 
the immediately preceding episode to guide the choice on the current trial, and in that way, the 
task is similar in demands to those of episodic memory. If hippocampal neurons encode each 
sequential behavioral event and its locus within one type of episode, then most cells should fire 
only when the rat is performing within either the left-turn or the right-turn type of episode. This 
should be particularly evident when the rat is on the “stem” of the maze, when the rat traverses 
the same set of locations on both types of trials. Indeed, a large proportion of cells that fired 
when the rat was on the maze stem fired differentially on left-turn versus right-turn trials. The 
majority of cells showed strong selectivity, some firing at over ten times the rate on one trial 
type, suggesting they were part of the representations of only one type of episode. Other cells 
fired substantially on both trial types, potentially providing a link between left-turn and right-
turn representations by the common places traversed on both trial types. 
Functional imaging studies in humans have also revealed hippocampal involvement in both 
spatial and non-spatial sequence representation. Several studies have shown that the 
hippocampus is active when people recall routes between specific start points and goals, but not 
when subjects merely follow a set of cues through space (Hartley et al.2003). In addition, the 
hippocampus is selectively activated when people learn sequences of pictures (Kumaran & 
Maguire, 2006). Even greater hippocampal activation is observed when subjects must 
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disambiguate picture sequences that overlap, parallel to the findings on hippocampal cells that 
disambiguate spatial sequences (Wood et al., 2000). 
Memories are networked to support inferential memory expression. Further consideration of the 
cognitive properties of episodic memory suggest that related episodic representations might be 
integrated with one another to support semantic memory and the ability to generalize and 
make inferences from memories. Referring to how related memories are integrated with one 
another, William James (1890) emphasized that “...in mental terms, the more other facts a fact 
is associated with in the mind, the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of its 
associates becomes a hook to which it hangs, a means by which to fish it up by when sunk 
beneath the surface. Together they form a network of attachments by which it is woven into the 
entire tissue of our thought.” James envisioned memory as a systematic organization of 
information wherein the usefulness of memories was determined by how well they are linked 
together. 
There are two main outcomes of the linking of representations of specific experiences. One is a 
common base of associations that are not dependent on the episodic context in which the 
information was acquired. Thus when several experiences share considerable common 
information, the overlapping elements and common links among them will be reinforced, such 
that those items and associations become general regularities. The representation of these 
general regularities constitutes semantic “knowledge” that is not bound to the particular 
episode or context in which the information was encoded. The networking of episodic memories 
by common elements provides a mechanism for the commonly (albeit not universally, see 
Tulving, 2002) held view that semantic knowledge is derived from information repeated within 
and abstracted from episodic memories. 
There is considerable evidence that hippocampal neurons indeed extract the common features 
among related episodes. In all the studies described above, a subset of hippocampal neurons 
encode features that are common among different experiences – these representations could 
provide links between distinct memories. For example, in the Wood et al. (1999) study on odor 
recognition memory, whereas some cells showed striking associative coding of odors, their 
match/non-match status, and places, other cells fired associated with one of those features 
across different trials. Some cells fired during a particular phase of the approach towards any 
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stimulus cup. Others fired differentially as the rat sampled a particular odor, regardless of its 
location or match-non-match status. Other cells fired only when the rat sampled the odor at a 
particular place, regardless of the odor or its status. Yet other cells fired differentially associated 
with the match and nonmatch status of the odor, regardless of the odor or where it was 
sampled. Similarly, in Ekstrom and colleagues’ (2003) study on humans performing a virtual 
navigation task, whereas some hippocampal neurons fired associated with combinations of 
views, goals, and places, other cells fired when subjects viewed particular scenes, occupied 
particular locations, or had particular goals in findings passengers or locations for drop off. In 
studies that have recorded hippocampal neuronal activity as rats perform alternation tasks in a 
T-maze (Wood et al., 2000; Frank et al., 2000; Ferbintineau & Shapiro, 2003), whereas many 
cells distinguish overalapping actions and locations on the maze, some cells capture the 
common places and events between the different types of episodes. 
The notion that hippocampal cells might reflect the linking of important features across 
experiences and the abstraction of common information was also highlighted in recent studies 
on monkeys and humans. Hampson et al. (2004) trained monkeys on matching to sample 
problems, then probed the nature of the representation of stimuli by recording from 
hippocampal cells when the animals were shown novel stimuli that shared features with the 
trained cues. They found many hippocampal neurons that encoded meaningful categories of 
stimulus features and appeared to employ these representations to recognize the same features 
across many situations. Kreiman et al., (2000a) characterized hippocampal firing patterns in 
humans during presentations of a variety of visual stimuli. They reported a substantial number 
of hippocampal neurons that fired when the subject viewed specific categories of material, e.g., 
faces, famous people, animals, scenes, houses, across many exemplars of each. A subsequent 
study showed that these neurons are activated when a subject simply imagines its optimal 
stimulus, supporting a role for hippocampal networks in recollection of specific memories 
(Krieman et al., 2000b). A subsequent study showed that some hippocampal neurons are 
activated a subject views any of a variety of different images of a particular person, suggesting 
these cells could link the recollection of many specific memories related to that person (Quiroga 
et al., 2005). This combination findings across species provides compelling evidence for the 
notion that some hippocampal cells represent common features among the various episodes 
that could serve to link memories obtained in separate experiences. 
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The second outcome from a network of linked memories is a capacity to use the common 
elements to retrieve multiple memories that include that element. Furthermore, hippocampal 
representations could support a capacity to “surf” the network of linked memories and identify 
relationships and associations among items that were experienced in distinct memories and 
therefore are only indirectly related. A single cue could generate the retrieval of multiple 
episodic and semantic memories, and cortical areas can access these multiple memories to 
analyze the consequential, logical, spatial, and other abstract relationships among items that 
appeared separately in distinct memories. These logical operations on indirectly related 
memories can support inferences from memory. The activity of searching and surfing networks 
of memories, and then comparing and contrasting memories could underlie our awareness of 
memories and the experience of conscious recollection. The organization of linked experience-
specific and experience- general memories with the capacity for association and inference 
among memories is called a “relational memory network.” 
In a series of studies, Eichenbaum has used a model system of rodent olfactory memory to 
explore the importance of the hippocampus in the linking memories and using the resulting 
relational networks to make associational and logical inferences from memory. One study 
examined the role of the hippocampus in making indirect associations between stimuli that 
were each directly associated with a common stimulus. Initially, control rats and rats with 
hippocampal lesions were trained on a series of overlapping “paired associates” (Bunsey & 
Eichenbaum, 1996). On each trial, the rat was initially presented with one of two initial items in 
a pairing, and then had to select the arbitrarily assigned associate. For example, for training on 
the pairs A-B and X-Y, if A was the initial item, then the rat had to select B and not Y; conversely, 
if X was the initial item the rat had to select Y and not B. Then the rats were trained on a second 
paired associated list where the initial items were the second items in the first list and new 
items were the associates (B-C and Y-Z). Thus, when B was presented initially, the rat was 
required to select C and not Z; when Y was presented initially, the rats was then required to 
select Z and not C. After training on all four paired associates, the rats were tested on their 
knowledge of the indirect relations among the pairings. These tests involved presentations of an 
initial item from the first learned paired associates (A or X) followed by a choice between the 
second items of the later learned associates (C versus Z). Normal rats demonstrated their ability 
to express these indirect relations by selecting C when A was presented and Z when X was 
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presented, whereas rats with selective hippocampal damage showed no capacity for this 
inference from memory. These findings, combined with observations on another transitive 
inference task (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997), indicate that the hippocampus is critical to binding 
distinct memories into a relational network that supports flexible memory expression. 
In another experiment, rats learned a hierarchical series of overlapping odor choice judgments 
(e.g., A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E), then were probed on the relationship between indirectly related 
items (B > D ?). Normal rats learned the series and showed robust transitive inference on the 
probe tests. Rats with hippocampal damage also learned each of the initial premises but failed 
to show transitivity (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997). The combined findings from these studies 
show that rats with hippocampal damage can learn even complex associations, such as those 
embodied in the odor paired- associates and conditional discriminations. But, without a 
hippocampus, they do not interleave the distinct experiences according to their overlapping 
elements to form a relational network that supports inferential and flexible expression of their 
memories (see also Buckmaster et al., 2004). 
Complementary evidence on the role of the hippocampus in networking of memories comes 
from two recent studies indicating that the hippocampus is selectively activated when humans 
make inferential memory judgments. In one study, subjects initially learned to associate each of 
two faces with a house and, separately, learned to associate pairs of faces (Preston & Gabrieli, 
2004). Then, during brain scanning, the subjects were tested on their ability to judge whether 
two faces who were each associated with the same house were therefore indirectly associated 
with each other, and on whether they could remember trained face pairs. The hippocampus was 
selectively activated during performance of the inferential judgment about indirectly related 
faces as compared to during memory for trained face-house or face-face pairings. In the other 
study, subjects learned a series of choice judgments between pairs of visual patterns that 
contained overlapping elements, just as in the studies on rats and monkeys, and as a control 
they also learned a set of non-overlapping choice judgments (Heckers et al., 2004). The 
hippocampus was selectively activated during transitive judgments as compared to novel non-
transitive judgments. 
These findings indicate that the hippocampal relational network mediates the linking of distinct 
episodes that may contain items that have not been experienced in the same episode or in the 
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same context. In doing so, the hippocampus plays a role in more than simply binding items 
within memories, but also mediates associations between distinct memories. During 
recollection, the hippocampus supports a capacity to generate multiple memories that share a 
common element, and the information contained within these memories can be used by many 
brain systems to make judgments about causal, logical, temporal, and spatial relations among 
the items in those memories (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993). Iterations of association, retrieval, 
and re-coding memories according to deduced relationships among the items would lead to the 
development of a systematic organization of items and episodes in memory wherein facts and 
events are linked to one another by a broad range of causal, logical, temporal, spatial, and other 
relevant relationships among the items. And this organization supports flexibility in the 
expression that is characteristic or recollective memory, specifically involving inferences 
between items that are only indirectly related. 
2.2 The Anatomy of Memory 
How do the above described memory functions emerge from the circuitry of the hippocampus? 
The brain system that mediates retrospective and prospective memory is composed of several 
cortical association areas interacting with structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), and in 
particular, the hippocampus. There is a general consensus that areas of the cerebral cortex are 
specialized for distinct aspects of cognitive and perceptual processing that are essential to 
memory, and that the cortex is the repository of detailed representations of perceptions and 
thoughts. The MTL is the recipient of inputs from widespread areas of the cortex and supports 
the ability to bind together cortical representations such that, when cued by part of a previous 
representation, the MTL reactivates the full set of cortical representations that compose a 
retrospective memory. Areas of the cortex both direct the storage of memories in the MTL and 
interpret the reconstructed memories generated by the MTL to support prospective memory. 
This simple, anatomically based scheme provides the framework on which our model is built. In 
the following sections, we will describe in greater detail the functional components of this 
system and the pathways by which information flows among them, and a qualitative model of 
how they interact to support retrospective and prospective memory. 
The anatomy of the brain system that supports memory is remarkably conserved across 
mammalian species (Manns & Eichenbuam, 2007). Information processing in this system occurs 
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in three main stages. The first stage involves virtually every neocortical association area (Burwell 
et al., 1995; Suzuki, 1996). Each of these neocortical areas projects to one or more subdivisions 
of the parahippocampal region, which includes the perirhinal cortex, the parahippocampal 
cortex, and the entorhinal cortex. The subdivisions of the parahippocampal region are 
interconnected and send major efferents to multiple subdivisions of the hippocampus itself. 
Thus, the parahippocampal region serves as a convergence site for cortical input and mediates 
the distribution of cortical afferents to the hippocampus. Within the hippocampus, there are 
broadly divergent and convergent connections that could mediate a large network of 
associations (Amaral & Witter, 1989), and these connections support plasticity mechanisms that 
could participate in the rapid coding of novel conjunctions of information (Bliss & Collingridge, 
1993). 
The outcomes of hippocampal processing are directed back to the parahippocampal region, and 
the outputs of that region are directed in turn back to the same areas of the cerebral cortex that 
were the source of inputs to the MTL. 
Only highly pre-processed sensory information reaches the MTL, but these inputs come from 
virtually all higher-order cortical processing areas. Perhaps the most thoroughly studied cortical 
area afferent to the hippocampus is the inferotemporal (IT) cortex, the highest-order visual 
object processor in primates. Ablation (removal of material from the surface of an object by 
vaporization or other erosive processes) of the inferotemporal cortex results in a visual-guided 
learning and deficits without impairment in visual fields, acuity, or threshold. The behavioral 
physiology of inferotemporal cortex is consistent with the data from ablation studies, showing 
that IT neurons are maximally driven by complex visual patterns, and the response properties of 
these cells are dependent on attentional mechanisms and reward association. Many IT neurons 
are preferentially responsive to a particular pattern, often one that is of obvious significance to 
the animal, including cells that respond selectively to faces. IT neurons respond differently to 
the same stimuli when they appear as stimuli to-be-remembered, or when they were novel 
versus familiar, and some cells maintain firing during the memory delay periods during 
performance of short term memory tasks. In humans, distinct ventral temporal areas that 
include and surround IT are activated by presentation of different categories of visual cues, 
including faces, tools, and animate objects (Martin, 2007; Kanwisher, 2007). 
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Other major inputs to the MTL arise from the posterior parietal area. Damage to this cortical 
area results in impairment in neglect of contralateral sensory stimulation across sensory 
modalities (Mountcastle et al., 1975; Andersen, 1989). One area within parietal cortex that has 
received particular interest is area 7a where most cells are visually driven. These cells have very 
large receptive fields and neuronal responsiveness is highly dependent on attentional factors. 
These cells respond best when the stimulus is the target of an eye or hand movement and they 
prefer moving stimuli but show little preference for stimulus form or color. These and other 
data indicate that the posterior parietal area is specialized for attention and egocentric spatial 
analyses including localization and visual and manual acquisition of targets in space. Also, areas 
of the parietal and temporal cortex are involved in complex perceptual processing essential to 
configuration of the conceptual contents of information that is the subject of recollection (e.g., 
Uncapher et al., 2006). 
Additional major inputs to the MTL arise from several areas within the prefrontal cortex, a 
sensory-motor-limbic integration area involved in the highest-order cognitive functions 
including motor programming, vicarious trial and error, and memory (Fuster, 1995). In humans 
components of the prefrontal cortex mediate working memory, effortful retrieval, source 
monitoring, and other processing currently being specified that contribute critically to cognitive 
functions essential to recollection (Dobbins et al., 2002). In addition, midline structures within 
the prefrontal and cingulate cortical areas have been identified as activated during processing of 
self-referential information that may be strongly related to autobiographical memory (Northoff 
& Bermpohl, 2004; Fink et al., 1996; Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). 
The nature of cortical inputs to the MTL differs considerably across mammalian species (Manns 
& Eichenbaum, 2006). The proportion of inputs derived from different sensory modalities also 
varies substantially between species, such that olfaction (e.g., rats), vision (e.g., primates), 
audition (e.g., bats), or somatosensation (e.g., moles) have become disproportionately 
represented in the brain in different animals (Krubitzer and Kaas, 2005). Nevertheless, the 
sources of information derived from prefrontal and midline cortical areas, as well as posterior 
sensory areas, are remarkably consistent across species. 
Despite major species differences in the neocortex, the organization of cortical inputs to the 
hippocampus is remarkably similar in rodents and primates. Across species, most of the 
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neocortical input to the perirhinal cortex comes from association areas that process unimodal 
sensory information about qualities of objects (i.e., “what” information), whereas most of the 
neocortical input to the parahippocampal cortex comes from areas that process polymodal 
spatial (“where”) information (Suzuki & Amaral, 1994; Burwell et al., 1995. There are 
connections between the perirhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex, but the “what” and 
“where” streams of processing remain largely segregated as the perirhinal cortex projects 
primarily to the lateral entorhinal area whereas the parahippocampal cortex projects mainly to 
the medial entorhinal area. Similarly, there are some connections between the entorhinal areas, 
but the “what” and “where” information streams mainly converge within the hippocampus. The 
cortical outputs of hippocampal processing involve feedback connections from the hippocampus 
successively back to the entorhinal cortex, then perirhinal and parahippocampal cortex, and 
finally, neocortical areas from which the inputs to the MTL originated. 
2.3 Towards a functional organization of a cortical-hippocampal memory system 
The anatomical evidence reviewed above suggests the following hypothesis about how 
information is encoded and retrieved during memory processing. During encoding, 
representations of distinct items (e.g., people, objects, events) are formed in the perirhinal 
cortex and lateral entorhinal area. These representations along with back projections to the 
“what” pathways of the neocortex can then support subsequent judgments of familiarity. In 
addition, during encoding, item information is combined with contextual (“where”) 
representations that are formed in the parahippocampal cortex and medial entorhinal area, and 
the hippocampus associates items and their context. When an item is subsequently presented 
as a memory cue, the hippocampus completes the full pattern and mediates a recovery of the 
contextual representation in the parahippocampal cortex and medial entorhinal area. 
Hippocampal processing may also recover specific item associates of the cue and reactivate 
those representations in the perirhinal cortex and lateral entorhinal area. The recovery of 
context and item associations constitutes the experience of retrospective recollection. 
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Figure 4.2. The Hippocampal Structures of the Brain 
 
Perirhinal cortex and lateral entorhinal area. Substantial evidence indicates that neurons in the 
perirhinal cortex and lateral entorhinal cortex are involved in the representation of individual 
perceptual stimuli. Electrophysiological studies on monkeys and rats performing simple 
recognition tasks have identified three general types of responses (Brown & Xiang, 1998; Suzuki 
& Eichenbaum, 2000). First, many cells in these areas exhibit selective tuning to memory cues 
such as odors or visual stimuli. Second, some cells maintain firing in a stimulus-specific fashion 
during a memory delay, indicating the persistence of a stimulus representation. Third, many 
cells have enhanced or suppressed responses to stimuli when they re-appear in a recognition 
test, indicating involvement in the recognition judgment. Similarly, in humans, among all areas 
within the medial temporal lobe, the perirhinal area selectively shows suppressed responses to 
familiar stimuli (Henson et al., 2003). Complementary studies in animals with damage to the 
perirhinal cortex indicate that this area may be critical to memory for individual stimuli in the 
delayed non-matching to sample task in rats (Mumby & Pinel, 1994; Otto & Eichenbaum, 1992) 
and monkeys (Suzuki et al., 1993). These and other data have led several investigators to the 
view that the perirhinal cortex is specialized for identifying the memory strength of individual 
stimuli (e.g. Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Henson et al., 2003; Aggleton et al., 2004). 
Parahippocampal cortex and medial entorhinal area. The parahippocampal cortex and medial 
entorhinal area may be specialized for processing spatial context. Whereas perirhinal and lateral 
entorhinal neurons have poor spatial coding properties, parahippocampal and medial entorhinal 
neurons show strong spatial coding (Burwell & Hafeman, 2003; Hargreaves et al., 2005). Further, 
the immediate early gene fos is activated in perirhinal cortex by novel visual cues, but fos is 
activated in the postrhinal cortex by a spatial re-arrangement of the cues (Wan et al., 1999). In 
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addition, whereas object recognition is impaired following perirhinal damage, object-location 
recognition is deficient following parahippocampal cortex damage in rats (Gaffan et al., 2004) 
and monkeys (Alvarado & Bachevalier, 2005). Similarly, perirhinal cortex damage results in 
greater impairment in memory for object pairings whereas parahippocampal cortex lesions 
results in greater impairment in memory for the context in which an object was presented 
(Norman & Eacott, 2005). Parallel findings from functional imaging studies in humans have 
dissociated object processing in perirhinal cortex from spatial processing in the 
parahippocampal cortex (Pihlajamaki et al., 2004). Furthermore, whereas perirhinal cortex is 
activated in association with the memory strength of specific stimuli (Henson et al., 2003), the 
parahippocampal cortex is activated during recall of spatial and non-spatial context (Ranganath 
et al., 2003; Bar and Aminoff, 2003). 
Hippocampus. Compelling in support for differentiation of functions associated with recollection 
come from within-study dissociations that reveal activation of the perirhinal cortex selectively 
associated with familiarity and activity in the hippocampus as well as parahippocampal cortex 
was selectively associated with recollection (Deselaar et al., 2006; Davachi & Wagner, 2002; 
Davachi et al., 2003; Ranganath et al., 2003). These and many other results summarized in a 
recent review suggest a functional dissociation between the perirhinal cortex, where activation 
changes are consistently associated with familiarity, and the hippocampus and parahippocampal 
cortex, where activation changes are consistently associated with recollection (Eichenbaum et 
al., 2007). An outstanding question in these studies is whether the parahippocampal cortex and 
hippocampus play different roles in recollection. In particular, the above described findings on 
parahippocampal activation associated with viewing of spatial scenes suggests the possibility 
that this area is activated during recollection because recall involves retrieval of spatial 
contextual information. By contrast, the hippocampus may be activated associated with the 
combination of item and context information. 
CA1 versus CA3. Several recent studies have suggested that subregions of the hippocampus may 
play distinct roles in memory. A particularly striking contrast comes from a comparison between 
two studies by Kesner and colleagues (Gilbert and Kesner, 2003; Kesner et al., 2005). In one 
experiment, normal rats learned associations between a particular object or odor and their 
locations in specific places in an open field. On each trial, one of two objects (differentiated by 
visual or olfactory cues) was placed at one of two locations on a large open field. If object A was 
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in place 1, a reward could be found underneath. Similarly, if object B was in place two a reward 
could be obtained by displacing the object. However, no reward was available if either object 
was presented in the alternate location. Normal animals improved in performance across days, 
as reflected in differentiating their latencies to approach object in rewarded vs non-rewarded 
locations. Selective lesions of CA3 completely blocked acquisition of object-place associations, 
whereas CA1 lesions had no effect. In contrast, the opposite pattern of results was found in 
another study were rats were taught associations between an object and an odor that were 
separated by a short delay. The animals learned that if object A was presented before the delay, 
then a cup of sand would contain a food reward if it was scented with odor 1 (but not with odor 
2). Conversely, if object B was presented first, then a cup of sand would contain a food reward if 
it was scented with odor 2 (but not odor 1). Memory was measured by a briefer latency to 
approach the scented cup on rewarded pairings (A-1 and B-2) than on non-rewarded pairings (A-
2 and B-1). In normal rats, the latency to approach rewarded cups gradually decreased over 
daily training sessions, at about the same rate as observed in the previous object-place 
association study. In contrast, rats with selective CA1 lesions showed no sign of acquiring the 
associations between temporally separated objects, whereas rats with CA3 lesions acquired the 
task just as rapidly as normal animals. These results are consistent with the idea CA1 is 
specialized for representation of the order of events that are separated in time (Manns & 
Eichenbaum, 2006). 
3. CURRENT COMPUTATIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 3.2. General Description of Architecture 
For this LDRD project we focused on higher-level processing, occurring after eye foviation and 
movements such as saccades. The model starts at the point where the visual input images have 
been separated into two components. The first sub-image corresponds to the area seen by the 
focal area of the eye, and the second sub-image contains the entire field-of-view for the eye. 
This division models the higher resolution present in the fovea, as well as the way focus and 
context information are treated separately through some parts of biological cortex. We will 
begin the description of the computational system by describing the bottom-up behavior 
involved in encoding episodic memories into the representation of the system. As illustrated in 
Figure 4.3, the first sub-image (the blue sphere at bottom of image) is directed to the ventral 
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stream of neural processing where object detection and categorization is handled (i.e., “what” 
information). The second sub- image (the upper-right portion of the visual input) is directed to 
the dorsal stream where the spatial context of what the eye is seeing is determined and 
categorized (i.e., “where” information). This stream consists of a lower resolution (zoomed out) 
view of the entire field of view including the focal area itself. Note that both sub-images are 
further segmented into overlapping sub-sections for even greater specificity in category 
formation of our episodic memory. 
Our cortical model is comprised of stacked layers of fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) 
networks. ART is a well established self-organizing neural technique for classifying input 
activations. The interested reader can find a wealth of literature on ARTs details, performance, 
and stability (see Vila, 1994; Walczak, 2005). While ART is a good choice for the classification 
modules, other unsupervised learning techniques could be expected to render similar results, 
though probably with subtle and interesting differences. Between each pair of ART modules 
there is a layer of Temporal Integrators (Taylor et al., 2009), with an adjustable time constant of 
integration for each layer. This TIART network is meant to model a biological cortical column, 
which receives afferent connections from either a particular subsection of the input field or a 
particular subsection of the previous layer. These subsections overlap in a manner inspired by 
the biological cortex (Kingsley, 2000). The system as a whole is a simple but powerful cortical 
classifier. Progressively higher layers encode progressively more abstract objects or spatial 
locations. Low levels correspond to simple perceptual primitives (edges etc.), high levels might 
correspond to whole objects or other semantic concepts. However, the cortical ART networks 
have an interesting modification. Each ART network has a "top down" recall mode driven by 
input from higher-level, more abstract layers as well as the traditional "bottom up" mode driven 
by stimulus input. While in "top down" mode, an activated F2 node in the ART network 
reinstates the prototypical input pattern which it encodes in synaptic weights between layers F1 
and F2 (see Figure 4.4). So, for example if a particular F2 node encoded the concept of "dog" it 
could read out the features ("fur," "tail," "barks," etc.) in the F1 layer. These features would in 
turn activate the F2 layer of the next lowest ART module and so on. In this way the network 
learns new inputs from the bottom up, and can then recall and reconstruct these features from 
the top down. 
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Figure 4.3. A conceptual view of the computational architecture 
 
In our version of the cortex, one half of the cortical input columns receive high resolution input 
from the center of the visual field. This causes the network to develop templates which 
corresponds to "objects" and is meant to simulate the fovea near the sensory level and the 
ventral visual stream near the associative levels. The other half of the cortical columns receive 
low resolution input from the periphery which leads the development of spatial representations. 
This is meant to correspond to the off-center visual field at low levels and the dorsal visual 
stream at associative levels. 
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Figure 4.4. An example of an Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) module 
 
For each cortical modality (i.e., focus and context) there are three levels of cortex. For each level 
of cortex, we have implemented a grid of fuzzy ART modules (the current version has 6 layers at 
7 X 7 modules; see Appendix 1). There exist temporal integrators between the fuzzy ART levels, 
but for these experiments the time constant of integration is dialed down to where they are 
inconsequential from the point of view of pasting together temporal events. The temporal 
integrators are dialed down because the experimental tasks are static in nature rather that 
temporal. A future extension of this architecture would be a single mechanism that dynamically 
adapts both static and temporal tasks. 
3.1.1 The Hippocampus 
The hippocampal system makes use of several ART variations, so it is related to the cortical 
system at a single unit level, but has a very different architecture and accomplishes 
fundamentally different information processing. While the cortex attempts to represent the 
conceptual structure of its inputs, the hippocampus attempts to quickly bind snapshots of high 
level cortical activity. Behaviorally, this gives us an episodic memory mechanism where concepts 
originating in multimodal sensory input are bound together. By way of this binding, the 
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hippocampal representation can also be used to recover neocortical representations from 
partial activations. 
Hippocampus is modeled as a loop of neural modules starting at entorhinal cortex, proceeding 
to dentate gyrus, continuing to CA3, then returning to entorhinal cortex through CA1, where 
some of the function of subiculum is implicitly captured in CA1. Entorhinal Cortex (EC) is the last 
level of cortex on the way from sensory input to the hippocampus. The EC is where all 
information that will be encoded in episodic memory 
must converge. The Dentate Gyrus (DG) provides a pattern separation function for the 
information received from entorhinal cortex. The CA3 provides pattern completion and 
semanto-spatial association. CA1 closes the loop and provides temporal association. 
The EC is an area of multi-modal convergence, where several data streams from different senses 
come together (Anderson, et al., 2007). The EC's cytoarchitechture resembles that of the cortex, 
so it here is modeled as is the rest of cortex. However, the ART networks which make up the EC 
have two sets of connections to the hippocampus, a feed forward connection to the DG and CA3 
meant to simulate the perforant path, and bidirectional connections to the CA1/Subiculum 
component of the hippocampal model. The forward connections provide inputs to the 
hippocampal module. The back connections use LAPART rules to learn associative links between 
activity in CA1 and EC, thereby closing the autoassociative hippocampal loop. When a CA1 
representation is activated, these back connections can drive top-down cortical recall (Figure 
4.5). 
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Figure 4.5. The modeled representation of the hippocampal system 
 
In our implementation, the pre-Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL) sensory cortex and EC are 
represented by layers of fuzzy-ART modules which are modified to encode temporal semantic 
data. Individually, these temporally integrated adaptive resonance theory (TIART) modules are 
capable of encoding categorical representations of their given input vectors over time (Taylor, et 
al., 2009). By combining layers of TIART modules, our EC creates categories of categories to 
represent larger semantic concepts and combine the "dorsal stream" containing contextual 
information and the "ventral stream" of focal information before these streams enter the 
hippocampus. Within the hippocampal representation in our model, each of the primary regions 
is represented by a different ART variant selected to achieve the particular functionality of the 
individual region. The relative size of each module is scaled in accordance with approximate 
human neuroanatomy. 
The DG has peculiar anatomical properties. It has a large number of neurons with relatively low 
activity and it is one of the few places in the brain in which new neurons are generated in the 
adult brain. These properties have lead to the suggestion that the DG creates sparse, non-
overlapping codes for unique events via pattern separation (Leutgeb, et al., 2007). 
The DG in our model receives the conjoined multimodal sensory signals from EC. It performs 
pattern separation on this abundance of sensory information to produce sparse output 
activation, which ensures different semantic concepts are given unique encoding (Rolls & 
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Kesner, 2006). Computationally, a series of k-winner-take-all (k-WTA) fuzzy- ART modules 
constitute the DG module of our model. A WTA module is a competitive network in which a 
single concept beats out competing concepts to represent the input vector. Effectively, a sparse 
encoding is created as each of the k WTA modules yields a single output. Similar input vectors 
will be represented by the same single winning output, and dissimilar inputs will be represented 
by a differing winning output, yielding pattern separated outputs. These outputs serve as the 
input for CA3. 
Anatomical studies of the hippocampus proper reveal cytoarchitechture which differs radically 
from that of the cortex (Anderson, et al., 2007). While both CA1 and CA3 both contain pyramidal 
cells like the cortex, existence of extensive recurrent connections in CA3 and the presence of 
inhibitory and excitatory interneurons have led some investigators to suggest that CA3 may be 
involved in pattern completion (O’Reilly & Rudy, 2001). 
In this implementation the sparse output pattern from DG serves as input to CA3. Functionally, 
CA3 assists with episodic binding through auto-association. In our model, this functionality is 
represented by a Self-Organizing Map (SOM) structure. A standard SOM transforms a given 
input vector into a distinct topological region without supervision guiding the classification 
(Haykin, 1999). Incorporating the neighborhood updating capabilities of a SOM within a fuzzy-
ART module, we have created a SOMART module to represent CA3. This module is capable of 
mapping semantically similar inputs to proximate topological regions. Thus the learning 
algorithm creates "islands" of activity which respond to similar input sets, but avoids a global 
topology. In effect, related concepts are clustered together to help associate episodic memories 
and these "islands" of relational bindings form the inputs to CA1. 
Anatomically, the output of CA3 proceeds to CA1 and then to the subiculum as the major output 
region of the hippocampus. However, the exact functionality of the subiculum is largely 
unknown, so we have merged the capabilities of CA1 and subiculum in our model. CA1 has been 
implicated in learning relational information for temporal sequences and connecting these 
episodic encodings back to the original sensory inputs from EC. This ability to link sequences 
allows for temporal packaging of episodes. Since our CA3 can only encode momentary 
conjunctions, we need a mechanism which can capture sequences of changing relations. Thus, 
CA1 contains a unit which temporally integrates CA3 outputs using a set of leaky integrators. 
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This provides a temporal gradient of input conjunctions coming from CA3, the oldest bindings 
will have the weakest signal in the temporal integrator, while the most recent bindings will be 
most strongly represented. This temporally coded sequence of CA3 activity is used by CA1 to 
create a topology of temporal sequence. 
Once this temporal topology has been established, activity in CA1 is associated with activity in 
the EC via a Laterally Primed Adaptive Resonance Theory (LAPART) partially-supervised learning 
paradigm. Local CA1 learning is supervised in that a certain sequence of CA3 activations 
corresponds with certain EC activation. CA3 sequence A, where that sequence is translated to an 
instantaneous representation through the temporal integrator, is bound through learning to EC 
activation B. LAPART uses two ART modules connected by a lateral activation field, so the 
activations on each side are generalized via the ART classification mechanism. Through 
experience, a connection weight is learned to bind the node that corresponds to each classified 
CA3 sequence to a node that corresponds to some EC activation. This mapping of sequences 
onto the high- level cortical representations closes the hippocampal loop, and allows activations 
in CA1 to cue top-down recall in the cortex and unspool the temporal representations it has 
created. This entire process is graphically described in Figure 4.6 (A-K). 
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Figure 4.6. Step-by-step process of episodic/semantic activation
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Figure 4.6 Cont. 
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Figure 4.6 Cont. 
 
In our computational system, when an episodic memory is recalled, the hippocampus activates 
one of the categories in CA1, and it begins the top-down recall of the episodic trace which it 
encodes. In the recall, the active category in the CA1 ART unit encodes a temporal sequence of 
conjunctive associations which were formed in CA3 during the episodic memory formation. 
During recall of a specific conjunctive association in CA3, each stream (ventral and dorsal) that 
makes up part of the conjunctive association is activated in top-down fashion. The top-down 
activation of each stream is similar, thus the top-down description of a single stream will be 
 118 
given in the interest of brevity. In the top- down activation of a cortical stream (either “what” or 
“where”), the top-level ART category is activated (in the EC or DG). This top-level category 
consists of a concatenation of ART categories from each column in the cortical stream. Top-
down recall of this concatenation of categories consists of a simultaneous recall of each column 
starting at the ART unit which is at the top of each column. It is this ART unit which provides its 
category for the concatenation during the formation of the episodic memory. The top-down 
recall for each column is similar, thus the description of a single column will be given in the 
interest of brevity. During recall of a cortical column, the category in the top-most ART unit is 
activated in top-down fashion. This category contains a temporal sequence of categories from 
the next lower ART unit as integrated through the integration unit between them. The recall 
continues from ART unit to ART unit downward through the connecting temporal integration 
units until the bottom ART unit is reached. In top-down activation, each temporal integration 
unit contains a temporal sequence of ART category activations which were fed to it as input 
during episodic memory formation. During recall of the temporal sequence of ART categories in 
a temporal integration unit, each category in the sequence is re-activated in top-down fashion in 
the same temporal order as was originally experienced and encoded in the episodic memory 
trace. When the recall reaches the lowest level ART unit, it is ready for “replay.” During replay, 
the memory is re-activated in forward or bottom-up fashion in the same temporal sequence it 
was originally experienced. In this system, temporal information is stored in the activation 
potentials of temporal nodes. Local semantic information is stored in the synaptic weights of the 
ART modules. Long-term, memory can occur through Hebbian-like adaptation of synaptic 
connection weights between local cortical areas. In our model, a local cortical area at a given 
level is comprised of a collection of nodes that all influence the activation of the same ART 
output node. 
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Figure 4.7. The bottom-up/top-down flow of information that both consolidates memory into 
LTM and produces recall when prompted. 
 
 
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL 
Assessing a computational model for the degree of neuro-cognitive plausibility is a significant 
challenge. No one qualitative or quantitative method is sufficient to adequately evaluate the 
level of agreement between a computational model and the analogous brain system it seeks to 
represent. Thus, we employed several evaluative methods that were based on empirical, human 
studies as a means to quantitative compare the model. These comparisons helped to 
qualitatively assess the accuracy of the model, whereby the more qualitative comparisons, the 
greater potential for an accurate assessment of the model. Each comparison described below 
was meant to address a key aspect or function of episodic memory. 
4.1 Temporal and Sequential Memory and Recall of Objects 
This section details our approach to assessing the model’s learning of temporal semantics. First, 
the method of assessment is described and then a step-by-step example of its operation is 
given. Finally, the experimental method of assessment is demonstrated with a discussion of the 
results. 
This explanation and the first experimental assessment have been presented in Taylor et al., 
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2009. We encode temporal semantic data as a recency gradient of generalized classifications. 
Fuzzy ART is used as the classifier that creates an active output on a certain F2 node for any 
given input vector. We implemented an ART network with a fixed number of F2 nodes available 
for recruitment, where each available F2 node (whether it had yet been recruited or not) is 
connected to a leaky temporal integrator. This implements a static architecture, which is 
convenient for explanation. The method might be extended to dynamic architecture creation 
(allowing ART to recruit new F2 nodes indefinitely) in modeling neuro-development. The 
integrators need be leaky, otherwise the output would continually increase over time (assuming 
continual input greater than zero), eventually saturating. A general leaky integrator is modeled 
as (Carpenter, Grossberg, & Rosen, 1991). Where y is the integrator output, x the input, and a an 
integration constant. 
 
We implement a discretized (using Euler's method with an arbitrary sample period of one time 
method is simple enough in concept that we can provide a comprehensive example of its 
operation. The following example assumes three arbitrary sensory input vectors. We use 
sensory inputs to create grounded, stand-alone, examples. However, if the sequence of inputs 
over time were internal cortical activation patterns, the example could be describing an 
additional functional level of cortex, above that which created the inputs. 
Let there be three distinct sensory input activation vectors A, B, C that form a temporal semantic 
sequence that we wish to encode. Inputs feed into an ART module (see Figure 9). Each input 
results in a different active node output on the ART. By placing a leaky temporal integrator on 
each ART output node, we encode a temporal sequence of inputs as a single real valued vector. 
The integrated vector is a recency gradient, where the order of element amplitudes (from low to 
high) represents the order of occurrence of the input vectors (from oldest to most recent). As 
mentioned, the value of a given integrator output node will decrease over time. As a result, the 
farther in the past a given input was observed, the smaller a value the corresponding integrator 
output will have (until at some small activation level, the integrator output is lost in the noise of 
the system). A more biologically faithful sequence recall scheme (Sun & Giles, 2001), could 
(4.2) 
 
(4.3) 
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involve an extra step where by leaky integrator activations provide an inhibitory signal to other 
nodes, such that highest activations could be ordered first in temporal sequence. 
Figure 4.8. Time series of temporal integrator outputs given example input: "A", "B", "C" 
 
 
If the first system input is a semantic concept A (the specific vector of input data is not 
important, the simplest assumption would be that the semantic concept A is represented by an 
array of pixel values that visually correspond to the letter A), then let the output of the ART be 
[1 0 0], considering only the first three outputs for simplicity. Likewise, let the ART outputs 
corresponding to inputs B and C be [0 1 0] and [0 0 1] respectively. The temporal integration 
array initializes to [0 0 0]. Figure 8 illustrates the temporal sequence of integrator node outputs 
that result from presenting A at timestep 1, B at timestep 2, and C at timestep 3. 
[0.5 0.707 1.0] (4.4) 
Finally then, the temporal input sequence A, B, C is encoded at a single point in time as vector 
(4.4). Ascending values in the vector indicated encoded temporal order, while connectivity to 
the rest of the architecture encodes semantic content. In the context in which it was formed, 
and to the level of detail that the ART categories have formed generalized templates encodes 
both the temporal and semantic information of the input sequence (Sun & Giles, 2001). 
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Figure 4.9. ART with temporal integrator 
 
Figure 4.10. Example temporal integrator outputs
 
Vector (4.4) can now be encoded by a level 2 ART (see Figure 9) to uniquely represent the 
sequence A, B, C. Figure 10 illustrates some other possible temporal integrator outputs, given 
the indicated input sequence. Level 2 ART could encode these other vectors as representations 
of the corresponding temporal semantic sequence. Because the level 2 ART representations are 
unique (to the level of precision determined by the ART operational parameters), a top-down 
recall operation can recover the original sequence A, B, C from the level 2 ART encoding of (4.4). 
For example, let the temporal integrator output (4.4) result in activation of the first F2 output on 
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level 2 ART. Then, given an augmented ART with top-down recall ability, as well as a playback 
mechanism for the temporal integrator, top level stimulation of the first F2 node on level 2 ART 
will result in the sequence A, B, C being played back at the system input level. 
Later work will delve into neural implementations of these top-down recall mechanisms. A brief 
overview of possible mechanisms is given now, so that their functionality can be used in the 
experiments that confirm temporal semantic encoding has occurred. We supplement ART by 
specifying a top-down behavior. When an F2 node is stimulated from above, it plays down the 
associated template's activation levels to the ART input layer. Template activation level 
adjustment is where all memory storage in ART occurs, so playback of a given template 
represents recall of one memory component at the scale of that ART unit. 
We also supplement the bottom-up temporal integration scheme with a top-down behavior. As 
the output of a temporal integrator array is a pattern encoding the order of input activation, 
recall of that gradient should play back the temporal integrator inputs in that order. When a 
pattern is placed on the temporal integrator array from above, the array will first activate the 
input corresponding to the lowest value in the pattern, then the next lowest, and so on. This 
behavior will play back the input activations in their original order. As a manner of 
implementation, we can imagine the top-down stimulation of the temporal integrator array as 
setting a threshold for each element of the array. The integrators then start integrating up from 
zero and fire the associated input node when their internal value reaches the threshold. The 
lowest threshold will be reached first, which is correct because it represents the input that 
occurred farthest in the past and therefore the input that should be played back first. 
4.1.1 Experimental Results 
This experiment demonstrated successful encoding of temporal semantic data. In this case, the 
semantic meaning will be visual sensory observation. The formation of the encodings 
themselves can be tracked by probing node activations in the architecture. However, this can at 
most show that some representations were formed (not that those representations are correct). 
We demonstrate that the representations are valid encodings of the input information by 
initiating a recall process that decodes the temporal semantic representations into whatever 
those representations encode in the context of the system. If the encoding, in the context in 
which it is stored and recalled, decodes to the original information (to the resolution of the 
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system), then we have solid evidence that the desired functionality is captured by the described 
method. 
Figure 4.9 shows the architecture used for the recall experiment. The visual sensory input is a 
two dimensional array of 10 by 10 pixels. The first level ART forms templates to represent the 
visual input symbols. The temporal integrator forms semanto-spatial patterns to represent 
sequences of symbols observed by the first layer ART as passed on by the first layer ART's F2 
node activation. The second layer ART forms templates that represent the patterns output by 
the first layer temporal integrator array that represent temporal sequences of input symbols. In 
this case, the timescales are such that the second layer ART captures temporal integrator 
patterns corresponding to three input timesteps. Figure 4.11 shows an input sequence. Figure 
4.12 shows one recall sequence, in this case recall corresponds to the middle three symbols of 
the input. 
 
Figure 4.11. Memory and recall input sequence
 
Figure 4.12. A sample memory and recall output sequence 
 
We note that the recalled sequence is not an exact copy of the input sequence. The plus and 
diamond symbols have been aliased to a common symbol. This aliasing occurs because in the 
metric used by ART, the plus and diamond symbols are sufficiently close for classification to the 
same F2 template. An easy parallel can be drawn in human memory formation. To the non- 
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expert, transient observation of either a grey Toyota Corolla or a grey Honda Accord is likely to 
form an aliased memory of "grey import sedan." In ART, the vigilance parameter determines 
how close two inputs must be to be classified into the same template. 
The vigilance parameter was set arbitrarily at 0.8, in a range of 0 to 1, for the described 
experiment. In our architectures, the vigilance parameter of the ART units is an independent 
variable that can be used to tune the performance of the network. One of the trade offs 
inherent in tuning with the vigilance parameter is memory space vs. precision, greater vigilance 
will form a greater number of more precise templates. We can tune a part, or all, of this sort of 
architecture for more precise (higher resolution) temporal semantic encoding, but only at the 
expense of using up more memory space. 
As stated earlier, the temporal semantic encoding method is capable of encoding information to 
the precision of the generalization used in the ART module(s). This experiment demonstrates 
that valid temporal semantic encodings were formed because when the encodings are decoded, 
the original temporal and semantic information is recovered. 
In addition to the limitations of the ART parameters used, the user would want to consider 
supplemental mechanisms (possibly such as those found in (James, 2001)) if exact encoding of 
sequences is important. The anticipated use of this method is the simulation of biological 
cognitive processes, so some deficit in perfect memory is acceptable. Further research can 
characterize the consequences of potential imperfections in the system, as compared to 
imperfections in human cognition. Research shows better relative memory performance, as 
opposed to absolute memory performance in humans (Sejnowksi & Rosenberg, 1987). 
Another consideration for future applications is the packaging of input episodes. The above 
example uses static episode size for simplicity of analysis. A more interesting system would 
dynamically package episodes, possibly based on rate of change and/or novelty. 
 (4.5) 
There exists a biological correlate, in the behavior of neurons, to the sort of temporal 
integration described here. Membrane potentials integrate down (assuming sub-threshold 
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stimulation to some level above resting equilibrium) over time due to leakage current through 
resting ion channels. The Goldman equation (Vila, 1994), describes the influence of ionic 
concentrations on the neuron membrane potential (Waibel, et al., 1989). An elevated 
membrane potential would reflect deviation from an equilibrium (where the Goldman equation 
expressed that equilibrium for the pertinent ions in neurons) of ionic concentrations between 
the inside and outside of the neuron. Ions would then flow through resting (non-gated) ion 
channels until equilibrium was restored. The time course of this equilibrium restoration can be 
described by temporal integration. 
The rate of change of the membrane potential is a function of the number of resting channels 
and the number, connection strength, and activity of afferent neural connections. We abstract 
beyond gated ion channels and outgoing action potentials as we only seek to explain neural 
plausibility rather than a full model of neuron. With proper balance and biasing, the rate of 
change in membrane potential (and hence the rate of decay of the integration) could be tuned 
over a wide range. This tuning allows the arbitrary time scale representation that we mentioned 
earlier. 
We illustrate the biological correlate both to show neurological plausibility of our technique, but 
also as evidence for pervasive temporal integration (and thereby pervasive co-encoding of both 
temporal and semantic information at multiple levels through cortex). No neurons function 
without some form of temporal integration, though a counter argument is that the time scale of 
ion-channel temporal integration is not relevant to information encoding. 
Structure is a critical characteristic of any neural system (Wan, 1994; Heathcote, 1995), no less 
so in the method described here. Temporal semantic information encoded as a recency gradient 
only has meaning within the structural context in which it was encoded. The activation of a 
temporal integration node, which represents the information that a square was the most recent 
symbol in a certain sequence, only has that specific meaning because there exists a connection 
between that node and a classifier node that represents square. Furthermore, that classifier 
node only represents square because of the particular connects between the classifier 
functional subsection inputs and visual sensor outputs. The guidance to be appreciated by the 
consideration of structure is that when building up larger architectures with these methods, one 
must keep in mind invariant structural mappings of the processed information, lest one lose or 
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corrupt the information being encoded. 
4.2. Associating Object/Scenes Pairs 
For the second assessment we compared the model results to study results of Hannula et al. 
(Haykin, 1999). The Hannula study presented human subjects with a series of face-scene pairs in 
a study block, and then tracked eye movements for sets of three faces, with a background 
scene, presented in a test block. The set of three faces can be from one of three categories: 
match, re- pair, or novel. The match face sets contain three known (previously seen) faces, one 
of which is correctly paired with the background scene. The re-pair face sets contain three 
known faces, but none of them are correctly paired with the background scene. The novel face 
sets contain three unknown faces. This task is an exercise in episodic memory for associating 
people and places. 
Figure 4.13. Hannula image scheme 
 
Published results show that normal subjects will spend a larger proportion of viewing time 
directed to a face that correctly matched the background. Subjects with hippocampal damage 
did not exhibit this proportional increase in dwell time on the matching face. This result 
indicates that hippocampus is required for the recognition of previously observed episodes. 
The goal of this assessment is to show evidence that our model exhibits some of the same 
function as biological brain with regard to scene/object pair association. In the interest of 
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correlating behavior from our model to human behavior, we create a mapping of the human 
experimental setup to an experiment that we can run, in simulation, on our model. To mitigate 
visual processing effects, we map the face-scene focus-context images to simple geometric 
images (initially using squares and triangles, then going to orthogonal lines and dashed lines). 
Our input images were ten pixels by ten pixels. 
We present arrangements of our focus and context images that correspond with the study and 
test image presentations of the original experiment. The study presentation sequence of the 
original experiment is fixation, scene, face. As our model lacks a mechanism for separating focus 
and context information in the visual field, we must simulate that separation by presenting 
separate images to the focus and surround modality inputs. The presentation sequence for the 
focus modality is fixation, scene, face. The presentation sequence for the context modality is 
fixation, scene, scene. These sequences reflect the fact that the scene image is a focus image 
during the second element of the original study presentation because the scene is the only 
image on the screen. The context modality only ever sees the scene because even when the face 
is present in the original study presentation, the scene still forms the background of the image. 
Part of the original experimental setup is that visual dwell time on an image is a measure of 
recognition of that image. As the model is lacking eyes, an alternate measure of recognition 
must be developed. The simulated measure of recognition is equivalent to directly probing 
neural activation in a human brain. Modeled neural activation can be evaluated by observing 
the ART classifier module output in the cortex model and the grid node outputs in the 
hippocampus model. A representative output report is shown in Figure 14. Model recognition 
scores are computed by summing contributions from each cortical classification module, and 
the hippocampus. The cortical classification modules can each contribute one point, and the 
hippocampus can contribute a point. This scoring convention was arbitrary and was sufficient 
for our purposes. The first ART module in the cortical focus modality contributed a point if it 
identified an existing template (i.e. it had previously learned a generalization) for the current 
input. As inputs are presented in sequences of three (fixation, scene, face), the first ART module 
will make its contribution based on the last element of the sequence. The second ART module in 
each cortical modality is located after a temporal integrator, and so it will score familiarity based 
on the whole sequence. 
Another biological brain mechanism that our model lacks is the ability to concentrate on 
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different portions of an image. As such, we must simulate that ability for the purpose of the test 
images. Instead of a single sequence with the last image containing three faces, we present 
three sequences with the last image each containing one face. This way, the model does not 
need to consider three sub-images as the human subjects do when looking at the single test 
image of three faces. The experiment outputs from Figure 4.5 reflect a test sequence in the 
original experiment where faces 1, 2, and 3 are shown against scene 1, then faces 2, 5, and 6 are 
shown against scene 2. In the study portion of the experiment, face 1 was viewed with scene 1 
and face 2 was viewed with scene 2. 
4.2.1 Results 
Figure 4.14 shows an example of the experimental results. This example reflects two test 
sequences from the Hannula experiment. As this example is from the match category of faces, 
all three faces are known. One face should have an episodic memory associating it with the 
tested scene. 
Figure 4.14. Experiment outputs 
 
The intact model exhibits higher familiarity scores when previously studied matching focus- 
context (face-scene) image pairs are presented, as opposed to pairs that were not studied 
together. This behavior correlates to the eye dwell time of human subjects in the Hannula study. 
If the hippocampus section of the model is lesioned, familiarity scores are the same between 
matching and non-matching image pairs. This behavior also correlates with human subjects, 
where subjects with hippocampal damage do not preferentially dwell on particular faces during 
the matching and non-matching face-scene pairs. Further results show that there is no 
difference in familiarity scores between different focus images in the re-pair and novel tasks, 
with either intact or lesioned models. These results correlate with the Hannula data where 
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hippocampally damaged and normal subjects both view faces in the re-pair task with no 
preference. 
4.2.2 Repeated Experiment 
The aforementioned results were obtained from initial model architectures. With significant 
advances made to the architecture we re-ran the experiment and were subsequently able to 
improve upon the mapping between the procedure performed by Hannula et al. and our work. 
Model fidelity advances allowed us to use actual images of faces and scenes rather than 
representative geometric shapes. 
Furthermore, advancements made to the hippocampus representation enabled us to restrict the 
neural activation analysis to CA3 where associations are formed. By doing so, we were 
subsequently able to analyze the model CA3 activations and attain the results similar to Hannula 
et al. These results correlate well with human performance data in which greater hippocampal 
activation is observed when an existent encoding may be retrieved. Likewise, partial 
hippocampal activity is required to explore the representation of a novel input, and little 
hippocampus involvement is required for re-paired episodes which do not fit prior encodings. 
4.3 Co-occurrence of Shared Scenes with Novel Objects 
For the third assessment we compared the model to a study performed by Preston et al. 
(Preston, 2004). In the Preston study, human subjects were trained on black and white 
photographs of face-house pairs and face-face pairs in three sets. The first set consists of pairs 
of faces and houses. The second training set introduces new faces paired with the same set of 
houses shown in the first set. And finally, the third training set consisted of face-face pairs which 
were previously unseen. During the testing phase of the Preston study, subjects performed 
forced- choice judgment tasks. Two of the tasks presented either a face or a house and required 
the subject select the corresponding house or face to complete the pair. The other two tasks 
focused on face-face pairs. One task was simply a test of the learned face-face pairs, whereas 
the other task tested subject’s ability to recall related face-face pairs which shared a common 
house but which were never explicitly seen together. 
Similarly, we trained our model using face-house pairs such that a face is processed by the 
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ventral stream and a house is processed by the dorsal stream. An example of the input 
presented to the model may be seen in the left half of Figure 4.15. See Appendix B for the full 
training sequence. Our model lacks the ability to perform the forced-choice judgment task. So 
rather we first trained the model on face-house pairs including faces with a common house. 
Then, we turned off learning in the model so that no new concepts could be formed, but rather 
only existent concepts could be used. We then presented the model an ambiguous partial input 
cue by inputting a blank image to the ventral stream and one of the houses previously seen 
during training to the dorsal stream. This partial cue presentation may be seen on the right half 
of Figure 4.15. Rather than selecting between possible choices as in the forced-choice judgment 
task, we get our model to reconstruct the image that it has stored in memory associated with 
the house. The resultant image is not an exact copy of the original input, but rather is an 
amalgamation of categorical representations distributed throughout the hierarchy of TIART 
modules comprising sensory cortex. A sample recalled face may be seen at the bottom right of 
Figure 4.15. 
Figure 4.15. Face and scene pairs
 
4.3.1 Qualitative comparison results 
In addition to the example shown in Figure 4.15, the model was successfully able to recall 
correct corresponding faces for each of the houses shown during testing. All of the recalled 
faces clearly resembled a particular face shown during the training phase; however, each was 
subject to slight distortions yielding an imperfect recall. 
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The ability to associate related face-face pairs can be observed qualitatively within the model by 
noting the activation regions within CA3. Portrayed in the upper left region of the graphical user 
interface (GUI), shown in Figure 4.16, informally one can observe whether or not the same CA3 
activations are employed to encode the association of cohabitation. The visual input presented 
to the model can be seen in the lower left of the GUI. As displayed in Figure 16, when presented 
with face A and house A, a distinct region of CA3 is activated. Likewise, as shown in Figure 17, 
when presented with a different face B also paired with house A, an overlapping region of CA3 is 
indeed active indicative of the shared encoding between the related face-face pairing. On the 
other hand, as shown by Figure 4.17, when presented a distinctly different face C and a different 
house B an entirely different CA3 region is utilized for the encoding. 
Figure 4.16. Person ‘A’ with house ‘A’
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Figure 4.17. Person ‘B’ with house ‘A’
 
Figure 4.18. Person ‘C’ with house ‘C’ produces distinct mapping of activation 
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4.3.2 Quantitative comparison results 
In the absence of a fully embodied model, with output modality to articulate the envisioned 
associations beyond cued recall, we have applied the mathematics of information theory to 
quantify the relationship between semantic concepts within the architectural implementation of 
CA3. Information theory allows for a quantitative evaluation of the information content 
independent of the particular computational implementation or the underlying 
neuroanatomical processes modeled. 
More specifically, within the context of information theory, mutual information is a measure of 
the dependence between two random variables (Cover, 2005), and is computed by the double 
summation given in equation (4.6). 
 (4.6) 
 Treating a conjoined face-house pair semantic concept as a random variable, the various CA3 
encoding regions represent the alphabet of possible states the random variable may take on. In 
other words, a single random variable, such as X, represents the combined concept of a 
particular face and a specific house. Any specific pattern of activation within the CA3 may be 
used to represent the random variable, and thus the entire CA3 grid is the set of all possible 
values the random variable may express. From this perspective, mutual information may then 
be used to 
quantitatively evaluate whether or not our architecture recognizes and auto associates inferred 
relationships. 
In comparison to the Preston study, this technique allows us to evaluate whether or not our 
model is capable of forming an association between unseen related face-face pairs. A single face 
is only part of a random variable, and so for two different faces to share a relationship they 
must have a common context. The left column of Figure 4.19 lists the mutual information for the 
related face-face pairs our model was trained on. For instance, the first entry is the mutual 
information for two random variables A and E. A different face is represented by A than that of 
E; however both random variables share the same house. The right column on the other hand 
presents an averaged mutual information value of all the unrelated faces in reference to a 
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particular face. As an example, the face represented by A is only related to the face represented 
by E. All other random variables (in this case B, C, D, F, G, and H) represent unrelated faces. 
Therefore, in column 2 of Figure 4.19, we represent the average mutual information values for 
non-matching (i.e. non-auto-associated) faces. 
Furthermore, we have tested the capabilities of our model on even more complex associations 
than those in the Preston experiment, to demonstrate the flexibility available in forming novel 
arbitrary associations. As shown in Figure 4.20, we have tested our model using a vehicle 
context in addition to houses. In addition to contextual relationship, a more advanced partially 
overlapping association occurs in this more advanced example. 
Figure 4.19. Model comparison to Preston study 
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Figure 4.20. Faces paired with different contexts.
 
The motivation behind the Preston et al. study was to investigate the role of the human 
hippocampus in the novel expression of declarative memories (Preston, 2004). Comparable 
performance by our model on an equivalent test demonstrates an apropos functional 
appropriation to the modules comprising our architecture. 
In the Preston study, human performance was near perfect for the learned face-house pairs 
(Preston, 2004). Likewise, our model was successfully able to recall a correct face for each house 
presented such that the recalled image incurred only slight distortion. Due to algorithmic 
limitations, the present version of the model can only recall one of the faces associated with a 
given house. However, this could be corrected by allowing the model to retrieve all association 
pairs rather than only the single best match. 
The Preston study observed increased hippocampal activation during fMRI scans when subjects 
were tested on related face-face pairs compared with learned face-face pairs (Preston, 2004). 
This observation demonstrates the important role of the hippocampus in relational tasks. 
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Beyond simply leveraging the hippocampus to form associations within our model, in particular 
mutual information has quantifiably shown our model is capable of forming associations 
between novel concepts. In our mutual information measure, we approximate the joint 
probability distributions for two semantic concepts. This approximation is calculated by 
computing the normalized fuzzy conjunction of the respective CA3 activations when the 
concepts are processed by the model individually. As can be seen by the mutual information 
approximation values given in Figure 20, the related face-face pairs have a significantly larger 
CA3 mutual information measure than that of unrelated pairs. 
Furthermore, by incorporating vehicles as an additional context, we are able to demonstrate 
that our model is capable of processing a variety of concepts, as is true for humans, and is not 
only capable of processing houses. This more complex association additionally demonstrates the 
ability to associate multiple contexts with a single focus in addition to associating multiple foci 
with a single context. For example, as illustrated in Figure 8, the same person represented in 
concepts A and B is associated with a house in one concept and a vehicle in the next. A second 
person is additionally associated with the same house as shown in concept C. While both people 
cohabitate the same house, only the first person is associated with the vehicle. The ability to 
differentiate between these overlapping associations is evident by the mutual information 
measures. Both the mutual information value associating the first person with his house and 
vehicle, as well as the mutual information value associating the two people cohabitating the 
same house are considerably larger than the relationship between the second person and the 
vehicle. 
Comparing human CA3 activation during a co-occurrence task (Leutgeb, et al., 2005) to the CA3 
activation of the computational model during a similar co-occurrence task yielded similar 
results. This is shown in Figure 4.21. 
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Figure 4.21. Experimental and model image of CA3 hippocampal activation during a co- 
occurrence task
 
5. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The progression of our computational model is driven by attempts to improve model fidelity in 
relation to neurobiology. Rather than striving to implement the most efficient machine learning 
algorithms to achieve a desired goal, our approach has been to model the neuroanatomy and 
processes underlying declarative memory and recall. In doing so, we have demonstrated the 
ability to model elements of cognitive behavior such as familiarity and recognition. 
As a result of continuous improvement to the model we are also able to create automatic 
associations of various semantic concepts. Additionally we have presented mutual information 
as a means of quantitatively analyzing the dependence between semantic concepts within the 
CA3 region of the model. Overall, information theoretic analysis provides a mathematically 
rigorous means of analyzing the information storage and propagation capabilities of a model in 
an implementation dependent manner. In general, the artificial neural network computation 
model we have presented processes sensory inputs and in effect is capable of exhibiting 
qualitative memory phenomena such as auto-association of episodic memory concepts. 
We have made both a neurophysiological and a psychological behavioral case for our model. We 
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assert that this approach is of great potential benefit to the field because it puts computational 
modelers and neuropsycholgical investigators into interdisciplinary communication. By 
engineering a structural neuro-cognitive model, we have highlighted areas where neuroscience 
could most profitably shine the light of discovery to push our understanding further forward. For 
instance, all information that traverses through our model goes through the entorhinal cortex to 
dentate gyrus connections. That connectivity scheme was modeled based on our best 
anatomical understanding, but what is the merit of bringing together all of the modalities before 
they are hippocampally bound? Why is this evolutionarily more valuable than retaining the 
higher information content possible with separate modalities? This is an area of in need of a 
neuroscientific theoretical approach and an answer could in turn, help us to construct a more 
veridical, powerful and explanatory model. We believe that our model provides the 
experimentalist with a useful tool to explore cognitive processes. The behavioral effects we 
suggest should be confirmed in human subjects, but the model can be used to run exhaustive 
trials that would not be plausible for human studies. As this model continues to be developed, 
the computational-to-human study paradigm will only become more attractive and the potential 
for interdisciplinary collaboration more alluring. This is exemplified in the statement by Neal 
Cohen, professor and Director of the Head, Brain & Cognition division at the Department of 
Psychology, & Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, & Neuroscience 
Program: 
This model supports the ability to do classification/categorization of a range of visual inputs, to 
remember the prior occurrence of each of those inputs individually, to do pattern completion 
permitting recovery of those items based on partial or incomplete cues, to represent different 
locations in the visual environment, to remember which individual items occurred in which 
locations, and to bind together in memory representations of any arbitrary collection of items 
with one another and with their spatial or other contexts. And all of these capabilities are 
implemented in a model with biological realism greater than in any previously implemented 
model. Finally, it is done in a way that permits us to test the contributions of each of the 
individual components of the model and to compare that with what is seen in humans and 
animals. 
We believe this work will also benefit the Science and Defense national security mission of the 
DOE and other federal agencies by increasing the understanding of key aspects of cognition as 
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well as creating a higher fidelity human modeling architecture. This will enable the DOE to 
better understand the thought processes underling human behavior, as well as enhance human 
modeling in areas such as action/counter-action predictive simulations, training, and assistive 
decision making. 
5.1 Model Limitations 
Although our model is built upon understood neuroanatomical hippocampal function using 
biologically plausible computational mechanisms, it is not an identical reproduction of neural 
anatomy and function. Our model is not an exact neuron for neuron replica of the HC. Indeed, 
even if we had the computational resources to implement it, a reference map of every neuron 
and synapse in biological sensory cortex and hippocampus does not exist. Our work provides 
evidence for some specific connection schemes that we consolidated from the best existing 
literature. Future models can iterate and improve upon our assumptions. While not 
implementing the absolute volume of neural nodes in modeled biological structures, the model 
does take into consideration the neuron density and type within distinct regions, and attempts 
to preserve the same ratios in allocating computational resources. 
In terms of scope, the model is constrained to sensory cortex, parahippocampus and HC. This 
partial neural representation does not include an output modality, consequently constraining 
the means by which we may query and test the model. As addressed in the relevant sections 
describing the means by which we have tested the model, we have accounted for this limitation 
by constraining the means in which we extract information from the model. Rather than simply 
making inferences regarding model performance or knowledge based upon the underlying 
computational implementation, we have restricted our analysis to mechanisms such as neural 
activation which is somewhat analogous to brain imaging approaches. 
As the fidelity of the model is not at the neuron level, likewise it does not operate via action 
potentials. Rather, our model requires a clocking system regulating the flow of information 
through the model. This seemed a reasonable abstraction as we are running the model on 
digital computers anyway. The temporal integrators through the system do provide a means of 
buffering up a sequence of inputs, but include a design tradeoff impairing the ability to encode a 
sequence containing a repeated input separated by a different input. The temporal integrator 
functionality, as described formerly, decays the activation value of a category representation 
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over time. However, the activation is replenished upon subsequent presentations of the same 
input. For example, while an input sequence of ABC could correspond to an integrated vector 
output <0.5, 0.75, 1>, a sequence which repeats such as ABA is indistinguishable from BA (and 
various other possibilities). Computationally there are several simple means of compensating in 
a non- biological manner, but that would contradict the design intentions of this project. We see 
two possibilities for reconciling this approach with the biology. First, the biology may implement 
a more complex temporal sequence encoding scheme. We implemented a fairly simple scheme 
in part through a desire not to make any unreasonable demands upon what biological neural 
networks might be capable of. Second, the inability to distinguish ABA from AB may not be an 
issue at sufficiently abstract conceptual levels. It seems a reasonable claim that you can never 
have exactly the same experience twice, therefore the brain will never see exactly the same 
pattern of activations twice, hence “A” will never repeat as in ABA. 
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APPENDIX A: LAYOUT AND CONNECTION STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
Modules from higher columns receive inputs from multiple modules of lower columns 
 
 
6 layers at 7X7 modules 
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APPENDIX B: THE INPUT SET PRESENTED TO THE MODEL IN COMPARISON WITH THE PRESTON 
STUDY 
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Abstract: 
We present a non-linear dynamical spiking neuron model based upon hippocampal anatomy 
and electrophysiology for relational memory binding, encoding, and reconstruction (RMBER).  
The model decomposes the complex firing dynamics of entorhinal cortex input neurons into 
subcomponents that encode phase and frequency information within the high-dimensional 
space of the dentate gyrus. These subcomponents of the input are combined within a highly 
recurrent CA3 model to recover the original input dynamics. The reconstituted signal is then 
mapped back to the correct inputs within CA1.   This decomposition and reconstruction is 
functionally similar to performing a discrete Fourier transform (DFT) followed by an inverse DFT 
on the entorhinal cortex dynamics, and allows the rapid encoding and reconstruction of any 
arbitrary pattern of input firing without sacrificing the fundamentally compositional nature of 
the input.  We demonstrate how these patterns of input firing can be used to represent 
different relationships between items and from simple rule-based mappings to complex spatial 
trajectories. 
  
Introduction 
 
The hippocampus is required for rich, relational representations including episodic memories 
(Cohen & Squire, 1980; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998; Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002; 
Konkel & Cohen, 2009); and emerging research suggests that it also contributes to online 
processing (Voss et al., 2011; Warren, Duff, Jensen, Tranel, & Cohen, 2012), and imagining 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Since episodic memory, online reasoning, and 
imagining are all constructive processes that require binding together complex, arbitrarily or 
accidentally related stimuli (e.g., items, locations, and times) from different sensory modalities, 
while simultaneously incorporating observed, remembered, and predicted stimuli, it is no 
surprise that these processes share some of the same hardware.  The hippocampus has long 
been associated with representing configurations of flexible relations, important for navigating 
novel paths (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Samsonovich & McNaughton, 1997), learning sequences 
(Eichenbaum, 2000; Jensen & Lisman, 2005), and applying abstract rules such as transitive 
inference (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Heckers, Zalesak, Weiss, Ditman, & Titone, 2004).   
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Yet, mental reconstruction is a tall order, as we experience and interact with our environment, 
neurons in sensory and associative regions are activated when appropriate environmental 
patterns occupy their receptive fields (e.g., lines: Hubel & Wiesel, 1963; shapes: Murata, Gallese, 
Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; faces: Tanaka, Saito, Fukada, & Moriya, 1991).  When one of 
these units is activated, its firing codes information about its input (Gerstner, Kreiter, Markram, 
& Herz, 1997), but different regions can use radically different coding schemes (Hargreaves, Rao, 
Lee, & Knierim, 2005).   To reconstruct a rich, episode-like experience, involving a novel and 
arbitrary composition of multiple items and relations, requires capturing each regions’ unique 
codes, and later rebuilding them with sufficient verisimilitude to resemble the original 
experience (c.f. mental time travel Tulving, 2002).   
 
What is it about the neural architecture of the hippocampus that allows it to bind together all of 
this information?  How are such codes represented in tissue? What mechanism encodes and 
reconstructs arbitrary relations within the hippocampus?  Several neurocomputational models 
have attacked these questions.   
 
Some focus on the hippocampus’s ability to rapidly encode associations, and provide a training 
signal for the neocortex (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).  
Some focus on hippocampal spatial representations, such as the formation of place cells, grid 
cells, and path integration (Etienne & Jeffery, 2004; Milford, Wyeth, & Prasser, 2004; 
Samsonovich & McNaughton, 1997).  Others focus on the electrophysiology of hippocampal 
theta and gamma oscillations, and map this to representations of temporal sequence 
(Cutsuridis, Cobb, & Graham, 2010; Mizuseki, Sirota, Pastalkova, & Buzsáki, 2009).  Still others 
focus on the hippocampus’s ability to create and distinguish between unique, non-overlapping 
representations (i.e., pattern separated representation), while simultaneously reconstructing 
partial or incomplete representations (i.e., pattern completion) (Treves & Rolls, 1994; O’Reilly & 
Rudy, 2000; O’Reilly & Norman, 2002; Rolls, 2010).   
 
We present a model for relational memory binding, encoding, and reconstruction (RMBER), 
based on hippocampal anatomy and electrophysiology designed to encode, maintain, and 
reconstruct any arbitrary pattern of neural firing in its inputs in exactly the same format as it 
was originally presented regardless of the code used by the input neurons, or the state of affairs 
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that code represents.  After all, from the point of view of the hippocampus, there’s no outside 
world at all, only afferents from the entorhinal cortex and modulatory systems, the 
hippocampus doesn’t “know” what this pattern of firing maps onto.  From the hippocampus’s 
perspective it is sufficient to: 
 
1. Capture the identities of active entorhinal cortex neurons involved in the memory to be 
(re)constructed.  
2. Capture the dynamics of these inputs (i.e., frequency of firing, and relative phases of 
each element, possibly with respect to reference rhythm such as theta). 
3. Reconstruct patterns of inputs and their temporal dynamics from a partial input. 
 
Music is a useful analogy: the entorhinal cortex has a series of instruments which can be played 
(i.e., cells which can fire).  These instruments can produce different notes (i.e., the cells fire with 
some sort of complex dynamics in the frequency domain), and notes can be combined into 
synchronous chords, asynchronous scales, or some combination (i.e., the different firing 
frequencies possess phase delays relative to each other).  If an input from the cortex plays a 
tune to the hippocampus, it need retain only the sheet music:  instructions for reproducing the 
song (i.e., the hippocampus compresses the input), since the instruments are still present in the 
entorhinal cortex, the hippocampus need not store any information about how to reproduce a 
particular sound. So long as the instructions contain rhythms, meter, and key—the instruments 
will reconstruct song by overlapping these different components, producing “melodies” and 
“harmonies” implicitly.  Given a few bars as a cue, the hippocampus should be able to fill in the 
rest by reactivating and playing back this compressed code using the “notes” available in the 
cortex and the rhythms and meters stored in the hippocampus.  This code is combinatorial, the 
sheet music can be cut up and reassembled in different ways to produce novel tunes 
constrained only by the tunes that have been encoded before.   
 
 Model Architecture 
In the following sections, we describe a spiking neuron based attractor neural network model of 
the hippocampus. The RMBER model mirrors the majority of the simplified structure, 
connectivity, and dynamics of the basic hippocampal-entorhinal circuit (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 - An illustrative slice of the hippocampo-entorhinal circuit, with projections indicated by arrows. 
The model is composed of four primary regions - the entorhinal cortex (which we further 
subdivide into input layers 2 and 3 and output layer 5 - henceforth EC2, EC3, and EC5 
respectively), the dentate gyrus (DG), Cornu Ammonis region 3 (CA3), and Cornu Ammonis 
region 1 (CA1). Each region consists of both principle cells and inhibitory interneurons. Each 
region fulfills a specific functional role within the RMBER model, allowing us to assign semantic 
labels to describe high-level functionality. (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 - RMBER Region Functional Roles 
Synaptic connectivity also mirrors that of the hippocampus (Andersen, Morris, Amaral, Bliss, & 
O’Keefe, 2008). Projections between regions are meant to parallel the perforant path (linking 
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CA1, CA3, and the EC), and trisynaptic loop (connecting EC to DG, DG to CA3, and CA3 to CA1).  
Inter-region connections preserve some of the topology between regions with each unit of the 
input region by projecting efferents that “fan” into the most topographically proximal section of 
the target.   
 
In addition, the model is designed to exhibit slow gamma phase oscillations, at approximately 
40hz (Mizuseki et al., 2009). This oscillation corresponds to transient synchrony between cells 
within a single sub-region of the RMBER model.  This means within each approximately 10hz 
theta cycle each successive sub-region of the model will become active once, allowing a single 
input pattern will propagate through all regions such that the output arrives back at the EC5 in 
synchrony with the peak of the subsequent theta cycle (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 - Slow Gamma / Theta Relationship Showing Active Region 
 
Components and Connectivity 
The parameters presented below should be viewed as our “best guess” based on the anatomy 
of the region.  We made an extensive exploration of the parameter-space, and found that the 
oscillatory dynamics of the model are reasonably robust to some changes in the initial weights 
and connectivity. Thus the general function of the model can be achieved by a wide variety of 
similar implementations, but the particular dynamics described in the results section will be 
influenced by the initial parameter assignment. Further, it is important to note that the model 
may not always converge or correctly encode all input terms due to the nature of the purely 
random connectivity and weighting parameters used. 
 
1. Neurons and Synapses 
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The model is composed of Mihalas-Niebur generalized linear integrate-and-fire neurons 
(Mihalas & Niebur, 2009) and synapses that possess an exponential post-synaptic potential 
current decay rate.  Synaptic plasticity plays a key role in the model's ability to learn and 
reconstruct patterns of similar, but disparate activity. Where applicable, synapses are updated 
via spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP, Song, Miller, & Abbott, 2000) with synaptic scaling 
(Abbott & Nelson, 2000; Turrigiano & Nelson, 2000;  Turrigiano, 2008). Initial weights and delays 
are drawn from Guassian distributions unless otherwise noted.  
 
2.  The entorhinal cortex input layers  (EC2 and EC3)  
The first layer (EC2) is meant to serve as the sole source of fully unitized input to the model.  The 
number of neurons in this layer is solely dependent on the nature and constraints of the input 
source being modeled. Within our implementation, these neurons were directly connected to 
input stimulus neurons with a weight and delay sufficient to exactly reproduce the desired input 
patterns. Where different input modalities are used, they are localized to different topological 
regions of EC2. 
 
Each EC2 neuron targets 5% of DG neurons with exclusively excitatory forward connections. 
These connections are designed to project the unitized input into a higher level space, 
generating a unique pattern of activity that can be used to reconstruct and disambiguate spatial 
and temporal relationships. Each input pattern should produce a unique and reproducible 
expansion that can fully express the needed level of granularity. The contribution of several 
closely timed input spikes is sufficient to produce this desired behavior - a one-to-many network 
pattern that relies on specific units and their timing. 
  
Within our implementation, the synaptic weights were selected between 2 and 3 mV with 
delays between 85-115% of a single gamma cycle. The exponential decay constant was selected 
as one-quarter of a gamma cycle. These parameters help to add a small amount of variability to 
the contributions of subsets of EC2 neurons to DG neurons, such that a DG neuron may respond 
to a particular subset of EC2 stimulus while another will not. 
 
 164 
The second layer (EC3) is meant to serve as an additional source of input to the CA1 region. This 
layer is not critical to the base functionality of the RMBER model; however, it was used to 
support modeling of spatial behavior.  
 
2. The Dentate Gyrus (DG) component  
The second component is meant to approximate the first region of the hippocampus proper, the 
Dentate Gyrus.  The Dentate Gyrus contains a different cell type from the other regions (dentate 
granule cells), and contains many more cells than either its principle input (EC2) or its principle 
target (CA3). Thus we model the DG with 100 times the number of EC2 neurons. The specific 
scale can vary depending on the resolution of the input patterns being modeled. Simple, 
sequential associations between two neurons can use considerably fewer DG neurons than 
input patterns with complex temporal relationships. This component receives inputs exclusively 
from the EC2 layer. 
  
Each DG unit has locally recurrent connections to 30% of its nearest neighbors. Again, this 
percentage can be modified depending on the complexity of the input pattern. This connectivity 
serves a critical role in being able to reconstruct a complete pattern based on partial input. The 
greater the number of DG neurons, the finer the resolution of reconstruction and ability to 
disambiguate between similar signals (c.f. Aimone, Deng, & Gage 2011). The strength of these 
connections is initialized at 0 mV with a delay between 0 ms and one half of a gamma cycle. 
STDP is configured with a coincidence window of +/- 2 ms with additive potentiation of 0.1 mV 
and maximum value between 0.5 and 1 mV.  
 
The coincidence window and maximum connection weights are relatively weak since the 
connectivity is fairly extensive. This means that the precise contribution of a preceding pattern is 
required to produce features of the subsequent pattern. Highly similar patterns may contain 
considerable overlap; however, the number of neurons and specific weight distributions can be 
extended to provide further disambiguation. The exponential decay constant was selected 
between 1 ms and one quarter gamma phase depending again on the complexity of the input 
being modeled - the lower the value, the higher the resolution of the pattern reproduced. 
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Many DG units project to a single CA3 unit. The specific number of targets reflects the inverse of 
the expansion connectivity from EC2 to DG - a randomly selected 5% of DG neurons target a 
single CA3 neuron. Connectivity strength of these connections is initialized between 2 and 3 mV 
with a delay of roughly a gamma phase and a post-synaptic exponential decay constant of 1 ms. 
STDP is configured with a coincidence window of +/- 1 ms with additive potentiation of 0.1 mV 
and maximum value of 3 mV.  
 
3.  The CA3 component 
The third component is meant to simulate CA3. Hippocampal anatomy suggests a rough parity 
between the number of CA3 neurons and EC neurons. The CA3 component receives input 
exclusively from DG units. This connectivity reproduces the original input signal terms from the 
high dimensional mapping produced by DG. 
 
Each CA3 unit has extensive locally recurrent connections with a large neighborhood, connecting 
with 50% of the other cells in CA3 The strength of these connections is initialized between 0 and 
0.5 mV with a delay between 0.1 and 1 ms and a post-synaptic exponential decay constant of 1 
ms. STDP is configured with a coincidence window of +/- 1 ms with additive potentiation of 0.1 
mV and maximum value of 0.5 mV.  
 
CA3 sends efferents exclusively to CA1, with each CA3 cell targeting a single CA1 cell.  The 
strength of these connections is initialized to feed the reconstructed CA3 pattern forward for 
reconciliation with the original EC2 input. 
 
4.  The CA1 Component. 
The fourth component is meant to simulate CA1.  Anatomical studies suggest it has a similar 
number of similar units to CA3, though its connectivity is quite different.  Thus we simulate CA1 
using the same number of neurons as both CA3 and the EC3.  The CA1 component receives 
inputs exclusively from both EC2 and CA3.   
 
Each CA1 unit has locally recurrent connections to 30% of its nearest neighbors.  The strength of 
these connections is initialized between 0.1 and 0.5 mV with a delay between 0.1 and 1 ms. 
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Each EC2 neuron also targets a single CA1 neuron with exclusively inhibitory forward 
connections with a constant inhibitory weight sufficient to produce the "difference" between 
the input signal provided to EC2 and the reconstructed signal generated by CA3. 
 
Each CA1 neuron sends output directly to a corresponding ERC5 neuron with a one-to-one 
mapping.  
 
5. The ERC5 Component 
The final component is meant to simulate the ERC layer 5 (ERC5), which represents the principle 
output of the hippocampus.  We simulate ERC5 with the same number units as EC2, and it 
receives input solely from CA1. Activity within EC5 will occur at the beginning of a theta cycle, 
which corresponds to the time at which new input will be stimulated in EC2. Thus incoming and 
outgoing activity within EC is phase-aligned. 
 
6. Inhibitory interneurons 
All areas of the hippocampus have extensive inhibitory interneurons, and receive extensive 
input from modulatory regions.  To simulate this, each neuron in the model receives an 
inhibitory signal that exhibits both tonic and phasic behavior.   This function serves as a feedback 
control to prevent the activity of the system from growing without bound, and acts as the 
pattern generator that creates gamma-phase oscillations.  Activity within each region 
progressively increases inhibitory feedback resulting in oscillations of bursting followed by 
silence.   This oscillatory behavior was tuned to match slow gamma phase oscillations, at 
approximately 40hz (Mizuseki et al., 2009).   
 
Results 
 Binding simple conjunctions 
First we tested a simple relation represented in a pattern of asynchronous firing (Figure 5.4).  
This code was meant to represent a simple predicate-consequent pair (If A then B).  This 
relationship was coded with a simple pattern of synchrony, a single lateral EC unit representing 
A and a single medial EC unit representing IF fired in unison to represent that A was present and 
bound to the predicate condition. The units representing B and THEN fire 180 degrees gamma 
phase advanced with respect to the A units, to represent consequent, and to represent that A 
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did not occupy the consequent slot (c.f. Holyoak & Hummel 1997).  During training and recall, 
we repeated the input pattern three times, on three subsequent theta cycles.  After training 
several intervening patterns, we test the network by presenting a partial input (only the “A + IF” 
portion of the conjunction) during which only four of the input neurons repeat their pattern of 
activation.  Correct performance corresponds to the ability of the network to complete the 
partial pattern, reactivating the missing two neurons (B + THEN), at the correct time (180 
degrees gamma phase advanced with respect to A), and to provide a code for the portion of the 
original signal that was “filled in” (i.e., to deconvolve the input from the filled in signal in order 
to distinguish that which was recalled from that which was provided by the input). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 - Structure and Timing of Simple Relation 
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Figure 5.5 - a) Initial Training Behavior and b) Reconstruction From Partial Pattern Behavior 
The model is successfully able to reconstruct the simple relation (Figure 5.5).  Within each theta 
cycle, the first gamma cycle, activates the sub-set of neurons in EC2 that represent the simple 
“IF A THEN B” conjunction.   During the second gamma cycle, these units activate a distributed 
representation in DG which uniquely codes for the phase and frequency information present in 
this particular conjunction of inputs.  Each DG cell codes for a particular complex relationship 
between an input, its frequency, and its phase with the strength of the connection between the 
EC cell and the DG cell encoding the frequency information, and the oscillatory delay of each DG 
cell relative to the theta phase encoding the phase information.  On the third gamma cycle, 
these complex conjunctive codes are summed in CA3 to produce the interference pattern of the 
many different phase and frequencies of the DG population.  The noise produced by the initially 
random weights and delays of DG cells averages out, leaving only the timings of the original 
inputs to drive the cells in CA3.   On the fourth gamma cycle, CA1 finds the mismatch between 
the activated input units, and CA3’s recovered temporal code, reconstructing both the correct 
timing and input identities.  Finally, on the fifth gamma cycle the mismatch between the input 
and the CA1 code is returned to the EC5.   
 
Compressed codes 
While the above encodes a simple rule at a single scale, the model is capable of encoding more 
complex configurations of input stimuli.  Using a more complex pattern of inputs with multiple 
signals over several seconds produces a different pattern of output.  In this case the 
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hippocampal model cortex does not reproduce exactly the pattern of units as the input signal, 
rather, the output is compressive-it does not reproduce any spikes that could be interpolated 
from adjacent spikes.  In this case the output resembles a compressed or low-resolution 
representation of the input that eschews redundant data (Figure 5.6).    
 
  
Figure 5.6 - Training, Reconstruction, and Compression of Complex, Disparate Input Stimulii A) Training and Test Stimulus in EC2 
B) Reconstruction in CA3 C) Output of EC5 
This compressed code closely resembles compressed path sequences observed in sleeping rats 
after training on a linear track task (Lee & Wilson 2002).  In the case of the model, the 
compression arises because dentate cells which are sensitive to particular phase or frequency 
relationships are not sensitive to repeats.  A frequency sensitive cell responds if a certain input 
frequency is present, not to each pulse within that input signal.  
 
Binding biologically realistic codes 
Cellular recordings of the MEC have found considerably more complex codes than the simple 
conjunctive binding-by-synchrony one presented above. Spatial representations, are especially 
well characterized; recent work has demonstrated that grid cells, as well as other classes of 
spatial invariant EC cells, exhibit sensitivity to periodic 2-D waves of firing oriented along a 
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restricted set of directions, and that the stable, spatially modulated response pattern of such 
cells arise from 1) the number of such wave-like components a cell is sensitive to, 2) the angle of 
these  of those waves relative to distal landmarks and 3) the orientation of these waves relative 
to each other (Gustafson & Daw, 2011; Krupic, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 - Spatially Invariant Grid Cell Behavior Simulated in EC2 Based On Environment Position 
 
This provides a more biologically realistic code for the model to bind.  In our second test, we 
simulated a “rat” running a path in a simulated, 2D, 1m circular enclosure.  This path was 
encoded into the firing of simulated grid (coding coordinate location), and head direction cells 
(coding angle of motion).  We used six grid cells for each of three different scales receptive fields 
(0.5m, 0.25m, and 0.125m fields) that loosely mirror those observed in rat hippocampus (as 
reported in Krupic et al., 2012).  We used eight head direction cells which coded for the 
orientation of the rat as it moved through the enclosure with receptive fields at 45 degree 
angles relative to each other (Figure 5.8). The rat’s position and orientation (at any of our scales) 
could therefore be decoded from the activity of the grid and head direction cells.   
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Figure 5.8 - Spatially Invariant Grid Fields at Multiple Scales and Direction Cell Sensitivity 
 
The activity trajectories generated by the grid and head direction cells from the underlying 
spatial path was input as a training sequence to the hippocampal model in the same manner as 
the simple rule training above.  Unlike the above encodings, each grid scale was trained 
separately to reduce the total number of combinations. In addition, EC3 was used to produce 
conjunctive grid-direction cells to provide additional input context to further aid in DG 
expansion and disambiguation of input highly similar input patterns. Timings were encoded by 
the rat’s simulated motion in real time with roughly one transition between large-scale grid cell 
fields per theta cycle, and transitions between finer-scale grid cells taking place within gamma 
cycles.  We measured output both by examining reconstructed and prospective paths and by 
examining hippocampal cells for “place cell” codings.   
 
After training, probing the hippocampal model with a partial input sequence (c.f. Lisman & 
Redish 2009) produced a reconstructed (relative to previous experience) or prospective (relative 
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to current location) path (Figure 5.9).  While reconstructed paths were generally accurate, they 
also contained short cuts, path inversions, and non-adjacent moves (Fig. 5.10) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 - Grid and Direction Cell Path Training and Reconstruction EC2 Input (Top) and EC5 Output (Bottom) 
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Figure 5.10 - Actual (Black) versus Reconstructed/Predicted (Red) Path 
 
"Place" Cell Activity 
The RMBER base model was augmented slightly to explore complementary "place" cell 
dynamics. As noted previously, forward projections were added between EC2 and EC3 to 
produce conjunctive grid-direction cell activity. Further, forward projections were added 
between EC and CA1 to implement a mechanism for conversion from spatially invariant grid 
cells to spatially bound place cells(Figure 5.11a) (Moser, Kropff, & Moser 2008). 
 
A set of observed hippocampal “place” cells emerged during training (Figure 5.11b).  These cells’ 
firing rates were modulated only when the “rat” occupied a particular point in space.  Figure 
5.11b further depicts the spatial variance for which each “place” cell was observed to be active – 
roughly fit within a bounding circle. This region of activity is directly correlated to the granularity 
of grid cells whose particular summation corresponds to the activation of each individual “place” 
cell as depicted in Figure 5.11a. A sub-set of these cells are modulated by the theta phase as 
well, and thus only become active when the “rat” occupies the location at a certain moment in 
the temporal sequence of grid cell firing (as in hippocampal “time” cells c.f. Farovik, Dupont, & 
Eichenbaum, 2010).   
 
 174 
 
Figure 5.11 (From Moser et al. 2008- a) Spatially Invariant Grid to Spatially Bound Place Cell Conversion  (b) Place Cell Activity 
Observed in CA1 (each marker style and color denote a different cell) 
 
Discussion  
We presented a model for binding together arbitrary relations between patterns of entorhinal 
cortex activity.  At the neural level, our chief addition is allowing spike-timing-dependent-
plasticity to tune the connectivity of inhibitory interneurons, which allows the model to learn 
both differences in connection strength and oscillatory delays.  This delay coding allows it to 
learn the order of input activations to create a dynamic, concatenative code capable of 
capturing everything from simple, asynchronously encoded, rule-based conjunctions, to 
biologically realistic grid cell activity.  Relations among input cells are encoded from the relative 
frequency and phases of EC input firings in the relatively high-dimensional space of the DG 
where conjunctive cells are sensitive to the co-occurance of input firing frequencies and phase 
delays (with respect to the theta rhythm).  Relations can be (re)constructed by collapsing the 
firing codes of DG conjunctive cells to a smaller number of recurrent CA3 cells, before finally 
being mapped back into the EC via CA1. Spike-timing dependent plasticity modulates both the 
strength of the weights and length of the oscillatory delays to fill in gaps in input signals with 
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patterns that match both the items and relations present in previously encoded patterns of 
relations.   
 
Encoding this oscillatory representation allows the model to be truly compositional.  Neural 
activity corresponds to the “symbols” present in the input, and fluctuations of this activity 
through time (i.e., the oscillations), correspond to the dynamic binding of these symbols to 
particular values (e.g., activation of a time cell signifies that the rat is at a particular point in a 
sequence). Summing the dynamics of individual “symbols” creates an interference pattern that 
uniquely corresponds to the composition created by binding those symbols together.  
Decomposing this interference patterns in the time domain creates a novel code for the 
relations between symbols since it captures the order and frequency of symbols’ activation.  By 
encoding these coefficients, the hippocampus creates a database of possible bindings.  Similar 
input patterns of bindings elicit activation of the nearest structurally similar matches, without 
being unduly driven by the surface features  of the particular symbols involved.  
  
In signal processing terms, this process is similar to upsampling a signal to create a high-
resolution version, applying an interpolating filter to fill gaps, and then recompressing.  The 
power of the model comes from the filter being dynamic; spike-timing dependent plasticity 
adjusts both what and when elements are interpolated, such that rather than filling gaps solely 
with noise or information from adjacent bins, gaps can be filled with information encoded 
during previous, similar experiences whether that similarity is due to shared items (as encoded 
by neural activity) or relations (as encoded by oscillatory dynamics).  The large number of 
dentate granule cells relative to the inputs ensures that filter samples a large number of kernel 
sizes, improving its ability to find the optimal resolution at which to represent the input.   
 
The model is able to capture the diverse input coding schemes used by its multi-modal inputs by 
transforming them into a single common code.  This transformation has much in common with a 
discrete Fourier transforms (and wavelet functions), and indeed connectionist models with 
similar network architecture can perform such transforms (Silvescu, 1999; Velik, 2008).  This 
transform creates a common language that allows diversely coded hippocampal inputs to be 
stored in a common compressed code, without losing the particulars of oscillatory frequency or 
phase that are were critical to the relational structure of the encoded input.  Note however, that 
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this code does not store or recall the complex dynamics of the inputs per se, it stores a 
compressed code that contains only the information required to adjust and re-align the current 
input dynamics to bias them to evolve toward previously experienced dynamics.   
 
This highlights a fundamental contrast between the RMBER model and other models of 
hippocampal function.  Hippocampal models in the tradition of Marr (Marr 1971, McNaughton 
& Morris 1987, Treves and Rolls 1994, O’Reilly and McClelland 1994, Hasselmo and Wyble 1997, 
Rolls & Kesner 2006), assume that input information is carried solely by neural activity (i.e., 
firing rate) rather than by neural dynamics (i.e., phase and frequency), and that these codes all 
exist at the same resolution or scale.  These models therefore, stress the involvement of the 
hippocampus in creating pattern separated codes that uniquely index particular input patterns 
followed by a pattern completion step to fill in missing information.  Creating orthogonal codes, 
and filling in absent information is an important part of hippocampal function captured by these 
models, and the RMBER model does implement this function in the interaction between the 
high-dimensional DG region and the low-dimensional CA3 region.   
 
However, pattern separation and pattern completion are simply different tunings of a 
classificatory process, with the former emphasizing fine-grained, specific categories that infer 
very little about a particular exemplar, and the latter coarse-grained, general ones with many 
associated features (indeed, both pattern separation and completion can be implemented by 
the same system, and often are in cortical models e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg 1988).   Recent 
analyses have begun to emphasize the hippocampus’s role not in pattern separation per se but 
in controlling the resolution at which memories are encoded (Aimone, Deng, & Gage, 2011).  
With dynamic input codes (as in RMBER), that carry information in the time domain (i.e., in 
oscillatory phase and frequency), and that encode information from multiple scales (e.g., cells 
representing entire events, and those sub-events) the criteria for resolving the category to 
which input samples belong must also be dynamic and multi-scale.   If I remember a birthday 
party, and recall that one of the guests left early, I must simultaneously assign them to the 
“attended the birthday party” category AND the “did not attend the birthday party” category, 
because both assignments are true (albeit at different scales)!  These dynamic, and multi-scale 
codes are precisely the sort of representations that require hippocampal function, but are not 
easily captured by the static coding scheme of models focused on pattern separation and 
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completion because they rely on selecting an appropriate category scale a priori, without 
knowing what information will be required by recall. 
 
The RMBER model circumvents this by directly encoding neural dynamics at multiple scales.  
Instead of encoding and reconstructing patterns of activity (the party, or it’s sub-elements), 
RMBER encodes and reconstructs both cells’ activity and the relative order of that activity.  This 
coding is not perfect, the incoming neural signal undergoes lossy compression, which tends to 
underweight high frequency and periodic input oscillations (these fade into the background as 
context).  Further, representation of fine-grained oscillatory activity is limited by the rate at 
which gamma frequency oscillations “sample” the slower theta rhythm (i.e., the model cannot 
capture changes in the EC inputs that occur more frequently than gamma because these 
changes cannot be coordinated between the EC and the DG). In addition, larger scales (e.g., the 
whole birthday party) are represented by stringing together multiple theta cycles, and 
reconstruction at this scale may fail either due to an insufficient number of DG cells sensitive to 
the boundaries between theta cycles (i.e., the event is too long to be remembered as a single 
“chunk”), or simply due to extrinsic activity interrupting reconstruction (i.e., memory 
interruptions).  However, these draw backs are necessary to create a truly concatenative code, 
RMBER reactivates neurons, at the frequency, and the phase order relative to each other as in 
the original event.  It can “gate” in and out elements as needed.  In the birthday party example, 
while the guest is present, the cells representing them are active, and when the guest leaves, 
they go silent without modifying the activity of cells representing other aspects of the party.   
 
Another tradition of hippocampal models stresses the importance of the hippocampus to single-
trial learning (Hopfield 1982, Minai & Levy, 1993, Deng, Aimone, & Gage 2010), though his 
tradition has recently been nuanced with the addition of models that can both rapidly encode 
simple associations, and generalize across larger categories (Kummeran & McClelland 2012).  
The goal of this rapid learning is often to train neocortical networks on infrequently experienced 
events (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly 1995). Since neocortical models typically rely on 
learning algorithms that infer the structure of their inputs via associative learning rules (i.e., they 
capture observed correlations) they are highly effective at learning structured semantic 
information about the world (e.g., dogs typically have tails), but is far less effective at capturing 
arbitrary, accidental, combinatorially complex, or ill-structured configurations of stimuli.  One-
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trial learning hippocampal model is meant to solve this by providing a learning signal that 
captures infrequently observed conjunctions.   
 
However, it is worth highlighting that the neocortical systems are not “accidentally” discarding 
rare instances.  Ignoring rare, arbitrary, or complex configurations is a feature, not a bug in 
associative learning systems.  A single, random instance of a low-probability event (e.g., this dog 
is painted blue) is not a structured pattern of associations.  It is not probabilistically likely, and 
an associative learning system attempting to build a statistically accurate, generative model of 
the world ought not to update its model because this peculiar instance does not strongly predict 
future events; it is possible, but not probable.  Associative learning systems should either accept 
that this example is acceptable variance within their model (“sometimes dogs are blue”) and not 
use it to guide future recall, or adjust the parameters to encode this single instance (“the blue 
dog I saw on Wednesday”) and accept that this over-fitting biases the model (this is known as 
the “bias-variance” trade-off c.f. Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992).   Using a hippocampal 
model to train a neocortex model on individual instances simply swings the pendulum towards 
bias.  This may be desirable, certain highly salient events may be worth over-fitting, but the 
hippocampal model would need to know presciently at encoding time which events would end 
up being important later.   
 
The RMBER model removes the need to fit individual instances with associative parameters.  
Instead it creates a code that instructs the associative memory how to configure the information 
it already has.  A good associative memory can learn that there is a cluster of features that 
correspond to the object we call a “chair” and another cluster of spatial features that 
correspond to the location “in front of the desk.”  However, if the associative memory system 
linked “chair” and “in front of desk,” it would damage the independence of those categories 
because chairs are not locations, nor are locations chairs.  Instead, the RMBER system can 
simply encode the transient firing dynamics produced by the cortex’s observation of an overlap 
between the spatial and non-spatial category, and by reconstructing this code later can adjust 
cortical dynamics toward the previous state of “chair in front of the desk,” without needing to 
create a conjunctive category tuned to the surface features of chairs in front of desks.  The 
model is thus capable of single-trial learning, but does so via a mechanism that captures 
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relationships between independent categories without fitting a category to the configuration of 
features present in an individual instance.   
 
This of course predicts that individual EC cells correspond to abstract, multi-modal conceptual 
categories (e.g., spatial locations, objects, parts of speech, emotions, etc).  If the associative 
cortex has done a good job of clustering similar items into conceptual categories, than activation 
of EC components should be relatively independent (though if they are not, RMEBER is perfectly 
capable of binding across these proto-concepts until the clustering algorithm can sort more 
successfully).  Therefore, the relative firing dynamics across these different components ought 
to correspond to the relations between independent concepts (although no claim is made about 
particulars of these dynamics, they can be arbitrary or even perverse). Remembering which 
concepts were bound to which relations is a matter of reconstructing their firing timings relative 
to each other. 
 
This prediction speaks to the third, and most recent tradition of hippocampal models: those that 
take seriously information encoded in oscillatory phase and frequency.  These models attempt 
to explain hippocampal involvement in arranging and replaying input sequences whether the 
dynamics of those input correspond to spatial (McNaughton et al., 2006, Fuhs & Touretzky, 
2006, Burgess, Barry, & O’Keefe 2007, Giocomo et al. 2007, Kropff & Treves 2008), or temporal 
(Hasslemo, Bodelón, & Wyble, 2002) trajectories.  This tradition of modeling has been closely 
tied to findings on theta phase precession.  One unresolved question of these models is whether 
theta precession is a result of oscillatory interference between gamma and theta rhythms 
(O’Keefe & Recce, 1993, Bose, Booth & Recce, 1999, Lengyel, Szatmáry, & Erdi, 2003, Burgess, 
Barry, & O’Keefe 2007, Hasselmo 2008), or a result of sequence read out requiring ever more 
compressed sequences causing initially encoded elements to move retrograde relative to theta 
(Tsodyks et al. 1996, Jeneson & Lisman 1996, Hasselmo and Eichenbaum 2005).  The RMBER 
model highlights possible common ground between these two perspectives.  In RMBER, phase 
precession occurs due to interference between the oscillations of phase sensitive DG cells when 
their firing is collapsed into a single gamma cycle of activity in CA3.  However, since DG phase 
sensitive cells index the position of elements in a sequence (with theta oscillations serving as a 
“carrier wave” for the sequence as a whole), their interference is also a required consequence 
sequence reconstruction.  In essence, RMBER accomplishes sequence reconstruction via a 
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mechanism of oscillatory interference.  Each element in the sequence is encoded within a 
gamma-scale oscillatory waveform, and the interference pattern of the waveforms at the theta-
scale corresponds to the complete sequence.  
 
Functionally, the RMBER model presents a slightly different interpretation for episodic memory 
and other forms of mental construction.  Some previous theories of episodic memory (Tulving, 
1984; Tulving, 2002), stressed the bottom-up, sensorial nature of episodes, and that the unique, 
instance-like nature of such memories came from an encoding of sensory and contextual details.   
This framework explains episodic memory as a recording of sensory experience, and an episode 
as a recalled instance as contrasted with the more general, instance-independent reconstructive 
process of semantic memory.  The RMBER model framework, argues instead that the specific, 
contextually elaborate nature of episodic memories comes from the coherence of their 
reconstruction, and that episodes are not recorded instances, but compressed codes that do not 
themselves contain any sensory details, but only instructions for tuning pre-existing associative, 
and perceptual systems to recover the appropriate sensory details. In this formulation, the 
hippocampally located episodic memory system and the neocortical located semantic or gist-
based memory systems do not act in parallel, but in concert.  The semantic systems are not used 
to “fill in” missing episodic information, for the episodic information was never recorded, and 
does not have gaps.  Rather the semantic systems are the set of brushes and paints employed by 
the hippocampus to compose images that look like previous experience.  The parallels between 
the model’s information processing and image compression techniques (up sampling, 
interpolating filters, and DFT) are not coincidental.  They argue that episodic memory is better 
understood as a top-down reconfiguration of previously learned categorical knowledge, and 
that the only information encoded by the hippocampus is the minimal set of phase and 
frequency coefficients required to recapitulate the appropriate neocortical dynamics.    
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Appendix A 
What impact does “unswapping” swap errors have on performance? 
Though the previous analysis demonstrates that the presence of swaps is associated with poor 
item misplacement performance, the swap-misplacement association may be an artifact of poor 
performance (i.e., swaps are merely a marker of poor performance, and do not specifically cause 
poor item misplacement).  To control for this we created an “unswapping” algorithm that 
substituted the reconstruction-phase coordinates of an item involved in a swap for the 
coordinates of the other item in the pair it was swapped with.  This method retains the general 
spatial properties present in the reconstruction, though it does have difficulty coping with trials 
which contained multiple swaps.  Although amnesic participants still performed worse than 
comparisons after “unswapping” (F(1, 327)=127.62, p<0.00001), unswapping led to a significant 
reduction in item misplacement (a one way ANOVA showed main effect of swaps vs. 
unswapped, F(1, 327)=5.76, p<0.02) (Figure A.1).  
 
However, while dropping data points involved in a swap dramatically improved edge resizing 
(F(1,358)=17.15, p<0.0001), edge deflection (F(1,358)=10.69, p<0.002), and rearrangement 
(F(1,358)=9.65, p<0.003);  unswapping did not (edge resizing F(1,358)0.13, p<0.72), edge 
deflection F(1,358)=0.52, p<0.48), rearrangements F(1,358)=0.28, p<0.6).  This strongly suggests 
that the primary contribution of swapping is to item misplacement, and not to general spatial 
reconstruction.  Since item misplacement is the overwhelmingly most common measure used in 
the literature, these results suggest that previous reports overestimate patients’ impairment in 
spatial reconstruction. 
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Figure A.1 
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Appendix B  
 
Different patterns of binding relationships require different amounts of information h (i.e., 
entropy).  h is related to the number of possible alternative binding configurations, by: 
 
Eq. B.0 
 
 
Where  is the number of possible configurations of binding in a given episode.  For example, if 
there are two possible configurations of a binding, there is exactly 1 bit of entropy required to 
assign that binding.  The number of configurations is determined by a covering mapping 
function that maps the higher-dimensional set of items onto the lower set different set 
according to the type of binding required by the experimental apparatus, and the experimental 
instructions.  Let t be the number of different types of binding. ERT contained three distinct 
types of binding with the following mapping functions:   
 
1-to-1 and onto Mappings  
For mapping a set of elements one-to-one and onto a second set (e.g., mapping three 
backgrounds onto three venues): 
 
Eq. B.1 
 
 
 
Where n is the number of elements in each set.  The number of alternatives is simply the 
number of ways one of the sets can be ordered since this order maps one-to-one and onto the 
second set. 
 
N-to-M mappings 
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Mapping the element of set A onto the elements of set B without allowing for mappings other 
than one to one, and requiring only that all elements in the smaller set be mapped (e.g., 
mapping two faces onto one background). In this case: 
 
Eq. B.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of possible mappings is simply the number of permutations of n chosen m at a 
time.   
 
Unconstrained bindings 
These bindings allow for any number of mappings to be assigned in any way, without requiring 
all of the elements in either set to be used.  In this case: 
 
Eq. B.3 
 
 
 
 
The number of mappings is the number of permutations of n chosen [1,2,3,…m] at a time.  Note 
that the previous two functions are special cases of this one in which k=m and k=m=n. 
 
Entropy of semantic constraints 
 
Since h depends upon n, m, and k, participants’ performance is constrained both by the 
experimental apparatus (i.e., it is impossible to make certain, incorrect responses such as 
binding two scenes to the same venue), and by the task instructions (i.e., participants are 
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informed that certain assignments are incorrect, such as placing two faces in the same socket, 
but are not actually prevented from doing so by the reconstruction program).  Note that the 
former set of constraints is stronger than the latter.  By calculating two values of a, one for 
those constraints required by the experimental apparatus and another for those constraints 
suggested by the task instructions it is possible to calculate , a measure of the amount of 
information provided by task instructions.  
 
Eq. B.4 
 
 
Where  and are the number of possible configurations given the experimental apparatus 
and given the apparatus and instructions respectively.   
 
Correct relational assignment by chance 
Just as the number of configurations is related to which bindings are possible, so is chance 
performance. “Correct” configuration means matching the bindings present in the study time 
configuration, and the probability of a reconstructed relation matching a study time relation by 
chance for any covering (n-to-m and onto) mapping function is: 
 
Eq. B.5a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the function is non-covering, but requires complete assignment of the smaller set: 
 
Eq. B.5b 
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And if the function is unconstrained: 
 
Eq. B.5c 
 
 
This allows us to calculate chance for each category of relation given the number of elements to 
be bound and the relational binding function.  We do this for both the experimental apparatus 
alone, and the experimental apparatus plus experimental instructions: 
Table B.1  Chance Level Performance 
Relation P(chance|apparatus) P(chance|apparatus+instruction) 
Scene-Venue 1/3 1/3 
Scene-Face 1/6 1/3 
Scene-Socket 1/18 1/3 
Scene-Time 1/6 1/3 
Venue-Face 1/6 1/3 
Venue-Socket 1 1/3 
Venue-Time 1/6 1 
Face-Socket 1/18 1/6 
Face-Time 1/6 1/6 
Socket-Time 1/18 1/6 
 
Unsurprisingly, our task instructions provide the most information about relations where chance 
performance is initially low (i.e., we explain the portions of our task which are most confusing or 
difficult).  Note that the task instructions actually lower chance level performance on the Venue-
Socket bindings.  Without instructions, there are 18 possible sockets to which faces can be 
assigned, and these sockets map deterministically to their venue (i.e., are contained by their 
venue); however, the instructions inform participants that in fact, these 18 spatial locations 
actually act as references to only 6 unique spatial sockets (i.e., the top left socket in the first 
venue is the same as the top left socket in the second venue).   This inter-socket relationship is 
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reinforced for participants during the experiment since one face appears in each of the 6 unique 
sockets.  However, this method of coding space causes venue-socket bindings to become 
ambiguous, actually lowering expected performance.  In exchange, there is considerable 
enhancement of other performance estimates related to sockets, since the socket-space is more 
greatly constrained. 
 
Table B.2 Performance above chance 
Relational category Chance performance Observed performance 
Scene-Venue .3333 .71 
Scene-Face .3333 .64 
Scene-Socket .3333 .54 
Scene-Time .3333 .67 
Venue-Face .3333 .79 
Venue-Socket .3333 .59 
Venue-Time 1 .95 
Face-Socket .1666 .45 
Face-Time .1666 .42 
Socket-Time .1666 .40 
 
Using the above calculations, and our empirically observed performance values, we can judge 
how successful participants were at encoding each type of relation by computing their 
performance above chance p according to: 
  
Eq B.6 
 
 
p in this case corresponds to the percentage of relations they correctly reconstructed (for each 
relational type), beyond those which they could be expected to get correct due to chance.  
Relation p 
Scene-Venue 0.625 
Scene-Face 0.475 
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Scene-Socket 0.325 
Scene-Time 0.52 
Venue-Face 0.7 
Venue-Socket 0.4 
Venue-Time N/A* 
Face-Socket 0.304 
Face-Time 0.34 
Socket-Time 0.04 
 
Note: Since Venue is deterministically mapped to time, chance on this dimension if you follow 
the rules should be 1.  This means that p is undefined since it is impossible to perform above 
chance.  However, performance on this metric was not perfect, meaning either that 
participants’ were not following the rules (and thus were acting with a chance level of 1/3) or 
were actually led astray by the information in their episodic memories. 
 
Monte-Carlo sampling provides a superior chance metric 
However, the existence of two different “chance” standards means that any participant 
performance is ambiguous: which chance standard are they using (if any!).  So long as 
performance exceeds the lower of the two bounds, we can’t know if the additional performance 
is due to memory or to using the other standard.  In addition, real data will contain a certain 
amount of noise (in both the chance-level standard, and the participant’s behavior), making 
memory performance a statistical property (i.e., are participants are above chance for 
mnemonic or simply random reasons?).   Additionally, if participants are using particular 
strategies or exhibit biases, their performance might be influenced by fixed memory-
independent effects, properly regarded as “semantic” effects, but captured within the 
“episodic” component of performance.   
 
To avoid this confound, we can use the participants’ own reconstructions as a model of their 
semantic memories.  The reconstruction of the study configuration presented during trial n, and 
a reconstruction of the study configuration presented during trial n-1, differ only due to the 
presentation of the intervening input n and some pattern of random effects.  Thus, if we 
compute the degree of relational overlap between these two reconstructions (as if one was a 
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reconstruction of the other), any overlap can only be due to chance constrained by those 
semantic rules that remained constant between trial n-1 and trial n.  Thus, both the mean and 
variance of reconstruction “performance” computed between two serially appearing 
reconstructions directly corresponds to the semantic component of performance.  These two 
components become our new ai  and aj.   
 
By subtracting this semantic component (trial by trial) from our overall study-reconstruction 
performance value, we can determine the proportion of reconstruction performance that 
exceeds the performance we would expect due to the proper application of the semantic rules 
alone.  Since this informational gain results exclusively from exposure to the study trial, it can be 
loosely thought of as the “episodic” component alone, independent of the baseline semantic 
performance.   
 
This sampling method is especially useful if participants change strategy often or have flexible 
biases, since it adjusts trial-by-trial to match their most recent tendencies present in their 
reconstructions.  
 
Episodic information encoded by relational memory  
 
Since we know which configurations are possible given the parameters of the experiment, and 
how well random assignment should perform, it is possible by observing participants’ 
performance to approximate exactly how much information about the relations they observed 
they have encoded in relational memory.  This is done by inverting Equations 1.5a-c and solving 
for the number of elements  and present in their mental sets.  Using these values of  and  
we can compute  the number of alternative configurations of the subjects actual 
reconstructions as constrained by their relational memory of the study phase bindings, and 
the amount of entropy present in their reconstructions which exceeds  the amount of 
information required to stay within the rules during reconstruction. 
 
Eq. B.7 
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On any given trial,  and  are always integers making calculating a on a trial-by-trial basis 
simple, however, many experiments calculate normative values of performance for 
convenience.  It is still possible to estimate a from normative values of n and m by taking a 
weighted average: 
 
 
 
 
helps answer one thorny memory binding question: are there preferred types of memory 
content (e.g., space, faces, time) irrespective of the entropy captured by that specific type of 
memory content?  For example, there is a lively debate within memory research about 
hippocampal memory.  One theory (hereafter referred to as the “spatial theory”) holds that the 
hippocampus is preferentially involved in spatial processing (e.g.,  O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; 
Maguire et al., 1999; Burgess et al., 2002), because hippocampal lesions disproportionately 
impair performance on a wide array of spatial tasks, and FMRI studies of the hippocampus show 
that it is strongly activated by tasks requiring spatial processing.   Another theory (the “episodic” 
theory), suggests that the hippocampus is important for encoding, rich, experiential, episodic 
memories, and for the ability to mentally “time travel” to these different episodes via a 
powerful reconstructive recall process  (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998; Nadel, Samsonovich, 
Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000; Winocur, Moscovitch, & Bontempi, 2010).  This theory is also well 
supported by evidence, hippocampal amnesics are unable to encode new episodic memories, 
and impaired at recalling old richly detailed memories (Rosenbaum, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 
2001; Sutherland et al., 2001)  or imagining new experiences based on old memories (Hassabis 
et al., 2007).   A third theory (the “relational” theory), argues that the hippocampus is critical for 
encoding and recalling complex or arbitrary relations between items (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 
1997; H Eichenbaum, 2000; Howard Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Konkel, Warren, Duff, Tranel, 
& Cohen, 2008), and is supported by evidence that hippocampal lesions impair performance on 
many kinds of relational tasks (e.g., transitive inference, transverse patterning), and that 
hippocampal activity increases during tasks requiring relational memory. 
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 The analyses presented here provide a method for quantitative falsification of these 
theories.  By computing the entropy required to accurately configure a particular relational 
binding or pattern of bindings, it is possible to precisely quantify complexity.  By measuring how 
much information is embedded in the experimental apparatus and task instructions we can 
compute how semanticized (i.e., constrained by rules which transcend a particular episode), or 
arbitrary (i.e., unconstrained by such rules), a particular binding is.  By computing performance 
on particular trials, we can find how much episodic or relational information and about what 
kind of bindings (object-space, object-time, space-time) participants were able to encode and 
recall.  Each theory makes strong predictions about these data. 
 The spatial theory predicts that hippocampal impairments will preferentially or 
exclusively impact spatial relations, partially sparing rule bound information, and bindings such 
as object-time, and that this impairment will hold regardless of the underlying complexity of 
relations (i.e., a spatial relation which requires configuring a 3-to-3 mapping will proportionally 
more impaired than a non-spatial relation requiring a 6 to 6 mapping).  
 The episodic theory predicts that hippocampal impairments will disproportionally 
impact non-semantic information, and may preferentially impact temporal bindings.   These 
impairments should also hold regardless of relational complexity.   
 The relational theory predicts, that hippocampal impairments should primarily affect 
complex or arbitrary bindings regardless of content type or whether the bindings is constrained 
by semantic or episodic information.  (i.e., 6-to-6 bindings will be harder than 3-to-3).   
 Further, all three theories could prove incorrect.  If, despite extensive evidence to the 
contrary, the hippocampus was secretly an item memory region, and impairment 
disproportionately struck object-space and object-time bindings, it would be possible to 
determine this, and such a finding would argue for the rejection of all three theories. 
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Appendix C 
 
Realignment algorithm 
The realignment algorithm is a recursive parser.  It accepts as arguments a “source” and a 
“target” sequence composed using the grammar outlined in the method sections.  It identifies 
the portion of those two sequences that does not match.  It assumes that these symbols 
constitute a “chunk,” and then applies attempts every transform of the mismatched region that 
does not place any symbol in a location where it began (since we already know that no symbol is 
in the correct location), and does not make any cuts in the chunk.   
 
If the number of symbols is odd, these transforms exactly correspond to the (n-1) ways it is 
possible to rotate the symbols through a circular buffer (i.e., moving the {1…n-1} symbols from 
the end of the sequence to the beginning while preserving their order).  If the number of 
symbols is odd, there are two additional possible transformations, the reflection of the original 
sequence, and the reflection of the sequence rotated by exactly n/2 steps.   
 
Once these transforms have been applied, the algorithm selects the one that maximizes the 
degree of overlap between the source and target, and applies this transform to the source’s 
string of symbols, effectively updating the source to the new, more overlapping sequence.  If 
any symbols remain mismatched the algorithm recurs. 
 
The algorithm produces an operation cost for realignment proportional to the number of 
symbols that were moved by transforms, plus the number of recursions.  This cost is loosely the 
number of “steps” required make the source and target match if one can only move all of the 
mismatched elements as a single chunk.  
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Appendix D: Supplementary Results 
Figure D.1: Reconstruction accuracy by relational type. 
 
 
Figure D.1 shows overall reconstruction accuracy parsed into its semantic and episodic components.  The ten relational types 
were 1) Backgrounds to Venues, 2) Backgrounds to Faces, 3) Backgrounds to Sockets, 4), Background to Times, 5) Venue to Faces, 
6) Venue to Sockets, 7) Venues to Times, 8) Faces to Sockets, 9) Faces to Times, 10) Sockets to Times. 
 
Performance varied by relational complexity and arbitrariness.  Performance on simpler 
relations, such as Background-Venue (a 3-to-3 mapping) was generally higher than that on 
moderate complexity mappings such as Background-Face (3-to-6), and high complexity 
mappings such as Face-Socket (6-to-6).  In addition, semantic performance closely tracked the 
level of chance predicted analytically.  The first relation (Background to Venue) was one to one, 
but had only three elements to map to three elements, giving it an estimated chance level of 
33%, very close to the semantic performance suggests.  The next five relations were all two-to-
one mappings with three and six elements also giving an estimated chance of 33%, again, closely 
approximating the semantic component.  The seventh relation was completely deterministic 
with a 100% estimated chance level performance, again, very closely approximating the 
semantic component.  The final three relations were one to one involving six elements in each 
set, and with estimated chance level of 16.7%, again very closely approximating the semantic 
component.   
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A 2-way group-level ANOVA with one factor of memory component (episodic v. semantic), and 
one of relational type found significant effects of both, and a significant interaction (memory 
component: d.f.=1, F=104.03, P<0.0001; relational type: d.f. =9, F=94.46, P<0.0001; interaction: 
d.f. = 9, F=348.1, P<0.0001).   
 
